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Editorial
This issue of SMT contains seven articles including two review arti-
cles. It is general in content, in contrast to the previous three issues
which were thematic. There is thus no overarching subject bonding
together the various articles in this number. Yet a number of themes
and topics link them together: for example epistemics in Henningsson
and Mæland, and the experiential circumstances in pluralism in Hale,
Mæland, Munga and in both of Henningsson’s articles.
The first article by Jan Henningsson was written in honour of Dr D. W.
Jesudoss, principal of the Gurukul Lutheran Theological College in In-
dia. Basing his reflections on the Book of Job and the Gospel of John,
Henningsson’s subject matter includes discussions of dual notions of
truth (relational contra revelational), the nature of divine discipleship,
and thoughts on the relationship between intuition, science and faith.
In her contribution Veronica Melander focuses on the appropriate-
ness of the term ‘fundamentalism’ to the Guatemalan experience of
civil war during the last thirty years. She defines the term’s applica-
tion in various contexts, beginning with its historical origin in the
United States, and its comparative study through the Chicago funda-
mentalist project. The rule of General Montt in Guatemala, and the
growth of the Verbo Church is at the centre of her article. Another
concern is the work of the Overseas Crusades, a US para-Church
agency, and its goal of making a majority of Guatemalans evangeli-
cal. Melander also describes the political and religious traumas en-
dured by the Indian population in the mountainous Ixil region of the
country and the related process of evangelical conversion.
The next two articles are on African themes. In an earlier issue (SMT,
vol. 86, no. 2, 1998) we published Carl F. Hallencreutz’s review arti-
cle of the published doctoral thesis by Stephen Munga, Beyond the
controversy: a study of African theologies of inculturation and lib-
eration. In this issue Munga presents a variety of conceptual ap-
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proaches to the study of African theology. He then relates these to the
works of several distinguished theologians, such as Harry Sawyerr
and Emmanuel Martey.
In a series of articles, published in SMT and elsewhere, Frederick
Hale has studied the representation of Christianity in Nigerian fic-
tion. (In SMT, vol. 87, no. 1, 1999, we published his analysis of Onuora
Nzekwu’s novel, Blade among the Boys, and its critical portrayal of
the impact of Roman Catholic missionaries in Eastern Nigeria). T.
M. Aluko is arguably, next to Wole Soyinka, the most prominent
English-language novelist from Western Nigeria. Hale describes the
contextual practices of Yoruba Anglicanism and popular
millenarianism as presented in Aluko’s novel, Kinsman and Fore-
man. Not least in Hale’s depiction of cultural and religious conflict in
the novel, is his sharp assessment of the apocalypticism of the Aladura-
like Alasoteles (Band of the Faithful).
Bård Mæland contrasts conceptions of religious plurality from the
writings of John Hick and the possibly less well-known S. Mark Heim.
Although written in Norwegian, we include a substantial English sum-
mary of 2,000 words. The gist of Mæland’s article is his discussion
of opposing inclusivist and exclusivist arguments about religious plu-
rality and pluralism.
Our concluding review articles both focus on Asia. Aasulv Lande
reviews the published doctoral thesis by Sister Katrin Åmell, Con-
templation et dialogue: Quelques examples de dialogue entre
spiritualités aprés le concile Vatican II, on Benedictine inter-reli-
gious dialogue with Zen Buddhism. Last year we published two arti-
cles by Sister Åmell on this subject (see SMT, vol. 87, nos. 1, 2,
1999). Finally, Jan Henningsson reviews three books recently pub-
lished in India. They treat different cases and tensions within the
multiculturalism – ‘one nation, many cultures’ – of the Union of In-
dia. These are namely, individual rights and inter-group inequalities,
Islamic distinctiveness and the problem of uniformity as expressed
through fatwas and the Shariah code, and the relationship of caste
hypergamy to dowry in marital customs.
Editorial
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Faith, Obedience, Understanding and
Liberation: Reflections on Biblical
Epistemology in Honour of
Revd. Dr D. W. Jesudoss, Gurukul
Jan Henningsson
Humankind coming of age
The Bible offers many themes for meditation on what we call
phylogenesis, i.e. the analogy between the historical evolution of a
species – humankind in this case – and the typical maturing of an
individual within that species. The most striking example is the peo-
ple of Israel, who are first like helpless children saved time and again
by God’s instrumental miracles (Exodus). Then, when they inherit
the land and are given a public law to follow, they are more like
primary school pupils (Deuteronomy). Later, when the people begin
to take responsibility for their own lives, they are admonished by
teachers (the prophets), who remind them of the rules and warn them
of their parents’ wrath (Amos). At that point the people resemble
adolescents/high school students, who will sometimes be in need of
words of comfort: “The Lord... will not always accuse, nor will he
harbour his anger for ever” (Ps. 103:9). Finally, having lost under
Roman occupation the external props of an autonomous confessional
society, the people receive confirmation through Jesus’ Sermon on
the Mount that the law is now “writ in their hearts”; they have come
of age. Such a paradigm shift had been adumbrated already during
the Babylonian captivity and foreseen by Ezekiel and Jeremiah. This
“new covenant” implies a society of morally mature persons; no longer
shall there be teachers and students of the Law, but “all shall be God’s
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disciples” (Isaiah 54 cited in John 6, see below!). The human person
– or the religion of humankind – has thus come of age, and Jesus, the
master, can now address his disciples as “friends” (John 15:15).
Any evolutionary biologist or palaeontologist can tell us that the
mental development of humankind spans not merely thousands but
millions of years. But even if we allow for this discrepancy in scale
by a symbolic interpretation of the Biblical story, there are many ob-
jections to be raised against reading a simplistic progression into the
Bible. Such exercises are extremely risky, especially if we expect the
process of development to consistently follow an assumed chronol-
ogy of Biblical texts.
A new covenant – a new mentality?
What, for example, do we make of the wisdom literature included in
the Old Testament? To what extent are Biblical texts emic expres-
sions of the “indigenous” intellectual status of Israel, and to what
extent are they clever borrowings from the advanced élites of other
cultures? Who is the disillusioned “anti-sage” (H-R. Weber) behind
these words:
I have seen all the things that are done under the sun; all of them are
meaningless, a chasing after the wind. [- -] For with much wisdom
comes much sorrow; the more knowledge, the more grief. (Eccles.
1:14, 18).
This teacher himself – as well as tradition – would have us believe
that here is a king (Solomon) speaking. However, we are hard put to
explain the uncanny similarities between Ecclesiastes and the disen-
gagement attitude of early Buddhism and its ideas of quenching the
swabhava in order to break the endless and meaningless process of
pratityasamutpada or samsara. Whether or not we consider these
parallels relevant, for the purposes of our phylogenetic project we
may choose to write off Ecclesiastes as atypical of its time, a lonely
intellectual voicing the disenchantment of a ruling, over privileged
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class with whom few people can ever identify. But what about Job,
the epitome of steadfastness in hardship, but even more the adoles-
cent self-assertion personified?
Listen to the pompous and rather childish power language used by
God when chastising Job at the end of the book: “Will the one who
contends with the Almighty correct him?” (Job 40:2). Is this not a
clear indication that intellectuals in Job’s time (whenever that was)
had already outgrown the all too anthropomorphic images of God
that seem to have prevailed in their milieu? Does not Job emerge as
the more mature dialogue partner, when – apparently trying to hu-
mour the Almighty – he says: “I am unworthy – how can I reply to
you? I put my hand over my mouth” (Job 40:4)?
While analysing the Old Testament texts, we must also reckon with
the possibility that one single book could be the fruit of several gen-
erations. Thus Nathan Söderblom, who was a guarded but firm evo-
lutionist, found a stylistic and psychological leap within the Book of
Psalms: “Yet I am always with you; you hold me by my right hand”
(Ps. 73:23).1
Thus it is clear that we cannot apply a phylogenetic perspective to
the New Testament which, like the Qur’an, has the limitation of re-
flecting the experience of only one or two generations unless it be in
continuity with the Old Testament and intertestamental literature. On
the other hand the New Testament is a multifaceted mirror of its time.
We encounter in it a range of philosophical reflections on the human
condition, quite similar to but not necessarily more advanced than
that of the Old Testament wisdom books. We must therefore ask
whether it is meaningful to locate the breakthrough of a new mental-
ity (as implied in the prophetic texts about a new covenant) to the
New Testament era.
1 Söderblom 1931.
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Paul is perhaps the clearest exponent of the intellectual dilemma of
an introspective mind. The moral implications of the new covenant
present him with almost insuperable difficulties: now that we have
become liberated from the destructive aspects of legalism, would we
not be expected to display deeper insight, greater capacity for good-
ness? And yet “I do not understand what I do. For what I want to do
I do not do, but what I hate I do” (Rom. 7:15). It would seem that
Socrates’ injunction “know thyself” was still valid in Paul’s time.
The process of achieving moral autonomy did not come to an end
with Paul and the other apostles, and the struggle between the con-
scious and the unconscious within the human psyche was to continue
throughout history. We may indeed regard the discoveries of modern
psychology and other behavioural sciences as signalling the next leap
towards an emancipating self-understanding.
Biblical epistemologies
Having received all these initial warnings, however, we shall tackle
the theme of epistemology, which, – although not directly
phylogenetic, is nevertheless related to the intellectual and moral
development of individuals and their societies. The Bible offers a
whole spectrum of different attitudes to the concepts of knowledge
and truth: there is credulity and scepticism, there is passionate curi-
osity and quiet contemplation, ideologisation and mysticism, and –
above all – two fundamentally different notions about the nature of
“truth”: the Hellenic and the Semitic. We shall approach our theme
through the following verses from the Gospel of John:
To the Jews who had believed him, Jesus said, “If you hold to my
teaching, you are really my disciples. Then you will know the truth,
and the truth shall set you free.” (John 8:31-32, NIV, 1984)2
The progression of thoughts in Jesus’ own words lays out the order
of things for us. Thus we may tentatively say that in these verses (and
2 Note that alethous, “really” in v. 31, could be rendered as “truly”.
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parallel texts such as John 7:17) faith precedes obedience, obedience
paves the way for understanding, and understanding opens the gates of
liberation. Thus stated, the scheme may seem rather too static. It does
not preclude, however, oscillation and interaction between the differ-
ent stages. Here we shall concentrate upon the concepts of truth and
obedience, leaving aside the complex issues of faith and liberation.
Truth as revelation and relation
A helpful prolegomenon is to look at Biblical terms for “truth”. The Greek
word in John 8 – and often elsewhere in the New Testament – is alétheia
(αληθεια), “that which is not hidden, that which is obvious”. Such an
understanding of truth seems to emerge from a rationalist milieu, such as
we would expect from the philosophical tradition of Greece: truth is some-
thing we can know, presumably with our intellectual faculties.3
But the Semitic tradition, as evidenced by Hebrew, Aramaic and Ara-
bic sources, takes a different approach. Here the words for “truth”
have to do with reliability, constancy, fidelity. For example, the origi-
nal meaning of the Arabic sidq – like the Hebrew tsädäq – is “that
which never fails” (e.g. a reliable source of water). Another Biblical
term, common in the Psalms, is ämät, which has a connotation of
“fidelity”.4 In Kabbalistic literature this term plays an important role:
“[yesod] projected onto the ethical plane becomes the virtue of truth
(ämäth) the dividing line between all directions of moral experience”.5
If the Semitic notion of truth is relational, whereas the Greek is
epistemic, how are we to understand New Testament passages about
“truth”? After all, Jesus spoke Aramaic, a Semitic language (akin to
the present-day Syriac dialect still spoken in Ma’lula). It might seem
that the Greek rendering of His words as in the Gospel of John would
3 Apparently this Greek word belongs to a rich semantic field along with concepts
such as apókryphon, “hidden”, apokálypsis “revelation” and epifáneia, “appearing”.
4 See Pss. 25:5, 26:3, 30:10.
5 Rojtman and Rendall 1998, p. 76.
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not convey the connotations that must have been present among His
Jewish contemporaries. But this problem, familiar to Bible transla-
tors of all times, is partly solved by the very context of the Gospels
and the contents of Jesus’ teaching.
First of all, Jesus talks about Himself as “the Truth”, and to identify
“the Truth” with a person is surely a relational definition, regardless
of the ethnic language used. (We may recall that in Islamic tradition
one of Allah’s ninety-nine names is precisely “the Truth”, al-Haqq, a
word with the additional connotations of “justice” and “reality”.)
Secondly, in John 8:36 Jesus says, “If the Son sets you free, you will be
free indeed”, a statement which read together with other verses from
John suggests that “the Truth” in 8:32 is a synonym for Jesus. Thus the
dynamics of liberation in Chapters seven and eight appear solidly based
in a Semitic understanding of truth as “trustworthiness in relationships”
(ämät). In order for humankind to proceed to the “epistemic” dimen-
sion mutual confidence must be built, in this case by honouring the
covenant with God. Only then can secrets be divulged and vital knowl-
edge shared, so that we can judge for ourselves whether our partner is
“truthful” according to our intellectual criteria.
Teachers and disciples
What is implied in Jesus’ words “you are really my disciples” (John
8:31)? To be a disciple is obviously to recognise someone as a teacher,
to learn from that person and sometimes – although it may seem out-
moded – to follow and obey him or her. Discipleship is thus the atti-
tude to accept actively the fact that someone else can show and teach
me things I would not otherwise find. Therefore the concept of disci-
pleship is inextricably linked with the authority and legitimacy of the
teacher, a relationship clearly indicated by the corresponding words
in many languages, e.g. Chinese, Kiswahili and Swedish.6
6 Kiswahili mitume, “disciple, the one who is sent for teaching outside the village”;
Swedish lärjunge, “a young learner”.
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A revealing illustration is the Jewish term talmûd, “teaching”, which
is related to the word for “disciple” in Biblical Hebrew; its etymol-
ogy provides an amusing background. In the Old Testament we find
limmûdîm, “disciples”, only in the plural form. The root is lamed,
which means “a sharp pole with which the farmers poke their oxen”
(cf. the shape of the Hebrew letter with the same name!). Thus limmûd
literally means “someone who has been poked repeatedly”. Many
teachers today – as of yore – may occasionally feel they are facing
just that: an inert flock of creatures, reluctant to move if not pro-
voked. A stark contrast is the usual Arab-Islamic word for student,
tâlib li-l ‘ilm, which literally means “someone who demands knowl-
edge”. Such a person would surely be the dream of many a worn-out
teacher despairing of igniting some motivation in his students!
Who are God’s disciples?
In John 6:45 Jesus says: “All shall be God’s disciples”, Kai esontai
pantes didaktoi Theo. These words refer back to Isaiah and anticipate
1 Thess. 4:9, where Paul uses the composite term Theodidaktoi.7 Isaiah
54:13 provides this important clue: Ve kôl banayk limmûdê Yahweh ve
râv sh’lôm banayk, “All your children shall be God’s disciples and
great shall be their peace”. This verse from Isaiah answers a question
of great religio-political significance: Whose disciples shall we be, from
whom shall we get our knowledge? Isaiah introduces the idea of com-
mon (non-discriminatory, inclusive, exoteric) discipleship, a concept
parallel to “the priesthood of all believers”. It may be understood as a
protest against the Levites. It may also – in a deeper sense – be seen as
analogous to the prophecy in Jeremiah 31:34: “No longer shall they
teach one another, or say to each other, “Know the Lord” for they shall
all know me, from the least of them to the greatest.”8
7 In the New Testament we find two words: didaktoi and mathetes. See e.g. the
passage on discipleship in Luke 14:25 ff., where mathetes is used in verses 26-27.
8 Cf. Ezekiel 36:26 f. and Ps. 51:10 f.
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We seem to have before us a kind of intellectual revolution, or at
least a new kind of self-assertion reminiscent of student unrest at
Western university campuses in 1968, from San Francisco and Harvard
to Paris and Berlin. Job gives us the clue, when he confronts the three
wise men who have come to admonish and instruct him in the man-
ner of superior people: “I have a mind as well as you” (12:3). Job
argues that wisdom and knowledge are accessible to all:
Does not the ear test words as the tongue tastes food? Is not wisdom
found among the aged? Does not long life bring understanding?
(12:11-12)
My eyes have seen all this, my ears have heard and understood it.
What you know I also know; I am not inferior to you. (13:1-2)
The prominent idea in all these texts is what Jesus himself brought
out, namely that before God there is no hierarchy. Instead, by send-
ing Jesus, God introduces the sacrament of friendship, a communion
which cuts right through all barriers of language, ethnicity, clan, caste,
class and profession. But there is also, cloaked in Job’s discourse
with the sages, a liberative dimension, the sense of freedom which
springs from the confidence of an intimate relationship with God.
This is what the author of Psalm 73 felt and what Jesus openly talked
about, and it may be that Job had already experienced it in his heart,
although the religious censorship of his time necessitated an infantile
regression at the end of the book: “I despise myself and repent in dust
and ashes” (42:6).
Hear, obey – and learn
In the Arabian Nights, we sometimes encounter the expression “To
hear is to obey” (Arabic: al-sam’u wa- l-tâ’atu), usually uttered in re-
sponse to a royal command or the like. According to some
psychohistorians such formulae are mental relics from a distant past,
when – with a few exceptions – our brains were not able to narrate or to
plan actions autonomously. Rather, we would have responded imme-
diately and uncritically to imperative voices emerging from within our
own minds, but perceived to be of divine origin. This idea has even
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been used to explain prophetic outbursts as a general religious phe-
nomenon, as well as particular incidents like the attack on aberrant
prophets in Zechariah 13. Thus the American psychologist Julian
Jaynes talks about “bicameral people”.9 The Book of Job shows us
how far from such primitive, instinctive mental behaviour human-
kind had come, already long before the New Testament. Indeed, the
very concept of morality presupposes autonomous, premeditated ac-
tions for which a self-aware person can be held accountable.
In John 8:31 Jesus is addressing “the Jews who had believed in him”;
i.e. the fact of faith was already established. Jesus instructs these
believers to hold to His teaching so that they may know the truth.10
Independent-minded scholars may find it hard to agree that any stu-
dent should follow any teacher uncritically. Is there no room for criti-
cal distance in our imitatio Christi? Can we not combine wholehearted
devotion with reflected obedience, or even “critical solidarity” (to
use an expression of Dorothee Sölle)? If we are all to be God’s disci-
ples, does any spiritual authority actually remain on earth?
Jesus’ own words imply that He is not to be regarded as a wisdom
teacher although there have been some latter-day suggestions to that
effect by Jews, Muslims and Buddhists. To be sure, Jesus employs
pedagogy and psychological insights at least as skilfully as Socrates,
His sermons are more forceful, less repetitive and more directly to
the point than those by Gautama Buddha. But a guru Jesus is not,
although His disciples sometimes call Him rabbi (John 4:31). From
this particular didactic perspective a closer analogy would be what
the Qur’an calls “a beautiful pattern” (Arabic: uswa hasana;
XXXIII:21). Indeed, if Jesus identifies Himself as “the Truth”, there
is little space for critical questions – although that might not deter a
contemporary Job!
9 Jaynes 1982.
10 The words “you will know the truth” (gnousesthe ten aletheian) must be explored
in the light of the Semitic connotation of truth as a (personalised) relationship.
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At the same time, we must note that there are many ways to follow
Christ. Martin Buber, the greatest Jewish mystic of the twentieth cen-
tury, recounts an instructive legend.11 There was a zaddiq, a Jewish
teacher, who sent his disciples to meet and follow other teachers.
Two of the young disciples came to an old, wise zaddiq, who ordered
them to pray in a certain way, with which they were not familiar.
Confused by this different approach they told him: “Our zaddiq did
not teach us this way!” The old zaddiq replied calmly: “What kind of
God is it that can be served only in one way? There are several ways,
which all lead to God. Indeed, there is a way for every human being.”
Religious obedience or self-imposed restrictions?
In that vein, let us turn to the thorny issue of faith and reason, or
religion and science. On the basis of the above verses from John, we
may restate it as the question of right obedience in scientific work.
The Nobel laureate Steven Weinberg, a particle physicist, comes from
a Jewish background but is hardly known for his religious fervour.
Yet in the following passage he sounds like a rabbi defending the
institution of law:
I do not believe that scientific progress is always best advanced by
keeping an altogether open mind. It is often necessary to forget one’s
doubts and to follow the consequences of one’s assumptions wherever
they may lead – the great thing is not to be free of theoretical preju-
dices, but to have the right theoretical prejudices. And always, the test
of any theoretical preconception is in where it leads. The standard
model of the early universe has scored some successes, and it provides
a theoretical framework for future experimental programs. This does
not mean that it is correct but it deserves to be taken seriously.12
Is it not paradoxical that a scientist should speak of “right prejudice”?
The dramatic history of interaction between faith and science is filled
with examples of anathema, of powerful religious authorities declar-
ing inquisitive minds to be heretical and lacking in obedience. Of
11 Buber 1960.
12 Weinberg 1977, quoted in Rohlf 1994, p. 565.
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course, if we generalise Weinberg’s argument by changing the adjec-
tive “theoretical” to “mental” prejudice, it sounds much less contro-
versial. Even on less advanced levels than theoretical physics, the
human mind needs a skeleton of ideas, or some kind of map, in order
to make progress. We need not go into the classical issues of heredi-
tary sin or the human mind as a tabula rasa, for by now the cognitive
sciences have shown us that our brains are pre-programmed in many
ways, including the instinct to learn – and if necessary re-learn –
natural languages.13
Intuition, method and courage
There are other compelling reasons to recognise that pre-conception
is indispensable: for every human person to start from scratch (if at
all conceivable) would be a huge waste of biological energy. For the
individual it is no less than a matter of survival, for the community it
is the cornerstone of social stability and coherence, if not progress.
This, then, seems to be one function of religious traditions: to pro-
vide a heritage on which we can feed initially, if only to discard it
later. For it appears that every step towards social change or scien-
tific progress entails a more or less dramatic break with current preju-
dice, i.e. what we may call tradition. European scholars have devel-
oped different models to describe and analyse that process: Michel
Foucault talks about a reorganisation of the shared mental universe
which he calls “the archive”14; Thomas Kuhn talks about “paradigm
shifts” as a key to the structure of scientific revolutions.15 In the 1990’s,
H. Floris Cohen has taken upon himself to show why not all societies
are able to sustain such revolutions.16
As in our reflection on the Biblical personalities above, we can dis-
cern connections between confidence and liberation, fidelity and free-
13 See Steven Pinker The language instinct.
14 Foucault 1976.
15 Kuhn 1970.
16 Cohen 1994.
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dom, tradition and innovation, love and rebellion. Weinberg is not
talking about eternal truths or sacred values but about the relative
merits of a certain line of thought, a trodden path, if you wish. His
own experience included the great triumph of a Nobel prize, shared
with two other physicists, Abdus Salam and Sheldon Glashow.
Weinberg makes the observation that there are times when we must
make a choice. It is like standing at a crossroads: we simply cannot
walk in four directions at the same time, just as a disciple cannot
faithfully follow more than one guru. It is also a question of how best
to use the limited resources of time and energy in a human life: to
concentrate them or to spread them thinly. But the fateful moment of
choice demands more than knowledge, experience and intuition. What
exactly does it require?
This question leads us on to a less obvious implication in Weinberg’s
words. It has to do with epistemology, the very nature of scientific
thought, namely the insight that science needs faith, i.e. the ability to
postpone judgement. In the following passage Donald Bruce, a Brit-
ish nuclear scientist, displays an almost religious adherence to the
principle of law and order in creation:
In my Ph.D. research I found an odd result. Whenever I did a certain
chemical reaction it produced completely different products from
what Australian scientists had reported from the same experiment.
According to the strict scientific data, I should have concluded that
chemical laws differed between Leicester and Melbourne. Against
the experimental difference, I believed in the consistency of scien-
tific laws and expected some hidden explanation. Years later, a chance
conversation led me to a possible answer. Till then, all I had to go on
was what a Christian would call faith.17
It may never be possible to analyse that delicate mixture of intuition,
methodology and courage that pave the way to scientific discoveries.
Let it remain God’s secret, like the gifts of artistic creativity, faith
and prophethood.
17 D. Bruce in IBRA 1998, p. 249.
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Introduction
At the end of 1996, the Guatemalan peace accords, signed by the
government and the united guerrilla front URNG, ended thirty-six
years of civil war. The precipitating crisis had its origin in the ouster
of a democratically elected government in a coup d’état supported by
the United States in 1954. In the war that followed, religious forces
became inextricably involved, both in support of the status quo and
in the promotion of reformist and revolutionary changes.
During the 1970s and 1980s evangelical growth in Guatemala was
more dramatic than in any other Latin American country. In 1970
only a small percentage of the population was Protestant, while the
number rose to between twenty-five and thirty per cent by 1990. In
Guatemala the terms ‘fundamentalism’ or ‘fundamentalist sects’ fre-
quently have been used in popular language as well as within the
Catholic Church and by researchers as labels for conservative evan-
gelical groups, which explicitly or implicitly supported right-wing
politics and the Guatemalan army during the civil war.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss some of the problems which
arise when the term ‘fundamentalism’ is removed from its original
context in the United States and applied in an inclusive sense to mili-
tant religious movements around the world, including Guatemala.
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The problem concerns some of the evangelical groups that supported
the policy of the United States and the Guatemalan army during the
violent years. In what sense can they be called fundamentalists? Does
it make any sense to label them fundamentalists at all?
Three concrete examples from Guatemala will be discussed. They are
the Verbo Church in which the ex-dictator General Efraín Ríos Montt
is a member, the paraecclesial agency Overseas Crusades, which
planned to make fifty per cent of the Guatemalan population evangeli-
cal by 1990, and the massive conversion to evangelical Churches by
members of the indigenous Mayan group Ixil in a region where the
conflict between the guerrilla front EGP and the Guatemalan army
was very intense. Before turning to Guatemala, this study will explore
some facts concerning the origin of the term ‘fundamentalism’ and
scholarly discussion on the extended use of ‘fundamentalism.’
Material and conclusions concerning Guatemala come from my doc-
toral dissertation, which was presented to the Faculty of Theology at
Uppsala University in May 1998. The present paper has a different
focus however. The dissertation does not highlight the use of the term
‘fundamentalism’ but instead concerns a movement within Protes-
tant evangelicalism which I call ‘Political Evangelicalism’ and its
relationship to the counterinsurgency war, which the Guatemalan
military waged against guerrillas, political opposition, and the Mayan
majority. It is a chronological study describing the role and develop-
ment of Political Evangelicalism in Guatemala between 1976 and
1990. Problems involving the term ‘fundamentalism’ formed part of
the background that led me to search for the term ‘Political Evangeli-
calism.’ I will return to this issue at the end of the paper.
The origin of the term ‘fundamentalism’
The conflict within US Protestantism, which has been labelled ‘the
liberal-fundamentalist controversy,’ started in the 1870s and reached
its height in the 1920s. American Protestant liberalism included a
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positive view of human nature and human prospects, a legacy of the
Enlightenment. Liberals were also characterised by optimism, anti-
formalism (implying the questioning of religious creeds and institu-
tions), an emphasis on social ethics, and a belief in the immanence of
God and anti-sectarianism. Finally, of course, liberalism was con-
nected with higher criticism of the Bible. From the turn of the cen-
tury, US Protestant liberalism was clearly marked by modernism,
including a sympathetic attitude towards secular culture and the idea
of adaptation to modern society.
The conservative opposition defended what they considered to be
traditional Protestant faith, but which in reality frequently turned out
to be North American premillennialist revivalism stemming from the
nineteenth century. Conservatives defended the inerrancy of the Bi-
ble, advocated creationism and concomitantly took a stand against
biological evolution, and opposed the optimistic liberal views of hu-
man progress. Civilisation would not improve by human efforts, but
Christ would return to set up a millennial kingdom. In 1919, the
World’s Christian Fundamentals Association was founded to support
the conservative fight against liberal views within the Protestant
Churches. The term came from a series of booklets called The Fun-
damentals, which were published between 1910 and 1915 to defend
certain doctrines that the liberals challenged. From 1920, the term
‘fundamentalism’ was used generally to describe the coalition of con-
servative Protestants who tried to preserve nineteenth-century Prot-
estant revivalism and purge the Churches of liberals.
The liberal-fundamentalist controversy was a struggle within the US
Protestant mainstream which affected mainly White Baptist and Pres-
byterian Churches. The Pentecostal movement, which was born at the
beginning of the century, shared many of the beliefs of the fundamen-
talists but was not involved in this battle. Pentecostals had their em-
phasis on experience and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Many fundamen-
talists did not accept them. They were suspicious of charismatic gifts
and did accept experience only if it could be confirmed by a literal
interpretation of the Bible. Consequently, US Church historians usu-
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ally do not view Pentecostal and other charismatic Churches as funda-
mentalist, even if they share some of the fundamentalist doctrines.
Except in the South the liberals won the contest, and many funda-
mentalists left the old Baptist and Presbyterian congregations to es-
tablish their own Churches. Protestant liberalism in the form it was
attacked by fundamentalists barely survived the depression of 1929,
however, mainly because of self-criticism. But modern biblical criti-
cism and the anti-formalism of the liberals remained dominant trends
within the US Protestant mainstream.
In US academic Church history the term ‘fundamentalism’ usually
has been reserved for the aggressive defence of the above-mentioned
conservative beliefs. An irenic defence of those beliefs it not suffi-
cient for being classified as ‘fundamentalism.’ To qualify as a ‘fun-
damentalist,’ the previously indicated conservative doctrines plus an
exclusive, anti-pluralist and sectarian attitude are necessary. A fun-
damentalist does not recognise people with other opinions as Chris-
tians and cannot bear to have them in the Church. But certainly dis-
tinctions vary. The term ‘fundamentalism’ frequently simply means
belief in the inerrancy of the Bible, both in academic and popular
language. On the other hand, ‘fundamentalism’ is also used to sig-
nify an exclusive, anti-pluralist and sectarian attitude, even when ‘fun-
damentalist’ doctrine is not present.
Some examples from the scholarly discussion about the
extended use of the term fundamentalism
The rise of fundamentalism in US political life during the latter half
of the 1970s was a surprise for all who thought that fundamentalism
never would recover from its defeat in the twenties and thirties. The
new rise was expressed above all in Jerry Falwell’s Moral Majority.
The conservative religious coalition (the New Religious Political
Right), which mobilised religious people in support of Ronald Reagan,
was not exclusively fundamentalist, however, because it included also
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Protestant charismatics, Catholics, Mormons, and Jews. The language
of this coalition basically came from the US Protestant tradition but
was inclusive enough not to exclude Catholics and Jews.
As is well-known, the term ‘fundamentalism’ since the 1980s has been
used by both researchers and journalists in descriptions and analyses
of the global emergence of politically aggressive and militant, if not
necessarily armed, religious movements that challenge the secular state
or secularism as an ideology. ‘Fundamentalism’ has been removed from
its original context, the fundamentalist-liberal controversy within North
American Protestantism, to be applied to movements in other religious
traditions that seem to demonstrate similarities.
The most comprehensive study of what is called ‘fundamentalism’
has been made by the Chicago fundamentalist project, directed by
Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby. The results have been pub-
lished in a long array of books and articles, including six volumes
containing case studies from different religions around the world,
which are compared and analyzed. Evangelicalism in Latin America,
especially in Guatemala, is included as well as Christian fundamen-
talism in the United States.1
The Chicago fundamentalist project, as expressed in the six volume
series, has a broad purpose and includes the whole socio-economic
and cultural arena. The study deals with ‘modern religious funda-
mentalism,’ which is defined as resistance to modernity. It is empha-
sised that in spite of this fact the movements studied are themselves
modern movements. They do not resist parts of modernity that are
instrumental to their own purposes, like technology and mass media.
The project also includes what are called ‘fundamentalist-like’ move-
ments and leaves the issue of definition rather open to the different
authors of the case studies.
1 M. E. Marty and R. S. Appleby (eds.) 1991, 1993a, 1993b, 1994, and 1995. Number
six has not been available to the author.
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In the first Chicago project Latin American case study, Pablo Deiros
investigates the fundamentalist impulse in both indigenous Churches
and in the ones planted by foreign missions. This impulse influences
also some Churches that otherwise might be called evangelical or
Pentecostal. What characterises the fundamentalist impulse is its le-
galistic morality, “a fervid and exclusionary emotionalism,” and sym-
pathy for the political right.2 According to Deiros, Latin American
fundamentalism is a product both of North American missionaries
and indigenous forces.3
The Latin American case studies in the Chicago project demonstrate
widely different views on the nature of fundamentalism, and some-
times the term is not even mentioned. In the concluding chapters of the
fifth volume, in which Guatemalan fundamentalism is compared with
fundamentalist movements in other parts of the world, the Guatemalan
phenomenon is sometimes called ‘Pentecostal’ and sometimes ‘Prot-
estant.’ This rather loosely defined entity is compared with, for in-
stance, the Algerian FIS, Gaza Hamas, Gush Emunim, analogous move-
ments within Hinduism, and so on, which are empirically recognisable
entities. The comparisons illustrate the problems involved with the use
of the term ‘fundamentalism’ on the international level. This fact is
also discussed by some of the authors involved in the Chicago project.
One of them is Mark Juergensmeyer, who discusses problems con-
cerning ‘anti-fundamentalism,’ a fear of fundamentalism, which in
some cases has resulted in the same kind of human rights violations
as fundamentalism. Juergensmeyer maintains that it is possible to
use the term ‘fundamentalism’ in an academic context but is dis-
turbed by the pejorative resonance and thinks that it is problematic to
use it in a non-Western context.4 From a Jewish perspective, Jay Harris
2 P.A. Deiros 1991:152.
3 P.A. Deiros 1991. The other Latin American case studies included in the Chicago
fundamentalist project are: J. E. Maldonado 1993; S. Rose and Q. Schultze 1993;
D. Stoll 1994; and D. H. Levine 1995. All of them focus on Protestantism, except
the last one, which also includes Catholicism.
4 M. Juergensmeyer 1995.
Veronica Melander
199
has criticised the extended use of the term ‘fundamentalism’ in a note-
worthy article in another comparative fundamentalist study. Accord-
ing to him, one problem with the term is that it is usually used as a label
for movements that are against ‘modernity,’ a largely meaningless con-
struct in his view. When ‘fundamentalism’ is discussed, ‘modernity’
usually implies everything that is good in society seen from a secular
North American perspective. Harris also points out that resistance to
modernity in fundamentalist studies frequently is connected to anti-
pluralism, despite the fact that the emergence of modernity in Europe
not was connected to pluralism.5 His criticism is well argued.
Also in the volume Questioning the Secular State: The Worldwide
Resurgence of Religion in Politics, edited by David Westerlund, the
problems with the term ‘fundamentalism,’ when applied to supposed
resistance movements to modernity, are discussed.6 The movements
that usually are included in ‘fundamentalism’ are not against moder-
nity as such, but against secular modernity or modernism. Conse-
quently the term ‘anti-secularism’ is used in this volume as a pre-
ferred alternative instead of fundamentalism. In the included case
study of Guatemala, Virginia Garrard-Burnett interprets the growing
influence of both evangelicalism and Catholicism in Guatemala within
a framework of resacralisation.7
In 1993, an issue of the Spanish Jesuit periodical Estudios
Eclesiasticos was dedicated to a comparative study on ‘fundamental-
ism,’ including Islam, Judaism, Catholicism and Protestantism.8 Also
here ‘fundamentalism’ is seen as resistance to modernity, but the ap-
proach is more inclusive, discussing ‘fundamentalism’ as a psycho-
logical attitude which is not necessarily religious. In the following
study of Guatemala I shall call fundamentalism in the traditional US
sense ‘Fundamentalism (1)’ and fundamentalism as resistance to
modernity ‘Fundamentalism (2)’.
5 J. M. Harris 1994.
6 D. Westerlund (ed.) 1996.
7 V. Garrard-Burnett 1996.
8 Estudios Eclesiasticos April–June 1993.
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The Verbo Church and General Efraín Ríos Montt
The growing socio-economic crisis in Guatemala during the 1970s led
to increased popular demands for structural changes. The army re-
sponded with repression leading to a political crisis and then to a revo-
lutionary crisis by 1980. These events coincided with a mobilisation
for a Republican election victory in the United States, in which the
New Religious Political Right played a prominent role. After coming
to power, the Reagan administration tried to convince Congress to re-
voke the ban on arms sales and military aid to Guatemala that Presi-
dent Carter had implemented in 1977 because of human rights abuses.
In the wake of these efforts, General Efraín Ríos Montt became presi-
dent in an attempt by the Guatemalan army to bolster the political sys-
tem. Whatever the US involvement, which remains obscure, may have
been, the Ríos Montt coup came at a very suitable time for the United
States so that relations between the two countries could improve and
Guatemala be brought into regional military co-operation.
Ríos Montt was the first Protestant president of Guatemala. During
his time in power from March 1982 to August 1983, he preached
about conversion to God and moral strengthening. Evangelicalism
was used in the United States for acquiring financial support for Ríos
Montt, on the Guatemalan national level for generating public con-
sent, and in the counterinsurgency war on the local level for winning
the loyalty of the population. The death toll during Ríos Montt’s short
stay in power was approximately 16,000 people, most of whom were
Mayas killed in the counterinsurgency war at the countryside.
Ríos Montt was born a Catholic but entered the Verbo Church in 1978.
Apparently, disappointments concerning his military and political ca-
reer created a great trauma for him and led him to a conversion experi-
ence. Ríos Montt’s conversion to evangelicalism was not a factor in
the military’s election of him as president in 1982, however. Those
involved in the coup did not know that he was active in the Verbo
Church and were not prepared for his public use of religion.
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During his time in power Ríos Montt appeared every Sunday evening
on national television, speaking to the Guatemalan people. Usually
he talked about issues that were not controversial from a confessional
point of view, for instance, family life, good health, and civic duty.
He seldom mentioned explicit evangelical beliefs. Apparently he did
not want to cause unnecessary confrontation in a country with a
majority of Catholics.
The principal message in the sermon-like speeches of Ríos Montt was
that the causes of social ills were inside the individual human being,
not in bad institutions. Guatemala would not be liberated by a revolu-
tion against oppressive structures but rather by a revolution within the
hearts of the people. According to Ríos Montt, poverty and civil strife
were moral problems to be solved only by a moral reformation.
When Ríos Montt became president, the Verbo Church entered the
public spotlight. Before that time few knew about the existence of
that Church or about Ríos Montt’s conversion. The Verbo Church
was established by Gospel Outreach, an offshoot of the charismatic
revival in the United States. Gospel Outreach was founded in 1970
by Jim Durkin, a former Assemblies of God pastor. Jim Durkin had a
premillenarian worldview, believing that the second coming of Christ
would soon occur, but thought that Christ would not return before
more people in the world became Christians. This was the motive for
sending missionaries. After the earthquake in Guatemala in February
1976, Gospel Outreach decided to send a missionary team to this
country to give assistance in reconstruction work and at the same
time establish a Church, which got the name Iglesia Cristiana Verbo.
Labels like fundamentalist, charismatic, and neo-Pentecostal have
been applied by researchers and journalists to the Verbo Church. All
of those terms have some relevance. Verbo is fundamentalist in the
traditional US sense. The Church aggressively defends ‘fundamen-
talist’ doctrine. Members who cannot live up to doctrinal and ethical
standards are excommunicated, and other members are forbidden to
have any contact with them.
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The Verbo Church may be labelled charismatic or neo-Pentecostal
because, as indicated, it is an offshoot of the charismatic revival of
the 1960s and 1970s. It places an emphasis on gifts of the Spirit and
is more open to charismatic movements within mainstream Churches
and the Catholic Church than to the evangelical community gener-
ally. In fact, an Episcopalian charismatic movement was among
Verbo’s closest co-operators in the 1980s. Arturo Fernandez, the priest
who led the movement, was forced to leave the Episcopal Church in
Guatemala. Later his community joined Verbo, and he became an
elder in it. Many other members of Verbo have their background in
the Catholic charismatic movement.
As in other Guatemalan neo-Pentecostal Churches, prosperity theol-
ogy is taught in the Verbo Church: When a person turns to God, he or
she will be blessed with prosperity, good fortune, and health in earthly
life. The same is relevant for a country: When a nation turns to God it
will prosper. Guatemala’s economic and political problems conse-
quently have a spiritual solution. The Verbo Church is not, however,
at all representative of neo-Pentecostal Churches in Guatemala con-
cerning other issues. It is a lot more closed and exclusive than most
others. Orthodoxy in doctrine is more important than quantitative
growth. Many members of other neo-Pentecostal Churches consider
Verbo to be too conservative and rigid.
The Verbo leaders believed Guatemala was involved in a spiritual
battle. In Ríos Montt’s Guatemala the forces of God had authority in
the heavens, but the forces of Satan tried to recapture the heavenly
throne. The only thing that could stop Satan was Christian prayer.
The Christians in Guatemala therefore had to be prayer warriors: “We
pray for Efraín Ríos Montt, for the Christians who are together with
him, and we pray that all forces that oppose the will of God not will
get the advantage.”9
9 J. Durkin, May 1, 1983:3.
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The opponents of Ríos Montt were seen as not only political adver-
saries, but also as diabolic. As said by a Verbo pastor: ‘The army
doesn’t massacre the Indians. It massacres demons, and the Indians
are demon possessed; they are communists.’10 The army did not mas-
sacre Indians, according to this pastor, but the problem was that de-
mons were located inside the Indians, which was why the Indians
died, when the army massacred those demons.
This kind of theology was not unique for the Verbo Church. A related
view was expressed for example by the neo-Pentecostal leader Johnny
Carrette, a Guatemalan-born US citizen who owns the well-known
Pan-American Hotel in the centre of Guatemala City. Carrette ex-
plained to the author that before Columbus America was governed
by Satan. Because Satan has had control for hundreds of years, he
struggles to keep his power despite the fact that the real king, Jesus,
has come to Central America. According to Carrette, the Mayas of
the ruined city of Tikal (found in the Guatemalan jungle in the nine-
teenth century) ceased to exist because they served the king of Death.
The Mayas are thus thought to be satanic, not worthy of life.
These views are not unique to Guatemala. The same kind of theology
is reported from different countries around the world. One case is
Sweden, where some evangelicals interpreted the murder of Olof
Palme in apocalyptic terms: The former prime minister was killed
because he hindered the plan of God, mainly because of his contacts
with Yassir Arafat.11 According to this kind of theology, those who
stand in the way of God’s plans are annihilated. God can even use
persons who are neither on his side nor conscious of the role they are
playing in the plan of God.
10 S. Diamond 1989:166. She refers to Sectas y religiosidad en America Latina,
published by the Instituto Latinoamericano de Estudios Transnacionales, Santiago,
Chile, October 1984:23, translation from Spanish by Diamond.
11 See S. Axelson 1992:106–133, who analyses the apocalyptic interpretations of
the murder of Olof Palme. Highlighted above all is Intercessors for Sweden, the
Swedish sister organisation to Intercessors for America.
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Views like the above frequently coincide both with Fundamentalism
(1) and Fundamentalism (2), but it may be questioned if it is fair to call
them fundamentalist. The view that a group of people may be sacri-
ficed because they are a hindrance to a good cause or a realisation of a
higher value (for example the plan of God) is possibly as common
among liberal Christians and non-religious secularists as among fun-
damentalists: Japanese may be sacrificed in the struggle for world peace,
Mayans in the struggle against Communism, Palestinians in the strug-
gle to protect Jews from anti-Semitic persecution, and so on.
A noteworthy theological change took place in the Verbo Church
during the course of the 1980s, implying a turn from premillennialism
toward postmillennialism. Premillennialism versus postmillennialism
has long been a major controversy within conservative evangelical-
ism. The premillennialist view implies that Christ will return and
establish the millennial kingdom. Until then the Christians have to
make as many disciples as possible. Some believe that Christ not will
return until all humans have heard the Gospel and accordingly have
had a chance to turn to Christ. Postmillennialism on the other hand
professes that the millennial kingdom should be established by Chris-
tians and that Christ not will return before the end of the thousand
years. This theological trend is often called dominion theology, be-
cause it means that the Christians should take dominion on earth and
create the perfect millennial kingdom. It is an important element in
the thoughts of the New Religious Political Right in the United States.
The most extreme variation of dominion theology is Reconstructionism,
which started to influence US fundamentalism in the 1960s. While the
‘old’ fundamentalists wanted to preserve nineteenth century
premillennial revivalism, the Reconstructionists owed more to the
Calvinist heritage. According to Reconstructionists, the state should
be governed by the laws in the Old Testament, including the same
punishments for the same crimes. Reconstructionism implies that God
governs directly through different spheres that are not allowed to in-
tervene in each other. The number of spheres differs among different
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thinkers, but they include family, economic life, state, and Church.
God governs family, economic life, and Church in a direct way, not
through the state, which is not allowed to intervene in these spheres.
Transnational organisations have no divine authorisation, and conse-
quently the Reconstructionists are against institutions like the United
Nations or the International Court at the Hague.12 Reconstructionism
fit very well with the rise of the New Right in the 1970s and 1980s,
for it had the same view of economic liberalism and a minimal state
only maintaining a judicial system and a defence capability.
Reconstructionists have had a significant presence in New Religious
Political Right networks in the United States, albeit behind the scenes.
Theologians like Rousas Rushdoony, Gary North, and Paul Jehle are
not well known to the public. In part, this has to do with the move-
ment’s identity as primarily an educational and not a political move-
ment. Its goals are broader. Influencing the public through education
will give more long-term results than political action, according to
Reconstructionists.
Sometime between 1982 and 1984, the Guatemalan Verbo Church es-
tablished contact with Reconstructionist theologian Paul Jehle, direc-
tor of the school belonging to the New Testament Church of Cedarville
in Plymouth, Massachusetts. In 1984, the Verbo Church started to use
the ‘Principle Approach’ developed by Paul Jehle and to spread it to
other evangelical schools in Guatemala and the rest of Latin America.
In 1990, when Ríos Montt was a presidential candidate, Paul Jehle
came to Guatemala to discuss Christian politics at a seminar held in
the Verbo Church. The Reconstructionist thoughts developed by Paul
Jehle demonstrated a very pragmatic view of the Bible and closely
followed the most burning political issues in Guatemala. One princi-
pal issue was to remove questions of economic policy from the po-
litical agenda, with the rationale that this was the will of God. The
12 See for example R. Rushdoony 1991, which is a collection of reports and articles
from the 1960s through the 1980s; and P. Jehle [1990].
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state should not intervene in economic life. Efforts to change distribu-
tion between rich and poor was a violation of the law of God. This
view of economics corresponded with opinions of the Guatemalan eco-
nomic elite in a situation when it confronted increased popular de-
mands for changes.13 An explicit Reconstructionist ideology was not
used by Ríos Montt in the larger public campaign, however, but it was
directed toward the evangelicals. Ríos Montt was forbidden to partici-
pate in the elections, because the Guatemalan constitution of 1985 pro-
hibits perpetrators of a coup d’état from running for the presidency.
To conclude, the Verbo Church clearly represents Fundamentalism (1),
and it may be argued that it also can be seen as a kind of Fundamental-
ism (2). That depends on how modernity is defined, however. Was the
Guatemalan counterinsurgency state an expression of modernity or not?
One may also argue that it is not relevant to discuss such questions.
Overseas Crusades
One of the most influential US para-Church agencies in Guatemala
during the 1980s was Overseas Crusades, in Latin America called
Servicio Evangelizador Para América Latina (SEPAL). The organi-
sation established its branch in Guatemala in August 1979, the month
after the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua. Many US organisations
arrived in Guatemala at that time with the direct or indirect purpose
of averting a similar political development as in Nicaragua.
Overseas Crusades was founded in 1950, when Madame Chiang Kai-
Shek asked a group of US evangelicals to come to Taiwan and preach
to the demoralised military forces in the country. Operations in Latin
America began in Colombia and Brazil in 1963, and expanded to
Guatemala in 1979. One goal of Overseas Crusades in Guatemala
was to make a majority of the population evangelical. According to
transnational evangelist Luis Palau, who was the president of Over-
13 P. Jehle [1990].
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seas Crusades at the end of the 1970s, Guatemala was in a strategic
point of time for the expansion of evangelicalism.
In the view of missionaries working for Overseas Crusades, the des-
tiny of a country would change when a substantial part of it had be-
come evangelical. Spreading the Gospel and multiplying congrega-
tions was considered to be the best thing to do for any country. Churches,
which were the result of such an effort, would revolutionise values.
The concrete goal set for Guatemala was that fifty per cent of the popu-
lation should be evangelical by 1990. This goal should not be reached
by a large influx of US missionaries, however, but by mobilising the
Guatemalan Churches to prioritise quantitative Church growth.
The strategy of Overseas Crusades in Guatemala was built on experi-
ences from Church planting efforts in the Philippines in the 1970s.
Overseas Crusades’ Philippine director James Montgomery developed
the concept Discipling of A Whole Nation (DAWN) explicitly hinting
at evangelisation of nation-states. The Guatemalan evangelical Churches
were not as enthusiastic about the so-called DAWN project (translated
to Amanecer in Spanish), however. Only a few persons attended the
first meeting held in 1982 with the purpose of establishing a DAWN/
Amanecer committee and selling the idea of a DAWN process. More
Overseas Crusades team workers than guests were present. The or-
ganisation called this meeting a failure, and the Amanecer congress,
which was planned for 1983, was postponed until 1984.
Among the participants at the Amanecer Congress in 1984 there ex-
isted different opinions about its purpose. One was that it should deal
with quantitative Church growth, but according to another opinion
the purpose was ‘holistic Church growth,’ including both quantita-
tive and qualitative aspects. This terminology is a translation to Eng-
lish of the Spanish term crecimiento integral. Missionaries from the
United States represented the former opinion, while the elected Gua-
temalan Amanecer president Emilio Antonio Nuñez advocated ho-
listic Church growth, which included growth in numbers but also a
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search for Christian maturity in every believer, that is, to know the
Word of God and the meaning of Christian discipleship. Nuñez also
included social responsibility in holistic Church growth.
These conflicting views of Church growth were not a marked contra-
diction with liberal and progressive evangelicals on one side and con-
servative evangelicals on the other. Conservatives were on both sides.
The charismatics, including both Pentecostals and neo-Pentecostals,
generally had a more positive view of quantitative Church growth
programs, while other Churches had more reservations. To many mem-
bers of small Churches with a Fundamentalist (1), non-charismatic
tendency, a strong emphasis on quantitative Church growth was un-
acceptable. These Churches usually cared most about doctrinal pu-
rity among their members and did not want to compromise their or-
thodoxy by trying to attract as many members as possible. For
evangelicals who slowly had begun to integrate the perspective of
social responsibility, the question of evangelical social concern was
more urgent than, or at least as important as, quantitative Church
growth. For ecumenically inclined Protestants, proselytising among
Catholics, as implied in the program Discipling A Whole Nation,
was unacceptable.
During the time of President Cerezo (1986–1990), it became clear
that the Guatemalan evangelicals were a highly diversified group with
different theological views and opinions about the political situation
in the country. The most visible expression of a social and political
awakening was the establishment of Conferencia de Iglesias
Evangélicas de Guatemala (CIEDEG) in April 1987. This organisa-
tion developed contacts with the Latin American Church Council
(CLAI) and with the World Council of Churches. It was an alterna-
tive to the conservative Alianza Evangélica. Behind the CIEDEG
were evangelical development agencies and congregations. In the
beginning, about 470 local congregations were members. It is note-
worthy that the great majority of them were Maya congregations,
both Pentecostal and non-Pentecostal.
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People involved with the CIEDEG were harshly critical of the evan-
gelical Churches’ traditional operational procedures. According to
General Secretary Vitalino Similox Saleazar (a Presbyterian pastor
belonging to the Maya group Caqchikel), there had never been any
evangelisation in Guatemala in the biblical sense, but only an Anglo-
Saxon evangelisation that in reality was an ideology dressed in Chris-
tian clothes. The Church had expressed an ideology in favour of the
economic power elite and had also been an instrument for division
between Protestants and Catholics, Pentecostals and non-Pentecostals
among the Mayas, maintained Similox.14
In parallel with the small but growing social and political awakening
among the evangelicals, the conflicts concerning the work of Overseas
Crusades’ Church growth program became aggravated. The main con-
flict between conservative and progressive evangelicals during the late
1980s came to a head in the Amanecer committee. Overseas Crusades
tried to influence the outcome in favour of the conservatives.
The major impact of Overseas Crusades was not as a catalyst for
Guatemalan evangelical Church growth. Instead, it was to influence
the evangelical Churches in a critical situation when deciding their
position in the political and social context. The emphasis on quanti-
tative growth was related to a theology that separated the spiritual
from the worldly dimension. The Churches should be preoccupied
with their own growth and not become involved in politics or social
concerns. For some years the work of Overseas Crusades was a rather
successful way of keeping ideological control of the Guatemalan
evangelical Churches.
Overseas Crusades is neither an expression of Fundamentalism (1)
nor of Fundamentalism (2). It gathers evangelicals of different ten-
dencies. The only common doctrinal content is to reach out with the
Gospel to as many people as possible. Overseas Crusades is about a
means of Church growth built on market research. It is a pragmatic
14 V. Similox Saleazar, June 1988. See also V. Similox Saleazar 1997.
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organisation that has a positive view on factors that promote evan-
gelical Church growth. Consequently, Overseas Crusades viewed the
government of Ríos Montt in a positive light, because it was consid-
ered to promote evangelical growth.
Evangelical conversion in the Ixil region
The counterinsurgency strategy in the Ixil region (and in other conflict
zones) from the time of Ríos Montt had great similarities with the strat-
egy applied by the United States in Vietnam during the first years of
the 1960s. The centrepieces were a strategic hamlet program, in Gua-
temala called model villages, and a civil defence militia called Patrullas
de Autodefensa Civil (PACs). Yet there were two principal differences
in comparison with Vietnam. First, in Vietnam the strategic hamlet
program came before the large military escalation of the war. In Guate-
mala it was a phase following the total destruction of Mayan villages.
Second, the use of religion was new in Guatemala.
Ixil is located in the northern part of the department of El Quiché, in
the mountain range of the Cuchumatánes. The Ixil people have inhab-
ited the region for at least 1,400 years. They were probably conquered
by the Maya Quiché kingdom in the beginning of the fifteenth century
and later by the Spaniards in 1530. But from the eighteenth century
until the end of the nineteenth century the presence of the colonial
powers and later the Guatemalan national rulers were minimal in the
area. The Roman Catholic Church had a very weak influence there and
its priests were not more than tolerated. Thanks to the isolation and
independence of the Ixil region, many cultural practices of the Ixils
survived, while other Mayan groups lost their cultural heritage.
In the 1890s, the Ixil region experienced dramatic changes as a result
of increased coffee production in Guatemala. From the time of the
liberal revolution in 1871 the ruling liberals strongly promoted cof-
fee exports, pushing Guatemala onto the world market as an agrarian
capitalist state. Just as in other parts of the country, the first impact of
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the coffee economy for the Ixils stemmed from labour recruitment.
Labour contractors arrived in the Ixil region in spite of the very strong
indigenous resistance against Ladino settlement in the area. Soon
Ladinos also arrived with the purpose of subduing land.15
During the twentieth century the Ixil communities lost most of the
fertile land in the valleys of the Ixil area to Ladino coffee growers.
Many Ixil men, and sometimes whole families, have to work as sea-
sonal labourers on the plantations in the area, but above all at the
Guatemalan Pacific coast. The rest of the year most Ixils cultivate
their milpa (corn field) on plots, which usually yield less than a fami-
ly’s subsistence requirements.
The Roman Catholic Church regained influence in the Ixil area, be-
ginning in the 1950s, and in the following decades catechists from
Catholic Action were heavily involved in the organising of the rural
workers’ movement. The growth of popular organising in the 1970s
coincided in time with the establishment of the guerrilla organisation
Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres, EGP, in the Ixcán jungle to the
north of the Ixil area. At the beginning of the 1980s, a majority of the
Ixil population supported EGP.16 People joined EGP as a consequence
of the army repression, not before. The repression was directed against
all popular organising, and people turned to guerrilla action when
other means fell short.
The Guatemalan army systematically destroyed all popular organisa-
tion among the Ixils by kidnapping or murdering all kinds of commu-
15 In Guatemala, Ladino means the part of the population (today approximately
forty per cent), who identify with the ‘White’ Western culture in contrast to the
indigenous Mayan culture.
16 There is common agreement that a majority of the Ixil people supported EGP in
the beginning of the 1980s. See for example D. Stoll 1993. According to J. F.
Cifuentes 1982:35 (an army document) approximately fifty per cent of the popula-
tion collaborated with the guerrillas concerning intelligence. According to evan-
gelical Church member E, interview April 23, 1994, between seventy and eighty
per cent were in favour of the guerrillas.
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nity leaders, including religious ones. In 1981 the scorched-earth cam-
paigns in the Ixil region started. All villages in the area were totally or
partially destroyed between 1981 and 1983. Many people were killed
in massacres and the survivors were displaced. Most of them fled to
distant areas of the northern El Quiché, where the army had difficulties
in reaching them because of the lack of infrastructure.
In May 1980 more than 400 catechists had been killed by the army in
northern El Quiché, including Ixcán and the Ixil region, according to
the Catholic Church.17 In June and July the army killed two priests in
El Quiché. The Catholic Church decided to close the diocese until
further notice, because it was impossible to carry on under those cir-
cumstances. Church representatives were worried that the army
planned to kill all priests, including Bishop Juan Gerardi.18 All Catholic
priests but one left the diocese, and the army occupied the Catholic
Church buildings. A third priest was killed by the army in El Quiché
in 1981 when he tried to work in the diocese despite the situation.
When the Catholic Church was forced underground the evangelical
Churches experienced tremendous growth. Most of the new Churches
established were different kinds of Pentecostal congregations. Sev-
eral of them were offshoots of the Primitive Methodist Church, which
had a longer presence in the Ixil region. Several others were estab-
lished by former Catholic Action catechists.
The Catholic charismatic movement must also be noted as part of the
background of evangelical growth. This movement started to grow
when the rural Catholic Action became polarised over the question
of liberation and social responsibility. The army’s oppression created
a favourable environment for the charismatic movement, which fo-
17 Y dieron la vida por El Quiché… 1992:74.
18 It must be noted that this was only some weeks after the murder of Archbishop
Mgr. Oscar Romero in El Salvador. Mgr. Juan Gerardi was murdered in April,
1998, after his presentation of the REMHI-report about human rights abuses in
Guatemala. The case remains unsolved, and the Guatemalan government denies
investigation of suspected army officers.
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cused on spiritual questions and skirted the social and political issues
facing the people. In the situation with increasing repression of Catho-
lic Action, the charismatic movement made it possible to stay in the
Catholic Church without being a member of Catholic Action. Be-
cause of conflicts with priests and with Catholic Action some Catho-
lic charismatics became evangelicals.
The army’s promotion of evangelicalism did not start with Ríos Montt
but during the Lucas García government (1978–1982). From around
1980, the army promoted evangelical growth in the Ixil area at the
same time as the Catholic Church was forced from the region. At the
end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s several military
officers in the Ixil area were evangelicals or at least expressed them-
selves in evangelical terms. One of them was Captain Muñoz Pilona,
the principal actor behind the coup that brought Ríos Montt to power.
Conservative Christian language has been a part of Latin American
military rhetoric since the time of Iberian colonisation, more or less
emphasised depending on the circumstances. In the Ixil area at the
turn of the 1970s, biblical rhetoric with an emphasis on subordina-
tion to authorities, individual conversion, and salvation fitted well
with the army’s counterinsurgency strategy. In principle language like
this could be Catholic as well as evangelical, but in this special situ-
ation it promoted evangelical growth. Conversion from Catholicism
to evangelicalism symbolised tacit support for one side in the war,
namely a change from resistance to the side of the army. Selective
repression of catechists, nuns and priests forced the people to either a
radicalisation or to another kind of religion. Conversion to evangeli-
calism or the Catholic charismatic movement thus became a survival
strategy in the Ixil area.
In 1979 and 1980 the army introduced civic action projects in the Ixil
area in co-ordination with preachers who said that the army would
forgive only the evangelicals. The message was that if one was to
avoid being killed, one should convert to evangelicalism. In March,
1980, the army started to issue new identity cards to inhabitants in
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the Ixil area. This was a way to determine those who were under mili-
tary jurisdiction and a way to distinguish Catholics from evangelicals.
Those cards functioned as safe conduct passes. Evangelicals who held
them could move themselves freely without limits, which was impos-
sible for other persons.19
The proportion of evangelicals in the Ixil area grew from about three
per cent to approximately twenty per cent of the population between
1979 to 1981. One year later, when Ríos Montt was in power, about
ninety-five per cent of the population in the municipality of Nebaj
said that they were evangelicals. In the army controlled refugee camp
Las Violetas, near the town of Nebaj, everybody was evangelical
during the time of the Ríos Montt government.
Obviously the large number of evangelicals had to do with the war.
Even though the army had promoted evangelicalism in the Ixil area
during the Lucas García government it was not until the Ríos Montt
regime when a clear identification emerged between the army and evan-
gelicalism. During Lucas García’s time the evangelicals had been more
reluctant to support the army, and some of them had sympathised with
or supported EGP. With Ríos Montt, the evangelicals were given a ra-
tionale to be on the army’s side, because its highest authority was an
evangelical president. Various factors supported conversion to evan-
gelicalism; evangelicals had power, without competition from the Catho-
lic Church, to distribute sorely needed goods like food and medicine.
The most important evangelical organisation in the Ixil area during
the government of Ríos Montt was FUNDAPI (Fundación Para Ayuda
19 An identity card showed to the author had a photo, the owner’s name, place of
residence, profession, religion, date and place of birth, civil status, name of spouse,
and names of father and mother. The card was issued in Nebaj on July 9, 1980, by
the Policía Militar Ambulante and was signed by the person in charge. According
to the card owner, the army began issuing these identity cards in March, 1980. The
card gave the owner freedom of movement in the Ixil region without being hin-
dered by military controls, which hunted Catholics as supposed guerrilla collabo-
rators. Evangelical Church member E, interview April 23, 1994.
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a los Pueblos Indígenas), a relief organisation established by the Verbo
Church/Gospel Outreach, Wycliffe Bible Translators/Summer Insti-
tute of Linguistics and the Carroll Berhorst Development Founda-
tion. FUNDAPI worked closely with the Guatemalan army in the
reconstruction of destroyed villages in the Ixil area.
In the Ixil municipality of Chajul, the leader of the Catholic charis-
matic movement, Tomás Asicona, co-operated with FUNDAPI and
the Ríos Montt government. When a Catholic priest started to visit
Chajul in 1984, a conflict arose between him and Asicona. The result
was that the charismatics left the Catholic Church and founded an
evangelical Church with Asicona as their pastor. This congregation
became affiliated to the Verbo Church. This Church had a different
appearance in comparison with the Verbo Church in the capital, how-
ever, as it emphasised charismatic gifts more than doctrine.
Fundamentalism (1) exists in the Ixil area, but its significance there
can be debated. Views of the Bible do not always differ very much
between Catholic Action catechists and evangelical pastors. Higher
biblical criticism and belief in biological evolution are far from the
world of most Ixils. In Guatemala the illiteracy rate is high also among
evangelicals. Some Mayan Pentecostal pastors are illiterate or can-
not rea well. The mixture of memorised Bible verses and personal
experiences in their sermons is far from the preaching of doctrine in
Fundamentalist (1) Churches in the capital.
The religious division and enmity between Catholics and evangelicals
in the Ixil region was created to a large degree by the war situation
and the manipulation by the army and US missionaries with the pur-
pose of neutralising the opposition. It did not mean that evangelicals
and Catholic charismatics were intrinsically conservative.
It is noteworthy that different religious allegiances did not cause this
kind of divisions outside the areas controlled by the Guatemalan army.
The Communities of Populations in Resistance, or CPRs (who were
hiding from the army in the Ixil mountains and the Ixcán jungle),
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were drawn together by their common experience of war. The CPRs
were also affected by the religious changes that had taken place in
the Ixil area. According to a Catholic priest who visited them during
the latter half of the 1980s, a large part of the Catholic population
was charismatic. Like the evangelicals they had a dualistic world
view with a total dichotomy between the spiritual and material di-
mensions. The difference from the population in government-con-
trolled zones was, however, that the charismatics among the CPRs
were politically radical. This priest should have been accompanied
by an evangelical pastor when he went to visit the CPRs. Due to a
change in plans, the pastor did not arrive. The evangelicals were dis-
appointed, but they easily participated in the Catholic meetings in
the absence of a pastor.20
Talking about Fundamentalism (2) in the Ixil area is a rather compli-
cated matter. It may be said that the Ixils have resisted modernity for
more than 100 years when they have opposed outside influence and
integration with the Guatemalan nation-state. From this perspective it
appears odd and irrelevant to view Ixil evangelicalism as resistance to
modernity. It may rather be seen as a religious legitimisation of moder-
nity. Again, however, this depends on how modernity is defined.
Concluding remarks
As has been evident, I have treated Fundamentalism (1) and Funda-
mentalism (2) as two different kinds of definitions. It may be possi-
ble to see Fundamentalism (1) as a variation of Fundamentalism (2).
But I prefer to see them as two different kinds of definitions, because
it can be questioned if Fundamentalism (1) of necessity always re-
sists modernity. Fundamentalism (1) cannot be seen as resistance to
modernity independent of context as the following example shows:
Fundamentalism (1) first arrived in Guatemala with the Central Ameri-
can Mission at the end of the nineteenth century, when the ‘liberal’
20 Catholic priest E, interview June 10, 1992.
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rulers wanted to promote Protestant missions to break the power of
the Roman Catholic Church. The Guatemalan ‘liberal’ presidents did
not ask about missionaries’ opinions concerning the fundamentalist-
liberal controversy. For them, Protestantism as a whole was connected
to capitalist modernisation. An aggressive, negative stand against
indigenous Mayan cultural and religious expressions did not distin-
guish fundamentalists but was shared by representatives of different
kinds of Churches and many liberal secularists of the time.
The term ‘fundamentalism’ is thus used to describe two different
phenomena. In addition come the other ways of defining ‘fundamen-
talism’ described at the beginning of this paper. Undefined discourse
about ‘fundamentalism’ thus leads to confusion. This is evident not
least in the Chicago fundamentalist project. Despite defining ‘funda-
mentalism’ as resistance to modernity, that is, Fundamentalism (2),
the project seems to turn to Fundamentalism (1) when highlighting
Protestantism in Latin America. Strictly following Fundamentalism
(2), the Chicago project probably would have focused on both Prot-
estantism and Catholicism and maybe on some ethnic movements.
The next problem involves the concept modernity, which is ambigu-
ous. It is also unclear how much and which parts of modernity must
be resisted to qualify as Fundamentalism (2). There seems to be an
inherent contradiction in research about evangelicalism in Latin
America on this point. On the one hand, evangelicalism is seen as a
‘fundamentalist’ or ‘fundamentalist-like’ movement, implying resist-
ance to modernity as in the case of the Chicago project. On the other
hand evangelicalism is sometimes seen as a social reform movement
struggling for modernity, implying pluralism and democracy.
Evangelicalism in Latin America in recent research has thus been in-
terpreted both as modernist and anti-modernist, as part of a process of
secularisation and of one of resacralisation. One explanation could be
that different researchers deal with different evangelical movements.
It is noteworthy, however, that what most have in mind is what they
call ‘Pentecostalism.’ Another explanation may be the different mean-
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ings of ‘modernism,’ ‘modernity,’ and ‘modernisation,’ and that they
are applied in different ways.
Because of the present confusion concerning the term ‘fundamental-
ism,’ I decided to use it only in the traditional US sense in my doctoral
dissertation, that is, Fundamentalism (1). I focused on the term ‘Politi-
cal Evangelicalism’ in an effort to encompass evangelical groups with
political aspirations, regardless of their different interpretations of the
Bible or their localisation on the political right-wing, left-wing scale.
Within Political Evangelicalism I intended to capture an expression
of evangelicalism as applied to the implementation of religious prin-
ciples in society. At one end of a scale are evangelical movements
with an explicit evangelical or Christian political program. At the
other end are evangelical movements without an explicit political
agenda, but that for example want to create a mass base for evangeli-
cal politics through the promotion of evangelical growth in a coun-
try, or view evangelical faith as necessary for the creation of the good
society. The term thus includes the New Religious Political Right in
the United States, but it is broader. It also includes US missionary
movements that may be more liberal in their home country but act
differently abroad, when confronting a majority of non-Protestants
and a state that is not influenced by Protestant values.21
It turned out that Guatemalan Political Evangelicalism acted on the
right-wing side of the political spectrum, despite the fact that the
definition of Political Evangelicalism left room for supposed left-
wing movements. The reason is that left-wing evangelicals in Guate-
21 The term ‘political’ has been used before in combination with, for instance, Is-
lam and Hinduism. The main inspiration to the term comes from Eva Hellman’s
use of the term ‘political Hinduism,’ even if I define Political Evangelicalism a
little bit different. Eva Hellman defines within political Hinduism movements that
have ‘formulated political goals for the protection of the Hindus and Hinduism.’
The different movements within political Hinduism are seen along a scale with
promotion of Hindu interests at one end and implementation of Hindu principles in
society at the other end. E. Hellman 1993:10.
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mala did not propose specifically evangelical or Christian politics,
but co-operated with other forces in search for humanistic values.
Thereby they were outside the definition of Political Evangelicalism.
Before around 1980, there was no visible expression of Political Evan-
gelicalism in Guatemala, as far as the author has detected. The Verbo
Church was established in 1976 and was characterised by
premillennialism and expectations of the return of Christ. Its strong
anti-Communism was in accordance with US interests and the wealthy
sectors of the Guatemalan society. It legitimised the established po-
litical order by reinforcing subordination to authority but did not pro-
mote active political involvement among its members. Neither did
other evangelical Churches and organisations.
Political Evangelicalism began when organisations like Overseas
Crusades entered Guatemala in 1979. At the same time an indigenous
rapprochement took place between groups within the military, the
extreme right, and some evangelical leaders. When Ríos Montt be-
came president, some evangelicals discovered that they were many
and that they had the potential for political influence. Ríos Montt and
US dominion theology encouraged a new positioning of the spiritual-
physical relationship. These two dimensions should be united, and
the Christian Gospel should influence politics.
But not until the ousting of Ríos Montt was a clear evangelical politi-
cal agenda outlined. The goal was to compete within the new frame-
work of democratic elections. At the time of the Guatemalan presi-
dential election of 1985, new influences of US dominion theology
became apparent in Guatemala. The Verbo Church appropriated
Reconstructionist teachings by US theologian Paul Jehle, promoting
governing of the state and society according to Old Testament laws.
At the same time, a milder form of dominion theology promoted by
Francis Schaeffer was involved in the election campaign of the evan-
gelical presidential candidate, Jorge Serrano Elías. This politician had a
neo-liberal New Right profile in his political program. In the Guatema-
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lan context his views corresponded to the moderate right. As were most
other candidates, he was in favour of continued counterinsurgency. He
built his campaign to a large extent on mobilising evangelicals, but not
on convincing them about New Right politics. Instead they were mobi-
lised on the notion that evangelical influences on politics would im-
prove the situation in the country. The message given to evangelicals in
the campaign of Serrano Elías in 1985 was that Christianity must influ-
ence the state and that the evangelicals must accept their responsibility
to bring this about. Only they are capable of discerning the true funda-
ment of authority of the state – the law of God.
Many evangelicals did not vote for Serrano, however. They did not
like his open manipulation of religion. Instead, a Christian Demo-
crat, Vinicio Cerezo, won the election. He had promised peace nego-
tiations and invoked hopes for a changed situation also among
evangelicals. In the election campaign of 1990, Serrano Elías did not
try to mobilise the evangelicals the same way as in 1985. He ob-
tained evangelical support, now without the blatant use of religion,
but only when the candidacy of Ríos Montt was ruled illegal.
The use of Political Evangelicalism in election campaigns was prag-
matic. It sought the most effective way to mobilise evangelicals for
political platforms that basically were not founded on evangelical-
ism. This means that such platforms were not formed as a result of
popular demands for increased religious influence in politics. They
were born of secular agendas, while alliances were made with evan-
gelical leaders for mobilising an evangelical mass.
It must be emphasised that dating the appearance of Political Evan-
gelicalism in Guatemala to around 1980 does not imply that
evangelicals did not play a political role before that time. A new de-
velopment started then, however, at the height of conflicts about the
future destiny of the country. Political Evangelicalism had an explicit
purpose of promoting Christian or evangelical values within state
and society.
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Religion generally increased its political influence in Guatemala dur-
ing the 1980s. This can partly be related to a popular demand for a
moral and ethical body politic. It does not mean that there was great
popular resistance to secularism, humanism or modernity, however.
Efforts to mobilise the evangelicals for anti-secularist policies were
made from above. The driving force was to preserve the status quo
concerning the Guatemalan socio-economic structures and to restore
religion as protection of this order. Evangelicalism became a viable
alternative when the Catholic Church no longer was reliable.
Political Evangelicalism in Guatemala could grow because it was pro-
moted by a counterinsurgency war. Certain elements in its theology
fitted extraordinarily well with the counterinsurgency strategy. Propo-
nents of Political Evangelicalism also demonstrated a pragmatism con-
cerning their views, which to a surprising degree could change de-
pending on political circumstances, even among Fundamentalists (1).
It is thus clear that Political Evangelicalism is identical with neither
Fundamentalism (1) nor Fundamentalism (2), and that research re-
sults may be different when moving away from the term ‘fundamen-
talism.’ The term Political Evangelicalism may not be useful for re-
search in other contexts or for other purposes. What is important,
though, is to have more careful definitions of religious movements
than the present use of ‘fundamentalism,’ which may obscure rela-
tions between religion and politics instead of shedding light on them.
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Encountering Changes
in African Theology
Stephen Munga
Introduction
In this article I present some observations on differences arising from
significant expansion as ‘shift’ in African theology. First I shall ar-
gue for the significance and inevitability of this expansion as a result
of differences in theological reflection. Secondly, I shall present some
views of how these changes and differences can be addressed. My
approach is broader, I tend to move from a general perspective to
particular reflection on African theology. A study of African theol-
ogy, specifically its development, reveals that there has been a con-
siderable shift both in approaches and themes. This theological de-
velopment or shift can be studied either historically or typologically.1
Historical investigation spells out in a systematic chronological or-
der what happened, how and why. In other words, such an investiga-
tion provides us with a picture of historically ordered events whose
presentation, analysis and interpretation offer a possibility of explain-
1 The distinction here is somehow deceiving in the sense that the boundaries that
divide the two are permeable (but cannot be melted out) and complementary ap-
proaches. However, the fact that the two approaches presuppose different meth-
odological tools remains emphatic. It is clear that on undertaking a historical in-
vestigation of African theology we are not only confronted by the history of that
theology per se. As I have shown somewhere else, the history of African theology
leans on a number of other historical foundations that influence that theology in
one way or another. See Stephen Munga, Beyond the Controversy: A Study of Afri-
can Theologies of Inculturation and Liberation (Studia Theologica Lundensia, 55.
Lund: Lund University Press, 1998), pp. 23, 39 ff.
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ing those events.2 Typological investigation, on the other hand, aims
at classifying different types of African theology. These two kinds of
analysis are reciprocally related. Either approach strengthens the re-
lationship between the two themes rather than weakening it. The
strength here lies in the assumption that the two types of investiga-
tion unveil a multidimensional possibility constituted in an interde-
pendent relationship between the historical and the typological
changes. The historical part offers a framework upon which the typo-
logical fits in a broader historical context.3 Both approaches include
some formal elements that can be applied to the content. Further-
more, from both approaches one can explicate some models that are
somehow concealed on the basis of time and context and which if
made explicit can facilitate our understanding of different theolo-
gies. Regarding African theology, it is often argued that some his-
torical events influenced its changes and development.4 For exam-
ple, the historical shift from colonial domination to independence in
many African states had considerable influence on the understanding
of the church that set the stage for theological questions.
Such historical changes and historical events in general still have
tremendous influence on the thinking of African scholars. One influ-
ential factor in African church history is, for example, a realisation
of the presence of categorical dualism, such as mission churches-
indigenous churches, missionary leadership-indigenous leadership,
and missionary theology-indigenous theology. In other words, his-
torical events like ‘struggle for independence’ and ‘achievement of
2 Ibid., Chapter 2. A point could be argued in this connection as to whether unveil-
ing historic changes should precede any theory that explains those changes from a
contemporary chronos and topos point of view. Most probably, but not necessarily,
changes might appear under different systems that are a created by a researcher as
a means of making such changes more intelligible. Whatever the case might be the
synchronic and diachronic approaches to the historic materials around African the-
ology is inescapable.
3 This view follows from the fact that ecclesial and theological history is part of the
general history.
4 In Beyond the Controversy I show how broader historical events have influenced
and motivated the formation of African theology.
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independence and self-determination’ provided challenges to the
African Churches and individual theologians that led to new theo-
logical questions. Consequently, these historical events gave birth to
ecclesial-theological themes. It is also argued that the challenges that
tracked these categorical distinctions led to the formation of differ-
ent types of theology. I shall chart these types of theology as theo-
logical modelistic paradigms.
A tentative description of such modelistic paradigms on the basis of
historical and typological factors reveals changes in African theology.
Assuming that each theological enterprise is made public, it follows
that each theology exhibits its factuality, relevance and influence in a
paradigmatic manner as unique and particular. In other words, each
type of African theology appears by way of models, motifs, arguments
and conceptions in subsequent discussions and debates. However, this
can be said of any theology, African or otherwise. Can one argue for
different African theological trends as different modelistic paradigms
of theology? How and why is such an attempt productive?
Towards modelistic paradigms
I use the two terms ‘models’ and ‘paradigm’ together for a specific
reason that complies to the purpose of this article. The Cambridge
International Dictionary of English portrays these terms as synony-
mous. Here the term ‘model’ is defined as a representation or copy of
something. Similarly, the term ‘paradigm’, is defined as a very clear
and typical example of something. From the point of view of this
non-technical meaning of the terms it appears that to use them to-
gether is somehow ambiguous and monotonous. While it cannot be
denied that these terms are closely related, it also depends upon the
parts of speech they represent. The adjectival role played by the word
‘model’ above suggests that it qualifies the noun ‘paradigm’. In this
essay I intend to present different models in African theology as theo-
logical paradigms. In my discussion I shall briefly explore each of
these terms in a referential manner.
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In the early 1960s Max Black presented distinct types of models and
their functions in various scientific works.5 He mentioned different
types of models and how each depicts its original domain despite the
intrinsic precariousness of such an inference. Black forthrightly dis-
tinguished between scale models and analogue models and expressed
his appreciation of theoretical models. Models are more than heuris-
tic fictions. They describe something ‘as it is’ and ‘how things work
in the large’. There always remains an intrinsic regulative interde-
pendence between the described model and its original domain that
allows for an extension and regulation of the original corpus of knowl-
edge leading to further mastery of the original domain. More strik-
ingly, Black sees models as metaphors since:
A memorable metaphor has the power to bring two separate domains
into cognitive and emotional relation by using language directly ap-
propriate to the one as a lens for seeing the other; the implication,
suggestions, and supporting values entwined with the literal use of
the metaphorical expression enables us to see a new subject matter
in a new way.6
The metaphorical meaning of models in this connection does not fol-
low from the meaning of metaphor as ‘saying one thing and meaning
another;’ rather it follows from its telos. Referring to E. H. Hutten,
Black indicated that we employ models when for one reason or an-
other we cannot offer a direct and complete description in the lan-
guage we normally use.7 In other words, Black speaks of ‘seeing new
connections,’ meaning that the metaphorical meaning of models serves
two purposes: first, to offer a strained and artificial description of a
domain sufficiently known otherwise, and secondly, to help us to
notice what otherwise would be overlooked, or to shift the relative
emphasis attached to details.8 In short, Black reveals the importance
of models not simply as passive structures representing certain origi-
5 For example, see Max Black, Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and
Philosophy (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1962), Chapter 13.
6 Ibid., p. 236 f.
7 Quoting E. H. Hutten, ‘The Roles of Models in Physics,’ British Journal of the
Philosophy of Science, IV (1953-54), 289.
8 Black, p. 237.
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nal domains but mainly as dynamic entities that assist our imagina-
tion and language about the original domains.
Robert J. Schreiter in his Constructing Local Theologies (Maryknoll:
Orbis Books, 1985) and Stephen Bevans in his Models for Contex-
tual Theologies (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1992) present a helpful
picture of types of theology. These theologies are presented as mod-
els that reflect different motifs, arguments and conceptions in the
context of historical, cultural, social-economic and political particu-
larities. Their works, as concrete examples of Black’s views of mod-
els, offer challenging perspectives on the subject, giving the impres-
sion that all theologies are local or contextual. More striking in these
works is that they unveil layers of basic motifs and some basic views
that distance one type of theology from another. Liberation theolo-
gians like Gustav Gutiérrez in his A Theology of Liberation: History,
Politics and Salvation (London: SCM Press, 1974) have painted a
clear picture of what Latin American liberation theology is about.
The motifs on which he grounds his arguments for an alternative epis-
temological theory as the basis for a hermeneutical exercise portray
the modelistic paradigm of this theology. Sigurd Bergmann’s Gud i
funktion: en orientering i den kontextuella teologin (Stockholm: Ver-
bum, 1997) can also be mentioned. His work illuminates a number of
paradigmatic models founded on a conceptual network that are extri-
cated from broader theological discussions. Bergmann’s concern for
different ways of doing theology suggests the possibility of describ-
ing different models within the ever-expanding framework of con-
textual theologies.9 The list of theologians who have attempted to
unveil various modelistic paradigms in theology is long. Yet in the
wilderness of this presentation one must ask whether theology is a
kind of modelistic paradigm. And why should one talk about
modelistic paradigm in regard to my review of African theology?
Concerning paradigms I refer to Thomas Kuhn and Ian Barbour. Draw-
ing some insights from Thomas Kuhn, Barbour defines ‘paradigm’
9 Sigurd Bergmann, Gud i function, pp. 41-53.
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as “a cluster of conceptual and methodological presuppositions em-
bodied in an exemplary body of scientific work.”10 Kuhn himself sees
‘paradigm’ as a constellation of group commitments characterised by
a disciplinary matrix.11 Furthermore, paradigms have a status prior to
that of shared rules and assumptions by a scientific community.12 He
describes any major paradigm shift as a “scientific revolution” result-
ing from a crisis within an existing paradigm. Such a crisis is solved by
a paradigm shift from the old to the new by questioning the fundamen-
tal assumptions, by modifying theories, by acquiring new kinds of data
(experimentation), and by reinterpreting the old data in the light of the
new theory.13 Primarily, a paradigm shift does not presuppose a falsifi-
cation of the old data; rather, it presupposes their verification in the
light of a new theory. Furthermore, according to Kuhn, two paradigms
are incommensurable in terms of the problems they tackle and their
standards of approach. Paradigms, therefore, function as vehicles for
scientific theory, and they give form to scientific life.14
In Beyond the Controversy I briefly argued that any theological inter-
pretation theory whose mentor considers an analysis of a broader
spectrum of formative factors as foundational might discover a di-
vergence of incommensurable paradigms in theology.15 Nevertheless,
10 Ian G. Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science (London: SCM Press, 1990), p. 33.
11 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolution (2nd. edn, Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1972), p. 181 ff.
12 Ibid., p. 48 f.
13 Ibid., Chapters. 7 and 8. Cf. Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science, p. 51.
14 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolution. 109. While Kuhn’s work was re-
ceived with appreciation, as it was found to be helpful in explaining the shifts
taking place in different fields of study, the same work was also received with
criticism, especially regarding his use of the term ‘incommensurability’ and ‘con-
version’. Using these terms Kuhn was not only found to contradict his own philo-
sophical program but also that he has turned science into “irrationality” and “a
matter of mob psychology”. Kuhn responds to these criticisms in the “Postscript”
of the second edition of his book.
15 See footnote no. 1 for details of my own published thesis, Beyond the Contro-
versy. Also Cf. Emmanuel Martey, African Theology: Inculturation and Libera-
tion (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1993), Chapter 5.
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I consider these theological modelistic paradigms to have shifted from
one traditional Christian paradigm, namely, the ‘bundle of data’ (Chris-
tian doctrine once interpreted from a Eurocentric and male perspec-
tive). I further indicated that differences in theological views, ten-
sional or controversial in most cases, create modelistic paradigms
whose challenging questions refer back to theories of approach and
contextual challenges.16 Surely when two or more scientific commu-
nities uphold the same basic data and still do not reach similar final
conclusions, something besides their theories may be responsible.
Sometimes the perspective of a scientist linked to certain worldviews
may lead to diminishing objectivity that might in turn create major
inadequacies in the old paradigm. In this case it is a disagreement in
theories, or the way we interpret certain data from a certain particular
point of view in the light of a particular theory or interpretative frame-
work, that divides one paradigm from another.
Paradigm change in theology
Kuhn’s theory of paradigm change has received attention not only in
the natural sciences, social sciences, and philosophy, but also in the-
ology. Among the theologians who have attempted to employ it is
Hans Küng in his article ‘Paradigm Change in Theology: A Proposal
for Discussion.’17 He recognises five major paradigms in the history
of Christian thought: the diachotomic paradigm of the New Testa-
ment-Jewish and Hellenistic models-centred in the one Christ-event;
the Hellenistic Alexandrian model; the Latin Augustinian model; the
Medieval Thomistic model; the Reformation model; and the Modern
Critical.18 As in Kuhn’s scientific case, Küng shows that each new
paradigm arose as a consequence of crisis and uncertainty. Further-
16 Munga, Beyond the Controversy; Bergmann, Gud i funktion, pp. 16-23.
17 See in Hans Küng and David Tracy (eds.) Paradigm Change in Theology (Edin-
burgh, T. and T. Clark, 1989), pp. 3-33.
18 Ibid., 15-19. Cf. Francis S. Fiorenza, ‘The Crisis of Hermeneutics and Christian
Theology,’ in Sheila Greeve Davaney (ed.), Theology at the End of Modernity, pp.
117-140.
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more, each paradigm (as in science) provided a framework for normal
work and a possibility for cumulative growth. However, he also points
out the distinctive features of paradigm shifts in Christian thought. All
paradigms of Christian thought arose from a particular experience of
the original domain. Thus each ‘new’ paradigm that can be extracted
from the history of Christian thought had two underlying features,
namely that it was a responsive concern to the Christian message, and
its aim was to make that message relevant to the contemporary world
experience and knowledge in each particular period.
With this awareness in mind we can conclude that Küng’s attempted
models offer a valuable starting point for further discussion of the
question. He himself has clearly stated that what he presented was a
proposal for discussion, and that allows us to approach the question
of paradigm shift in theology as open-ended. The concepts of tradi-
tion and classic seem to underlie Küng’s formulation. With these in
mind we are led to an understanding of paradigm in the strict sense as
arising from an understanding of a classic as a piece of work which
reverberates within one or more traditions. Hence, a classic articu-
lates powerfully influential views, positions and conception in a
broader context and whose importance is beyond debate. However,
since Küng’s presentation was a proposal for discussion and reflected
one particular perspective, we can continue where he left off.
Although we cannot apply Kuhn’s concept in every detail to the sci-
ences proper, I can say with reservations that each theological model
has a world of its own which can be compared to what Kuhn calls the
worldview of scientific work.19 I have broached the concept of par-
ticularity of perspective in relation to that of modelistic paradigm.
What does the concept of particularity of perspective mean in this
context? Before responding to this question I want to look briefly but
closely at how the concept of paradigm has helped to articulate spheres
of challenge in theology.
19 Placher, Unapologetic Theology, Chapter 10.
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Extension of Küng’s proposal
Apart from Küng, theologians like Per Frostin, Elisabeth S. Fiorenza,
Sallie McFague and Emmanuel Martey have attempted to work with
the concept of paradigm in theology. While Küng’s proposal was
locked up in the Western theological tradition (at least in his short
article I referred to) these theologians are among those attempted to
extend the boundaries. My use of the word ‘extension’ gives primacy
to attaining a complementary view of the use of the concept of para-
digm without following any chronological order of the works to which
I am referring to.
In discussing new types of theological methodology, Frostin and
Fiorenza use Kuhn’s term ‘paradigm’ to explain methodological shift
in theology.20 On adopting Kuhn’s concept of paradigm Frostin in-
tended to show that theological interpretation has reached another
historical point of crisis. The theological interpretation crisis in a
broader perspective has led to a new set of questions asked about the
understanding of the Christian faith. New perspectives and the dis-
covery of every ‘context and situation,’ such as those of liberation,
have set new theories and concepts from which these theological
questions are asked. Forthrightly, in responding to these new prob-
lems and questions, advocates of the new paradigm have developed
new theories that are capable of handling the old data, that is, the
Christian message and its successive interpretation in history. Fur-
thermore, the new paradigm makes it possible to see the new inter-
pretation of those data in continuity and discontinuity with the old.
20 Frostin, Liberation Theology in Tanzania and South Africa (Studia Theologica
Lundensia, 42. Lund: Lund University Press, 1988), p. 1. Elisabeth S Fiorenza, In
Memory of Her, xxi. Cf. Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situ-
ation (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975), p. 86. Also Tutu, ‘African Theology and Black
Theology,’ 59; also cf. Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, 23.
Sallie McFague has offered more illuminating views on the use of models in dif-
ferent fields of study and the role played by these models in bridging the gap be-
tween such disciplines of study. See Metaphorical Theology: Models of God in
Religious Language (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982).
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This is the essence of what Frostin meant by a shift in theological
paradigm as made explicit in the ‘new’ theological methodology.21
He thus used the concept of paradigm to explain the shift from estab-
lished theological methodologies to the ‘new’ methodologies of lib-
eration that have distinct theological profile.
Frostin emphasises that “cognisance of the experience of those de-
fined as poor stands as a necessary condition for theological reflec-
tion.” This emphasis on the term ‘poor’ as a new theological cat-
egory carries a tone similar to Martey’s ‘dehumanised’.22 Frostin used
it in his study of the two African theologies of liberation, i.e., post-
colonial African liberation theology and South African theology of
liberation. Frostin’s work did not simply generalise and equate these
two; rather he presented each of them as a particular perspective.
Nevertheless, quite striking in the liberation model is the elevation of
the function of ‘experience’ from being a mere passive placeless en-
tity to a place that portrays it as an intrinsic parallel element in the
Christian faith that includes other elements of the model.
The structure of Martey’s theology on the other hand, especially his
views on liberation theology, is similar to Frostin’s. However, these
two differ in their solidification of the models they describe. Martey
used the concept of paradigm to describe the relationship between
the African theologies of inculturation and liberation. Being tempted
by his integral-synthesis theory he forces the two modelistic para-
digms of African theology into one. The fundamental problem to
which Martey and Frostin respond can be divided into two parts: the
historical and the contemporary dimensions that founded their mod-
els. The historical dimension of the problem refers to the missionar-
ies’ teachings of the Christian faith in the context of African
culture(s).23 This theological era is what I called above the teaching
21 See Frostin, Liberation Theology in Tanzania and South Africa, p. 1.
22 Ibid., 6. Cf. West, Biblical Hermeneutics of Liberation, p. 86.
23 Cf. Lamin Sanneh, Encountering the West: Christianity and the Global Cultural
Process (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1993). Also Kwame Bediako, Theology and
Identity: The Impact of Culture upon Christian Thought in the Second Century and
Modern Africa (Oxford: Regum Books, 1992):
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of Christian theology in Africa from a Eurocentric perspective. The
contemporary dimension is a response to the historical and refers to
the problems incurred when interpreting the Christian message in the
political and socio-economic situations in post-colonial Africa and
in South Africa during its apartheid era. These two dimensions are
reciprocally related.
Fiorenza is among the feminist theologians who have used the concept
of paradigm in describing the methodological ‘shift’ in theology. She
clearly shows that Kuhn’s notion of scientific paradigms can be trans-
formed into useful interpretative models for biblical and theological
studies.24 According to her, “this theory helps us to understand that
theological approaches, like all other scientific theories, are not falsi-
fied, but replaced, not because we find new ‘data’ but because we find
new ways of looking at old data and problems.”25 Hence, according to
Fiorenza, the problems that led to crises in the old paradigm can be
solved by the birth of a new one, that is, by using a new theory to study
the problem and the old data. Hence, it is theories that divide but they
also cause the creation of new modelistic paradigms.
In her discussion of theological methodology, Fiorenza refers to Kuhn’s
concepts ‘particular research approach’ and ‘intellectual conversion’
but goes beyond them to assert that in the new theological methodolo-
gies of liberation interpreters recognise the perspectival nature of knowl-
edge and thus advocate ‘particularity of perspectives’.26 While the con-
cept of incommensurability, as Kuhn defined it, refers to intranslatability
24 E. Fiorenza, ‘Towards a Feminist Biblical Hermeneutics: Biblical Interpretation
and Liberation Theology,’ in B. Mahan and L. D. Richesin (eds.), The Challenge of
Liberation Theology: A First World Response (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1981),
pp. 96-99.
25 Ibid., p. 96; also idem, In Memory of Her: Feminist Theological Reconstruction
of Christian Origins (London: SCM Press, 1983), p. xxi. Cf. Gerald West, Biblical
Hermeneutics of Liberation: Modes of Reading the Bible in the South African Con-
text, 2nd rev. Ed., The Bible and Liberation Series (Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Pub-
lications and Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1995), p. 87.
26 E. Fiorenza, ‘Toward a Feminist Biblical Hermeneutics,’ pp. 92-93.
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of the ‘language’ of one paradigm into another, the concept of conver-
sion refers to a change in a scientist whose thinking shifts from an old
paradigm to a new one. Writing from a feminist liberation theological
perspective, Fiorenza exemplifies the meaning of conversion by say-
ing that “the shift from an endocentric to a feminist interpretation of
the world implies a revolutionary shift in scientific paradigm, a shift
with far–reaching ramifications not only for the interpretation of the
world but also for its change.”27
In other words, conversion is somehow synonymous with change, or
it defines a change of perspective from the old to the new. Each para-
digm is particular and is confined to a certain way of interpreting
existing data in the light of its theories, but such positions do not
stand in the way of understanding each theological paradigm and
even comparing them.
The views of Frostin, Fiorenza, and Martey shed light on my presenta-
tion of the term modelistic paradigm as a particular perspective shared
by a community of scholars who uphold common rules and assump-
tions. Similarly, the views of these three help to explain my emphasis
that the two African theologies reflect a kind of particularity of per-
spectives that can be modelled as paradigms. Both Frostin and Fiorenza
show that Kuhn’s views can be used to explain the methodological
shift in theology. Furthermore, they demonstrate that different theories
of theological interpretation reflect the possibility of different modelistic
paradigms characterised by particularity of perspectives. Quite posi-
tively they also accentuate in their theological discussions that by means
of dialogue advocates of different theological paradigms can under-
stand each other.28 The basis of this possibility is the fact that the con-
cept of shift presupposes that a new paradigm has its roots in the old
one. It follows from this presupposition that the rise of a new paradigm
opens the possibility of ‘conversation between’ and ‘conversion’ of
perspective from the old to the new paradigm.
27 E. Fiorenza, In Memory of Her, p. xxi.
28 See for example Frostin, Liberation Theology in Tanzania and South Africa, 199,
n. 1. Also Fiorenza, ‘Toward a Feminist Biblical Hermeneutics,’ p. 96.
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African theologies as modelistic paradigms
While the concept of modelistic paradigms helps to point to and distin-
guish the major theological shifts in the history of theology, it also
helps to mark out clearly the path taken by these shifts as change from
one paradigm to another. Küng has proposed some paradigms in the
history of theology. Likewise, Frostin and Fiorenza, like Schreiter and
Bevans whom I mentioned earlier, have clearly suggested that libera-
tion theologies are constellations of new theological modelistic para-
digms. Fiorenza walked the second mile by emphasising that these
new theologies reflect particularity of perspectives. As regarding Afri-
can theology, Martey has shown with a teleological emphasis in mind
that the inculturation and liberation trends represent a new theological
modelistic paradigm: “[African theologies of inculturation and libera-
tion] mediate to us the complete ‘reality of the dehumanised’ brought
about by human greed and sin, but above all, they point to the ‘com-
plete reality of the human’ created in God’s image, an inherent divine
gift that black Africans are striving to achieve.”29
After the 1970s controversy between inculturation and Black theol-
ogy, African theologians tried as much as possible to avoid further
strife. There was hardly a reception of that controversy whose analy-
sis could have revealed its positive contribution to the development
of African theology. It was Martey who came to break the silence
and unveiling the inner elements of the controversy. He describes the
African theologies of inculturation and liberation as a ‘paradigm’.
The ground of his argument is that the two theologies together reflect
what is ‘African’ as a necessary theological category.
Martey’s use of the concept ‘paradigm’ is predetermined by his the-
sis of integral-synthesis, which is also the basis of his theological
approach. Actually, what he did in the work I cited above is a way of
defending that thesis.30 The implication of Martey’s use ‘paradigm’
29 Martey, African Theology, p. 122.
30 Ibid., 132. Here Martey uses the expression “jointly created” to describe his
Black African theology.
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as a collective concept for the two African theologies suggests that in
the structure of his thought they are organically united.31 From the
way he uses the concept of paradigm, we can deduce that ‘Black
African theology’ represents a new theological paradigm at the ex-
pense of the two African theologies he attempted to coalesce. From
the historical point of view of the two theologies, and for the sake of
the future of African theology, Martey’s preconceived “jointly cre-
ated theology” seems erroneous and misleading. The question that
previously concerned me most regarding Martey’s integral-synthesis
conclusions was how do we do away with the two modelistic para-
digms he presented in detail in his illuminating work? Given differ-
ent elements that constitute the two models should we simply accept
a given compound structure that is not clearly defined by a sound
theory? In other words, we need to know precisely what takes place
in the shift from elements A and B to the emerging compound C.
My contention is that historically the African theological controversy
as a theological (interpretation) crisis has resulted in the formation of
a new theological modelistic paradigm –South African Black theol-
ogy. This is a new modelistic paradigm arising from the old one (Af-
rican theology). Tutu’s critique that African theology has failed to
develop a sharp edge with which to address contemporary African
existential problems has an upper hand in this development.32 Equally
supportive is Bujo’s critique that African inculturation theology did
not formulate the problem of Africa theology adequately, and that it
has left out some of the important data from the African reality
uninterpreted or totally ignored. These two critics challenge us to
find a way of fitting the emerging theologies within the framework
of concept of theological crisis.33 From this perspective Black theol-
31 This organic unity is a result of Martey’s generalisation of the problem and stand-
ards of African theology. Martey’s generalisations appear in two forms: (1) A lack
of detailed discussion of the background of the theological critique he made, (2) a
lack of adequate distinction of the concepts he uses to the critique he makes. I will
give examples of my critique.
32 See Munga, Beyond the Controversy, p. 94 ff.
33 B. Bujo, African Theology in Its Social Context, trans. John O’Donohue (Nai-
robi: St. Paul Publications, 1992), p. 70 f.
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ogy is a new modelistic paradigm developed from the old one (Afri-
can theology). Its creators not only introduced a more fitting theory
of interpretation in the framework of African theology but also that
they created a new cluster of theological concepts and a new under-
standing that inculturation theologians did not have before.34
Granted the two possibilities above, it follows that Martey’s talk of
an ‘African theological paradigm’ is distorted by its assumed unity
and hence betrays the data he presented prior to his conclusions.35 As
I discussed in Beyond the Controversy, some insights from Matthew
Schoffeleers in his socio-cultural theory of ‘alternate-occurrences’
between militant and pacifist prophets in South Africa might suggest
that the nature of the co-existence of the two theologies opened a
new beginning for the future of African theology. Furthermore,
Tinyiko Sam Maluleke’s tells us that a clear understanding of Afri-
can Christianity might be a starting point for assuming the future of
African theology. Such an understanding of African Christianity can
serve as a critical tool for studying African theology and at the same
time be a unifying factor in an environment of radical theological
pluralism. Hence, there is enough evidence to support the view that
African theology of inculturation and South African Black theology
and other types of African theology represent particular models as
34 See Munga, Beyond the Controversy, Chapter 10. Here I argued further that this
controversy remains a starting point from where a view on the particularity of
other types of African theologies can be developed. African women theology,
Uamsho theology, African narrative theology, etc., which are currently in the mar-
ket have unique approaches and clusters of conceptual network that strongly re-
flect their particularity. To exemplify my position I make reference to Anneth Munga,
Uamsho: A Theological Study of the Proclamation of the Revival Movement within
the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Tanzania (Lund: Lund University Press, 1998).
Both the methodology developed by the author and theological concepts she de-
veloped from teachings of wana uamsho add weight to my argument.
35 This agrees with my earlier claim that Martey did not develop his theory from
data but constructed some data that affirmed his theory. On the interdependence of
theory and data in theology see Tracy, ‘Theological Method,’ in Peter C. Hogdson
and Robert King (eds.), Christian Theology: An Introduction to Its Tradition and
Tasks (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985).
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theological perspectives that can be compared. The outcome of this
comparative study depends in part on the purpose of each particular
researcher. For me I used it in Beyond the Controversy to work out a
complementary understanding of certain theological themes.
Differences as particularity of perspective
I have used the term ‘particularity of perspectives’ without clarifying
it but must provide a brief clarification. If it is true that the meaning
of a term becomes more clear by its use, then many readers must
have grasped its meaning in the context of this essay. My clarifica-
tion will not be definitive but referential for the purpose of communi-
cation and dialogue.
Richard Bernstein attempted to match the two terms ‘paradigm’ and
‘anthropological knowledge’ in a way that throws light on how I use
the expression ‘particularity of perspectives’ in this essay. More spe-
cifically, we come into grips with his way of linking the two terms by
reviewing his correlation of Kuhn’s theory of incommensurability and
Clifford Geertz’s theory of ‘anthropological knowledge’. Referring to
Kuhn’s theory, Bernstein indicated that it was used by both proponents
and opponents of incommensurability. As a result the use of Kuhn’s
theory was not only for the better. Whereas proponents regarded it as a
liberating doctrine which could set free scientific thinking from all forms
of false parochialism, their opponents saw in it the door to radical open-
ness.36 Bernstein believes that both sides totally misrepresent Kuhn’s
views. His theory of incommensurability, according to Bernstein, does
not support any kind of objectivism or relativism:
What is sound in the incommensurability thesis is the clarification
of just what we are doing when we do compare paradigms, theories,
language games. We can compare them in multiple ways. We can
recognise losses and gains. We can even see how some of our stand-
36 Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), p. 79.
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ards for comparing them conflict with each other. We can recognise –
especially in cases of incommensurability in science – that our argu-
ments in support of rival paradigm theories may not be conclusive.37
There are many possibilities for applying the concept of incommen-
surability, but this does not mean that incommensurability erases the
boundaries or particularities of each paradigm. Bernstein refers to
the views of Clifford Geertz in order to show how this concept can
explain the fabric of the social sciences. Bernstein formulates the
question that engages Geertz as, “How is anthropological knowledge
of the way natives think, feel and perceive possible?”38 In other words,
he intends to explain Geertz’s main purpose of addressing the inter-
play between the objective and the subjective perspectives of anthro-
pological knowledge.
In attempting to solve this problem of ‘anthropological knowledge’,
Geertz introduces the concepts ‘experience near’ and ‘experience
distant’. The distinction between them guides anthropological analy-
sis and helps to frame its findings. In these methodological proce-
dures an anthropologist is required to pay attention to the symbolic
forms that people actually use, for example, in presenting themselves
to themselves and to one another. In so doing it is not only ‘experi-
ence near’ concepts which will lead to clear understanding but also
that these concepts must be balanced by the appropriate ‘experience
distant’ concepts that are not necessarily familiar to the people being
studied. This procedure leads to anthropological knowledge, that is,
‘experience distant’ concepts which “enable us to understand the dis-
tinctive symbolic forms of their culture.”39 Obviously, by making such
a distinction Geertz takes the risk of overlooking the accuracy of
translating the ‘symbolic forms of their culture’ into another differ-
ent conceptual framework outside that culture since it is likely that
conflictual understandings exist between the two distinct perspec-
37 Ibid., p. 92.
38 Ibid., p. 94.
39 Ibid., p. 95.
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tives. Nevertheless, in this particular point it is in running such risks
while being aware that conflictual understandings exist that the con-
cept of particularity of perspectives germinates.
Despite some shortcomings in the quest for ‘anthropological knowl-
edge’, Bernstein’s elucidation of Geertz’ approach in appropriating
the ‘hermeneutical circle’ in his ethnographic is clearly illuminative:
A continuous dialectical taking between the most local of local de-
tail and the most global of global structure in such a way as to bring
both into view simultaneously.
Hopping back and forth between the whole conceived through the
parts which actualise it and the parts conceived through the whole
which motivates them, we seek to turn them, by a sort of intellectual
perpetual motion, into explication of one another.40
Although Geertz never mentions the term ‘incommensurability’,
Bernstein considers it to be implicitly applicable in Geertz’s response
to the anthropological problem. In concretising this supposition
Bernstein offers an example from Geertz’s study of the Javanese,
Balinese, and Moroccan concepts of person. He shows that each of
these three cultures has its own concept of what a person is, which,
“‘from our point of view,’ may seem ‘more than a little odd.’”41 Ac-
cording to Bernstein those concepts of person signified by ‘from our
point of view’ are incommensurable to the Western concept of ‘per-
son’. Furthermore, according to Bernstein, ‘we’ cannot make “a point-
by-point comparison or translation or discover something which is
the generic concept of self of which these are exotic species with
clearly defined differentia.”42
Nevertheless, incommensurability, according to Bernstein does not
interfere with understanding and comparing the concepts, to which I
40 Ibid., quoting Geertz, ‘From the Native’s Point of View: On the Nature of An-
thropological Understanding,’ in Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan, Inter-
pretative Social Science: A Reader (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979),
p. 239.
41 Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, p. 95.
42 Ibid., p. 96.
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can add that they express the thought forms. Rather, we are chal-
lenged to search for some basic understandings and compare them, a
challenge that is met by the “artful employment of hermeneutical
skills.”43 The distinction referred as the ‘other’ groups’ concepts of
the ‘self’ and the Westerners’, which Geertz acknowledges, is what I
would call two particular perspectives about the concept of the ‘self’.
More distinctively, the concepts of ‘self’ among those ‘others’ and
that of Westerners, which Bernstein uses to explain Kuhn’s theory of
incommensurability, is what illuminates further the meaning of par-
ticularity of perspective. Tracking Bernstein’s conclusion, these par-
ticular perspectives of the concept of self, like paradigms, are incom-
mensurable. Obviously they are distanced from one another by a va-
riety of contextual factors founded not only on particular thoughts
but also the ways of thinking wrapped in clusters of concepts.
What role does the concept of particularity of perspective play in the
context of this essay? Although I have drawn some insights only
briefly in the above presentation of the concept of particularity of
perspective, the main poles have been erected. I indicated in Beyond
the Controversy that my understanding of the concept of particular-
ity of perspectives compresses two basic terms, namely the under-
standing of reality and the understanding of experience. These terms
appear to be categories of thinking in African theology in particular
and in the Third World theologies in general. How do we define real-
ity? Whose definition of reality is authentic? In a similar way, how
do we define experience? Whose experience should determine theo-
logical reflection? In the light of such questions we are confronted by
a thesis that all knowledge of reality and experience is particularly
perspectival. This is the lesson I elevated in my above-mentioned
work investigating the tension between African theologies of
inculturation and South African Black theology of liberation. We all
understand from a certain perspective not only as conditioned by a
number of factors arising from our context of our growth and exist-
ence but also by lack or limited by the actualities of the existential
43 Ibid.
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realities and experience(s) of others. Geertz hits the mark when he
says that our understanding of others is primarily through interpreta-
tion of ‘their’ categories of thought into ‘our’ categories of thought
with the result that this second hand understanding is always limited.
This is clearly a model of modelistic understanding.
The concept of particularity of perspectives is useful in the African
context in which new theologies are flourishing especially due to the
fluctuating situations and rapid growth of the church together with
the eruption of revival movements. However, does the apprehension
of the concept of particularity of perspectives mean that all theolo-
gies erupting should simply be accepted?
Unity in plurality as a challenge in African theology
At this point I intend to present briefly what I consider to be a general
approach to the study of the development of African theology. My
emphasis on the particularity of perspectives is a reaction to what I
might call reductionistic universalism. In other words, I see the fu-
ture of African theology mainly as dependent on a serious
hermenutical transformation from ‘reductionistic universalism’ such
as ‘Black African theology’, to ‘openness’ characterised by ‘unitive
pluralism’.44 Furthermore, the future of African theology does not
depend solely on what different theological schools say in their con-
ceptual battles; rather, it will depend primarily on what they say on
the basis of the empirical realities of the life and teachings that arise
from the African Christian communities. This is the mediative factor
of African theology.
In Beyond the Controversy I used constructive critique as an approach
to the study of the theologies involved in that particular controversy.
44 Cf. Robin Petersen, ‘Theological Reflection on Public Policy,’ JTSA 95 (1996),
pp. 76-85. I borrow the phrase ‘unitive pluralism’ from Petersen who uses it to
express what is needed of the Church in the post-modern era with its powerful
emphasis on pluralism (pp. 80-81).
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However, my conclusions went beyond the boundaries of that con-
troversy. I used constructive critique with the intention of transcend-
ing the old African theological framework and its despotism and pro-
tectionism of a certain number of theological trends. I still hold simi-
lar view that just as the two veteran African theologies, namely those
of inculturation and liberation, reflect two particular perspectives so
do other theologies arising out of African situational questions. My
intention is to extend the old framework created by the two theolo-
gies so as to allow other constructive and fruitful voices to join the
African theological debate. Each theological trend is like a modelistic
paradigm with its elements and forces that hold these elements to-
gether. Each context has its elements that make it and are used in
describing it. Changes in situations and conditions within a particu-
lar context affect the stability of the forces and hence most likely the
structure of the model itself.
It follows that each model is a unique and complete whole. We can
analyse it, describe its components, attach an interpretation to it and
even compare it with other models. Yet it remains unique but not
necessarily stable. That is why in my critique of integral-synthesis
constructions in Beyond the Controversy I defended this uniqueness
of each type of African theology. In that work I drew insights from
constructive (radical) postmodernism. The basic view of construc-
tive postmodernism is stated as to repudiate and oppose or critic au-
thoritarianism, imperialism and obscurantism that reflect repressive
and conservative views, while at the same time emphasising what its
exponents call politics of recognition.45 On the one hand, this basic
45 Cf. Amy Gutmann, ‘Introduction,’ in idem (ed.), Multiculturalism: Examining
the Politics of Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 3-24.
Also Charles Taylor, ‘The Politics of Recognition,’ in Gutmann (ed.),
Multiculturalism, 25-73. Of course, the advocates of ‘constructive postmodernism’
have different or oppositional views. If this understanding is used as a starting
point for my way of reading the texts of African theology, then it echoes Wesley
Kort’s argument that theological discourses can best be understood oppositionally.
Although Kort’s view can be seen to reduce theology to territories fighting each
other, his analysis of theological discourse is useful for understanding different
theological positions. Both the aims of constructive postmodernism and Kort’s ...
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view unveils a possibility of interchangeability between object A and
subject B in the socio-cultural drama in which there is a longing for
recognition. On the other hand, this interchangeability presupposes
maximum openness so as to let A be and represent itself as A and so
B likewise. A study of the relationship between various trends in
African theology presupposes a critical investigation of a modelistic
paradigm that might be described from a particular African context
and experience and investigate how each model represents compara-
tively to the others.
Hence, I used a simple theory of constructive critique as a device for
reviewing the integral-synthesis constructions. Furthermore, I used
it as an alternative theory to integral-synthesis and hence minimised
the possibility of slipping into the ‘engravements of assimilation’ of
the already established African theologies which represent themselves
as ‘dominant voices’. The difference between integral-synthesis con-
structions and assimilation in this development is slim. In Beyond
the Controversy I emphasised neither that the insoluble differences
make African theology less fruitful and less unitive, nor that the simi-
larities provide an absolute solution to the theological ‘tension’. Hence,
... oppositional analysis throw light on how a constructive critique functions as a
theological approach. While constructive postmodernism emphasises recognition
of the views of the ‘other’ as particular and unique, Kort’s views, no matter how
demeaning, degrading and disconcerting, cautions us that even those theologians
who generally hold the same principles of approach, e.g. ‘constructive
postmodernism’, have their oppositions. Such oppositions can be resolved by dia-
logue in practice. It is these oppositions which Terrence W. Tilley understands
positively meaning that they lead to a more understanding of each theological po-
sition. Kort’s oppositional analysis can somehow be related to Martey’s tensional
analysis, although at the same time their teloi are different. Therefore, a construc-
tive critique as a theological approach can be related to constructive postmodernism,
which aims at overcoming domination and authoritarianism in theological inter-
pretation. For a theological discussion of this, see Tilley, ‘Constructive
Postmodernism,’ in Tilley (ed.), Postmodern Theologies: The Challenge of Reli-
gious Diversity (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1995), pp. 1-3. On Kort’s views see his book
Bound to Differ: The Dynamics of Theological Discourses (University Park: The
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992).
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in order to go about this problem of ‘tension’ I have attempted to
avoid relativism in some cases so as to amplify the uniqueness of
each theology. My further assumption was that any study of the rela-
tionship of the two African theologies that remains imprisoned within
the boundaries of the controversy itself with the purpose of reconcil-
ing the two theological positions ends up in paradoxical conclusions.
What criterion solidifies my position?
Exemplifying what I mean by constructive critique I refer to Harry
Sawyerr, one of the fathers of African theology. Sawyerr long ago
taught us that “Africa” is primarily a mythological term.46 In its his-
torical context Sawyerr used the term ambiguously. In his usage it
seems that its definition is contradicted by its application to the Afri-
can context.47 If the mythological meaning of Africa is expressed by
function in the context of African existential realities namely that it
expresses love for a continent despite all the differences, then diver-
sity of theological expressions could have had a place in the frame-
work of this mythological meaning. Hence, my interest in Sawyerr’s
concept of the mythological meaning of Africa is rooted in how he
defined the concept “Africa”. Drawing from his definition, my as-
sumption is that the application of that concept is a kind of redefining
the predication. Thereafter, I find a possibility of changing the appli-
cation. The phrase “thinking together” as multiplicity of Christian
groupings in Africa, as Sawyerr argued, does not in my view, mean
to think about the Christian teaching in the same way and express it
using the same vocabulary. Furthermore, if the multiplicity of Chris-
tian groupings in Africa constitutes a multiplicity of the elements
that form the existential realities, e.g. races, sexes, culture, traditions,
46 Harry Sawyerr, ‘What is African Theology?’ in John Parratt (ed.), A Reader in
African Christian Theology (London, SPCK, 1987), p. 25.
47 Ibid. Sawyerr defined this term as “. . . expressive of love for a continent and a
commitment to an ideal” while at the same time bearing in mind that Africa is
geographically a vast continent with many people of different races and colours.
Hence for Sawyerr to talk about unity in this context means that the bond of that
unity is love. What followed in his critique of Black theology is his misunderstand-
ing that ‘love’ bridges difference without annulling them.
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political views, and religions, then that multiplicity involves also di-
versity and differences. Quite rightly the complications arising from
this diversity and difference call for attention in our theological re-
flections. From this trend of thought a student of African theology
needs a critical tool that enables him or her to describe and re-de-
scribe basic modelistic paradigms. Each element has its place in the
model. Hence, one can continuously use a model of the modelled in
attempting grasp a shifting picture of that theology.
The concept of constructive critique I am using proceeds from my
understanding of the plurality of voices in African theology that fol-
lows from the mythological meaning of Africa. Obviously this un-
derstanding constitutes various clusters of concepts based on differ-
ent situations and experiences on the same continent. For example,
no African male theologian can speak clearly about a theology made
of the ‘heart and womb’ or by ‘slave of slaves’ except African women
who share this experience and conviction.48 Similarly, we can add
that during the apartheid era in South Africa, no African theologian
from sub-Sahara Africa understood the real existential experiences
of apartheid other than those “Blacks” who were living in South Af-
rica. Time and again I sense that my approach to those theologies
produced from such peculiar contexts and situations is not only herme-
neutical but also ethical. As far as my existence is confined to a space
outside those perimeters I am an outsider or at most a partial partici-
pant in those theologies. I am in one way or another marginalised by
those peculiar elements in a particular context, situation and experi-
ence. I enter in those peculiar elements of ‘their’ theological thinking
through knowledge communicated by the insiders. The knowledge I
grasp is as modelistic paradigms that transform the insiders’ mean-
ing into my understanding so as to concretise this understanding. At
a fair level such knowledge is interpretational. Thus, there always
exists a certain awareness inside myself that recalls Geertz’ categori-
sation of ‘theirs’ and ‘ours’ or ‘mine’ which calls for a fair balance.
48 Cf. Mercy Amba Oduyoye, Daughters of Anowa, African Women and Patriar-
chy (Maryknoll, Orbis Books, 1995), pp. 85, 180 and 184.
Stephen Munga
249
This continuous search for balancing different experiences suggests
that in the methodological pattern the hermeneutical plane is pre-
ceded by a descriptive analytical exercise that helps to explain the
elements and forces that constitute each particular modelistic para-
digm. Modelistic paradigms in this connection attempt to substanti-
ate our mental imaginations once abstract and theoretical.
Whether we refer to contextual theologies in general or to African the-
ology in particular what I have just said suggests the possibility of
mapping each theology within the framework of the dialogic plural-
ism. Hence, constructive critique as an approach assists in formulating
questions about any possibilities of unity among the different African
theologies without annulling the uniqueness of each.49 It stands between
the creative part of my investigation and my conclusive judgements.
49 A dialogue between the two African theologies is possible if some potentialities
are realised and used as the point of departure. For example, there is an understand-
ing of Christian theology as an “articulation of Christian faith” (Kwesi Dickson),
whereas the concept “Christian faith” itself carries the potentialities of a common
ground from which a dialogue can be initiated. See also Kwame Bediako, Theol-
ogy and Identity, p. 439 f. See especially his identification of the Christian faith as
a historical part of African experience. This part of history forms the ground for a
broader framework for the possibility of dialogue between different Christian the-
ologies. See also Bediako, Christianity in Africa: The Renewal of a Non-Western
Religion, p. 4 f. Here he uses the term “African Christianity” as one form of Chris-
tian identity considered to have the potentialities for initiating dialogue between
different African theologies. See also Ngindu Mushete, ‘Unity of Faith and Plural-
ism in Theology,’ in Torres and Fabella, The Emergent Gospel, p. 50 ff. What we
gain from Mushete is that the category “unity of faith” can be a common ground
for identifying the reciprocal relationship between unity and pluralism in the di-
versified teaching of the Christian faith. Other areas, which conceal such potenti-
alities, are history and experience, used as points of departure for theological re-
flection by Third World theologians. The latest theological dialogues between Third
World theologians seem to be based on a renewed realisation and the will to use to
the maximum the possibilities which these potentialities can offer in order to cre-
ate a renewed way of understanding their theologies. See for example, Voices from
the Third World, vol. xviii, no. 1 (1995); also vol. xix, no. 2 (1996).
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Each theological modelistic paradigm stands uniquely on itself but
can also be seen in the presence of others. In Beyond the Controversy
especially chapter 10 I attempted a comparative study of key con-
cepts and themes as presented by the key theologies I investigated.
My intention in that chapter was to show that although Charles
Nyamiti and Manas Buthelezi used similar key words, they might
have had different meanings in their theological thinking. More ex-
plicitly, their theologies represent different modelistic paradigms.
From their theologies I attempted to address the question of search-
ing for a criterion of ‘unitive pluralism’ in the diversity of African
theologies although with some difficulties. African Christianity, ac-
cording to Maluleke, is a relevant unitive factor. I agree with him.
However, I would like to add from my previous argument that Afri-
can Christianity should stand as a subject open to different
predications. How do we encounter and mediate these predications?
Constructive critique stands as a mediative approach to an investiga-
tion of the relationship between different theologies, and in the case
of African theologies grasping the modelistic paradigm of one facili-
tates understanding the other clearly. As pointed out by Kwesi
Dickson, since the Christian faith is articulated by individuals in a
variety of cultures and existential situations, it is obvious that Afri-
can theology represents diversified reflections.50 Nevertheless, from
this expression it should be added that a comparative study of the
main views in each theology could amplify the particularity and
uniqueness of each, as well as provide a complementary understand-
ing that allows borrowing from each theology. If one theological
modelistic paradigm appears to have major inadequacies it is prefer-
able to search for alternative set of assumptions that might be more
fruitful. The future of African theology and its fruitfulness depends
on allowing for a continual critical engagement in viewing and re-
viewing its fundamental assumptions in the light of the challenges
that arise from changes in context and situations.
50 Kwesi Dickson, ‘The African Theological Task,’ p. 46 f.
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The Millenarian Meridian and
Cultural-Religious Conflict in
T. M. Aluko’s Kinsman and Foreman
Frederick Hale
Three decades of critical analysis since the 1960s have shed a great
deal of light on postcolonial Nigerian fiction, yet many facets of this
jewel remain tenebrous. Among the dozens of littérateurs whose
works have generally escaped the attention of scholars who have de-
voted a strongly disproportionate amount of their attention to the fic-
tion and drama of Chinua Achebe, Wole Soyinka, and a handful of
other pioneers is Timothy Mofolorunso Aluko. Professor Patrick Scott
could declare without fear of exaggeration in the early 1990s that
“Aluko is one of the most productive, though most undervalued, of
modern Nigerian novelists, and his seven novels offer a distinctive
insight into Nigerian society during the middle decades of the twen-
tieth century”.1 To be sure, this Yoruba’s literary output has not been
totally overlooked. His first novel, One Man, One Wife, for example,
is occasionally cited as an insightful pioneering analysis of the issue
of polygamy in the mission Church in which Aluko directed his sa-
tirical rapier at both traditional religious beliefs and practices and the
misdirected strategies of missionaries in rural western Nigeria. This
novel is also known in some circles as the first to be published by a
Nigerian firm. Most of Aluko’s subsequent fiction, however, has never
received its scholarly due, and critical opinion has never been univo-
cal about his talent as a literary artist. He has been alternatively vili-
fied for refusing to take explicitly political stances in a country whose
1 Patrick Scott, ‘T. M. Aluko’, in Bernth Lindfors and Reinhard Sander (eds.),
Dictionary of Literary Biography. Vol. 117. Twentieth-Century Caribbean and Black
African Writers (Detroit: Gale Research Inc., 1992), p. 41.
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chaotic and often violent politics has nearly been its undoing for dec-
ades and for representing an elitist mentality reminiscent of the Brit-
ish colonialism which gave him his formal education and career as a
civil engineer.2 On the other hand, some critics have lauded the deft-
ness with which he has wielded his satirical rapier and found his
controlled style and narrative technique praiseworthy.
Surprisingly scant attention has been paid to Aluko’s novel of 1966,
Kinsman and Foreman.3 It is at first blush primarily a reconstruction
of corruption in the civil service of colonial Nigeria a few years after
the completion of the Second World War, and literary commentary
has focussed on this theme, which has parallels in such works as
Achebe’s A Man of the People, published the same year. But Kins-
man and Foreman is also a novel about religious life, particularly the
interplay of grass roots Christianity and widespread local corruption.
Literary critics have prudently refrained from venturing out of their
depth and attempting to dissect the theological and other religious
dimensions which are vital to Aluko’s message.
From a missiological perspective, Kinsman and Foreman is a par-
ticularly valuable fictional reconstruction, as is provides a sensitive,
eye-witness consideration of such pivotal issues as ecclesiastical polity
and funding, the persistence of “pagan” beliefs and practices in Yoruba
Anglicanism, and popular millenarianism approximately two gen-
erations after Christianity gained major footholds in western Nigeria
but a decade before the attainment of independence from the British
Empire in 1960. While Aluko deals with inter alia the survival of
indigenous religious convictions in the Church, and thus to some
degree does for Yoruba Anglicanism what such contemporaries as
2 See especially S. A. Dzeagu, ‘T. M. Aluko as a Social Critic’, Legon Journal of
the Humanities, II (1976), pp. 28-41, which remains one of the few noteworthy
critiques of Aluko’s fiction.
3 T. M. Aluko, Kinsman and Foreman (London: Heinemann Educational Books,
1967). Though Heinemann initially published Kinsman and Foreman in 1966, all
references in the present article are to this widely available version in its African
Writers Series.
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John Munonye in The Only Son and Obi and Onuora Nzekwu in Wand
of Noble Wood and Blade Among the Boys do for Igbo Roman Ca-
tholicism, no more than either of these contemporaries does he deal
in cultural nostalgia or uncritically lionise his ethnic group while vili-
fying the British colonial administration. Instead, in Kinsman and
Foreman he focuses almost exclusively on events of the very recent
past, i.e. the era of his young adulthood not long after the termination
of the Second World War, and exercises his liberty to portray both
indigenes and imperialists in hues that represent much of the spec-
trum from pity to praise.
We shall pay special attention to Aluko’s consideration of
millenarianism, a pivotal theme which gives the plot of Kinsman and
Foreman a vital spiritual spark and at times has been a prominent
strain in the maintenance of the broad Aladura Church movement
which has flavoured much religious life amongst the Yoruba since
early in the twentieth century.
Plot summary
As Kinsman and Foreman is not an especially well known novel, a
synopsis of its plot is in order. The central character is Titus Oti, a
Yoruba in his twenties who, when the narrative begins in the late 1940s,
has just returned to Nigeria following the successful completion of a
three-year civil engineering course in London. (In this one senses an
autobiographical strain; Aluko studied that subject in the British me-
tropolis from 1946 until 1950.) His father has died the previous year;
his bereaved mother resides in Ibala, the town near Ibadan to which
Titus has been assigned by the Public Works Department as its District
Engineer, the first African to hold such a post in the colonial adminis-
tration. Whether this neophyte civil servant has any siblings is not stated.
In any case, his extended family descends upon him, seeking to capi-
talise on his status and supposed wealth. Indeed, the appeal he initially
has to them seems to verify the time-honoured adage, “Success is rela-
tive; the more success, the more relatives”. Particularly onerous in this
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regard is an ambitious cousin, Simeon Oke, who is employed as a fore-
man in the Public Works Department and promptly takes the initiative
in introducing his returned kinsman to people in positions of wealth
and authority at the All Races Club in Ibadan. It is under the tutelage of
this esteemed relative that the patriarch of Titus’s extended family has
just placed him as he launches his career.
Titus and his relatives are Anglicans who commune at moderately
large All Souls Church in Ibala, where his great-uncle Joel is a promi-
nent elder. Both this senior member of the parish and his friends as-
sume that young Titus has begun to garner considerable wealth and
seek to relieve him of part of it, both for themselves and to under-
write the construction of their new chapel. They, especially Joel, re-
sent the Westernised young engineer’s reluctance in this regard as
well as what they perceive as his cavalier attitude towards such tribal
traditions as respect for the older generation. At the same time, these
people hold Simeon in high regard, chiefly because he showers money
on them and contributes heavily to the Church and its building fund.
Early on, one of Titus’s British colonial superiors informs him that
Simeon is a scoundrel, an appellation whose appropriateness the young
District Engineer soon comes to realise when one incident after an-
other reveals that his cousin has accumulated his wealth through such
means as claiming mileage allotments for official use of his car (which
in fact has not left the All Races Club for two months), dispatching
government road labourers to toil on his private farm, and accepting
bribes from people who approach him in search of employment. When
Titus tells his mother, Joel, and others about Simeon’s corruption,
however, they reject his accusations as preposterous, their percep-
tions of him unquestionably coloured by their awareness that he con-
tributes generously to the Church and thus enjoys great local popu-
larity. Carrying this theme to its extreme, Titus’s mother discloses
that after the death of his father Titus was able to continue his studies
in London only because of Simeon’s generosity. Faced with these
attitudes, Titus finds it virtually impossible to deflate reports that he
is responsible for the rumoured transfer of his cousin to Cameroon
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and that he is seeking to rid himself of Simeon, who is already a
polygamist, in order to undertake a sexual affair with Simeon’s girl-
friend. This woman, Bimpe, who is apparently one of their distant
relatives, becomes acquainted with Titus at the All Races Club and
reveals to him that Simeon gives her work as an amateur contractor
and has sired her daughter. The crooked foreman escapes with impu-
nity from both a trial and a hearing at the Public Works Department,
however, largely because people who could testify against him are
unwilling to convict this man on whom they depend for their liveli-
hood.4 In the meantime, Simeon has learnt about Titus’s allegations
against him and enlisted the aid of both fellow parishioners and a
juju for his protection, especially against possible transfer out of the
district. Under great emotional duress, Titus suffers what appears to
be some sort of mental breakdown while on vacation but recovers
after a period of hospitalisation.
One of Bimpe’s instrumental functions in Kinsman and Foreman is
to introduce Titus to a religious movement which operates on the
periphery of the Anglican parish. Comprising some of the key mem-
bers of All Souls, these Alasoteles, or Band of the Faithful, began as
a group meeting at the home of Elder Matthew for additional prayers,
but their predominantly female movement takes on additional sig-
nificance after one of its members, a man named Bandele, has vi-
sions of the return of Jesus Christ. He eventually indicates that this
apocalyptic event will occur on 12 August 1950. Local religious fer-
vour focuses on that date, and on it townspeople gather to meet the
Lord. Fearful that they will not be acceptable to Christ if they still
have unforgiven sins on their consciences, some of them make pub-
lic confessions about all manner of personal offences. Simeon, who
has repeatedly denied wrongdoing, joins by confessing his illegal
practices and his perjury in denying them under oath. Subsequently
he is transferred to Cameroon, apparently accompanied by his para-
4 For an isolated critique of this dimension of the novel, see Beatrice Stegeman,
‘The Courtroom Clash in T. M. Aluko’s Kinsman and Foreman’, Critique, XVII,
no. 2 (1975), pp. 26-35.
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mour Bimpe. International publicity surrounding the millenarian ex-
pectations brings the plight of All Souls Church to the attention of a
similarly named parish in Chicago, which makes a major contribu-
tion to its building fund.
Between two cultures: exasperated engineer Titus Oti
Aluko employs Titus Oti’s position as a cultural mestizo to highlight
various dimensions of the clash between traditional Yoruba and Brit-
ish colonial ways, including discordant elements of the religious tradi-
tions at play in Kinsman and Foreman. The fact that he has studied
civil engineering in the capital of the British Empire and then partici-
pates in the ongoing construction of the colonial infrastructure of Ni-
geria sets the tone of nonconformity with the ways of his relatives.
Titus feels uncomfortable during a service at All Souls Church which
is both a thanksgiving for his safe return and a memorial to his late
father, especially when his great-uncle refers to the continuing pres-
ence and power of their deceased forebears: “Something deep down in
him was telling him in a thin voice that he should break away from it
all - he felt that he should run out of the airless room into the fresh
atmosphere outside - an atmosphere that was free of ancestral spirits”
(p. 8). Reminders of his modernity are scattered throughout the narra-
tive. During his childhood, his pastor reminds the congregation, Titus
was “a most saintly boy with the heart of a cherub” at All Souls (p. 173),
and at no time does he evince more than the slightest influence of tra-
ditional Yoruba spirituality. When his mother brings the infant child of
another relative unannounced to his office, for example, Titus finds it
repulsive that the baby defecates on the floor and assures his mother
that after he and his fiancée become parents their children will wear
napkins (p. 33). In another exchange with her, Titus makes it clear that
for him the Western, as opposed to the Yoruba, concept of “father” has
become normative and sighs “at the futility of his effort to show his
mother of the necessity of distinguishing between the members of a
real blood family and those of an extended family” (pp. 47-48). Titus
reads The Times at his home in Ibala (a modern house provided by the
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Public Works Department) and W. Somerset Maugham’s Of Human
Bondage while on vacation (pp. 127, 141). During his period of mental
illness in rural Nigeria, he hears voices singing two British standards,
Men of Harlech and Poor Old Joe (p. 142).
Notwithstanding his command of the English language, Bachelor of
Science from the University of London, Christian faith, ease of move-
ment in colonial circles, and other accoutrements of Westernisation,
Titus retains part of his African core. Aluko emphasises this when the
beleaguered engineer goes on holiday in a rural area not far from Ibadan.
En route to his destination, Titus is clearly returning to his ancestral
environment, although he views it through partially foreign eyes:
He was intrigued to see a huge baboon crossing the road some fifty
yards ahead. He slowed down when he got to the spot and watched
with interest the back view of the retreating beast. But a few mo-
ments later he saw a still greater spectacle, a whole family of mon-
keys, easily a dozen, crossing the road this time some hundred yards
ahead. . . . He was absolutely fascinated. This was the true Africa of
the dream of the European and the American, where man and mon-
key fought for space, under the watchful eye of the elephant and the
lion (p. 133).
Furthermore, when Bimpe invites him to the Alasotele service at Elder
Matthew’s house, Titus immediately perceives the essential difference
between that of the Anglican tradition and what he experiences here.
The informal congregation worships spontaneously: “They were now
all on their feet - and he noticed for the first time that they were all
barefoot. They all sang at the top of their voices. They clapped their
hands and swayed their hips in unison with the rhythm”. His own Af-
rican sympathies, in the most essential sense of the term, are obvious:
The effect on Titus was tremendous. This was a religious song with
a difference. It produced in him a completely different effect from
the prayers and responses at the services at All Souls which were
sung in a tediously monotonous matter. It was entirely different from
the effect produced on him by Pastor Morakinyo singing in a single
musical note the three prayers after the creed. This was worship in a
true African setting. And mechanically he removed his own shoes
and joined in the singing and the clapping of hands (pp. 71-72).
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Less apparent, however, is Titus’s spiritual condition during the time
frame of the plot. That he was firmly anchored in All Souls Church
before going to London is evident from remarks made by his pastor,
the Reverend Michael Morakinyo. After his heralded return to Ibala,
Titus initially seems to move comfortably in ecclesiastical circles, de-
spite his resistance to being exploited by the committee which is rais-
ing funds to complete construction of the chapel and his waxing disaf-
fection with Simeon and other members of the parish. Possibly owing
to preoccupation with his career, the young engineer rarely partici-
pates in its worship. It is also conceivable that under the ministry of
Morakinyo, whose potentially prophetic voice Simeon has effectively
neutralised through large contributions to the building fund, All Souls
parish simply has little of a practical nature to say to the disillusioned
Titus. He readily accepts Bimpe’s invitation to attend the Alasotele
meeting at Elder Matthew’s home, but he concedes that his sexual at-
traction to her is one factor which has motivated him to do so. Never-
theless, Titus finds that the African worship of this gathering resonates
with his inner spirituality. Perhaps as signs of his spiritual waning, Aluko
pointedly states that the returned engineer initially drinks orange squash
at the All Races Club, explicitly eschewing opportunities to partake
stronger beverages, but eventually consumes beer and wine (pp. 20,
141). What Aluko repeatedly underscores, however, is that the no longer
particularly religious Titus is a man of considerably stronger moral
fibre than are some pillars of the Church.
Servant of God? The Reverend Michael Morakinyo
The sole identified representative of the clergy in Kinsman and Fore-
man is Reverend Michael Morakinyo. Aluko’s portrayal of this age-
ing cleric is quite meticulously drawn and, in the main, sympathetic.
Morakinyo is described as “old” but is the father of a “little girl”
whose age is not specified (pp. 96, 100). Hardly a man of means, he
uses an “old bicycle” as his principal mode of transport (p. 185). Aluko
does not provide details of his education, apart from indicating that
he speaks English fluently, but the snippets from Morakinyo’s ser-
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mons indicate that he has a fairly conventional understanding of ba-
sic Christian doctrines as taught in the Anglican tradition. In one of
the most missiologically revelatory passages in Kinsman and Fore-
man, he ponders the dicotyledonous spirituality of his flock upon
being reminded that Elder Joel and “all the church folk believed in
witchcraft and in juju”:
Morakinyo sighed as he recollected that that was what most of his
congregation did. They attended the church twice on Sunday and
bible class once during the week. They prayed to God twice a day
asking for this and that. But they secretly went to the Ifa priest and
the Sango priest at night to ask for the intercession of the gods in
matters for which their Christian faith did not appear to have an im-
mediate answer (p. 150).
In his pastoral ministry, this man of the cloth evinces numerous tal-
ents. Previously a junior member of the clergy attached to one of its
lesser parishes, he has at some point become vicar at All Souls, the
“mother Church” of this diocese, although he is not a bishop. The
arrows in his quiver of skills include “his great organizing ability, his
oratory in the pulpit, and his charm and personality . . .” (p. 103).
Despite his seeming captivity to the teachings and trappings of the
Church of England, Morakinyo, like the much younger Titus Oti, is a
cultural mestizo. Aluko underscores his underlying Africanness. When
a member of the All Souls congregation anonymously requests inter-
cessory prayer, for instance, Morakinyo leads the parishioners in pe-
titioning God to watch over the unidentified man’s wives and to bless
with children those who lack them (p. 85). On the other hand,
Morakinyo has clearly appropriated some Western secular views.
When Titus’s mother creates a scene at the hospital where her men-
tally ill son is being treated by insisting on his immediate discharge,
for example, this clergyman disapproves of her demand and expresses
his allegiance to modern medicine by telling her that “the doctor says
he must not be disturbed at all” (p. 146).
Morakinyo emphatically rejects the Alasotele movement and its
millenarianism, although Aluko gives only a rough sketch of the
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grounds on which he does so. “It is a good thing to be at all times
ready for the second coming of Our Lord”, Morakinyo emphasises to
Titus on the morning of the appointed day. “It is true we are taught in
the Scriptures to expect it to be sudden. But the way the Alasoteles
have worked up the people into this frenzy is most strange” (pp. 183-
184). When the cynical young lawyer Chris Daniels, who Titus met
in London and who practices in Ibala, feigns seriousness and asks
him during the same conversation whether the last day was not at
hand, Morakinyo merely says, “Of course not, sir” without offering a
theological or other explanation for his categorical rejection of
Bandele’s vision (p. 184).
An underlying preoccupation determines Morakinyo’s perceptions
about much of what happens in Kinsman and Foreman: “The new
church building of All Souls had been the one consuming passion of
his pastoral career. He had dreamt of it ever since he had been working
as a junior member of the clergy in one of the smaller churches in the
Diocese” (p. 103). After Jesus Christ fails to return on 12 August 1950,
Morakinyo can apparently breath a sigh of relief. He nowhere men-
tions the confessions of Simeon or anyone else that he has heard, but
instead merely dismisses the apocalyptic fervour as “evil” and “chaos”
which God has used beneficially to “bring good fortune to our church”
in the form of money from overseas (p. 196). Morakinyo also regards
the transfer of his benefactor Simeon to Cameroon as evil but expresses
to Titus his belief that God would also use it for good (p. 197).
The apocalyptic axis of the Alasotele movement
As J. D. Y. Peel pointed out in his classic study of two key Independ-
ent Churches amongst the Yoruba during the first two-thirds of the
twentieth century, namely the Christ Apostolic Church and the Cheru-
bim and Seraphim, visions and prophecy have long been hallmarks
of these bodies’ spirituality and worship. Many of these phenomena
have been mundane and pertinent to immediate, local situations, while
others have related to matters affecting entire denominations or the
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sinful nature of mankind. The exponential growth of these Churches,
cornerstones of the broad Aladura, or praying, movement in Yoruba
Christianity, has occurred in a context of rapid social change, and, at
least in Peel’s view, been profoundly shaped by it.5
Aluko, it must be emphasised, does not depict an Aladura movement
as such, but his depiction of a consequential millenarian vision in
Kinsman and Foreman is nevertheless entirely relevant to an under-
standing of the broader phenomenon as an intimate reconstruction of
how this element was played out on the scene of the local Anglican
Church. His description of the meeting at Elder Matthew’s home is
particularly detailed and enlightening. In our consideration of Titus
Oti’s essential Africanness, we have called attention to the gender
imbalance of the group and its form of worship. It should also be
underscored that the focus of the message which Matthew preaches
is on eternal salvation in an eschatological sense; there is no apparent
concern for the here and now. Anything smacking of “Social Gos-
pel” or prophetic criticism of corruption appears to be entirely for-
eign to the spirituality of the Alasoteles. For that matter, even after
Bandele collapses during the reception of his vision (a crucial matter
to be considered shortly), Matthew admonishes his flock: “Do not be
unduly worried about the fate of this our brother in salvation. Do not
show undue concern for his body. It is about the soul of Bandele that
we must show anxiety. For his body is no more than earth - mere
earth. And we have faith in the Lord our Saviour that he has received
salvation regardless of what happens to his body - Allelujah” (p. 73).
Initially, virtually no details are given of the vision which Bandele
(who boasts one of the very few African given names in Kinsman
and Foreman) experiences. The narrative emphasis is on his behav-
iour. At one seemingly inappropriate point in the service, Bandele
shouts “Allelujah!” Aluko explains, “It was the shout of joy and of
victory, the shout of salvation and of redemption”. His fellow wor-
5 J. D. Y. Peel, Aladura: A Religious Movement Among the Yoruba (London: Ox-
ford University Press, 1968), pp. 65, 124-125.
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shippers initially ignore this exclamation as a normal utterance in the
service, but when Bandele repeats it in obvious pain a few minutes
later at an equally inopportune time, they take greater notice and see
that his pupils are dilated. Bandele then loses the hymnal he has been
holding and falls across a bench. Highlighting the partially individu-
alistic nature of Alasotele worship, however, “people in the immedi-
ate vicinity of the stricken brother showed more concern for their
own safety than for the man lying prostrate before them”. Some of
the worried members nearest him leave the scene but, as Aluko points
out, “it must be said to the credit of the core of worshippers that they
continued their singing as if they were disgusted with comrades of so
little faith that they were making so much fuss about such a little
incident” (pp. 72-73). Further accentuating the element of individu-
ality is the mode of praying which follows: “And the whole host went
down on their knees. They all said their prayers each completely
unmindful of the presence of others” (p. 74).Titus fears that the
stricken Bandele is in extremis, but when he telephones a police in-
spector to report the matter, that official informs him that “he was
used to the prophets of Elder Matthew’s fold seeing visions, that not
one in his experience had died in the act, and that the District Engi-
neer should not be upset by what he had witnessed”. Moreover, when
Titus returns to Elder Matthew’s house later that day, Bimpe assures
him that “of course” Bandele survived the incident. She also relates
that after gaining consciousness he “delivered his prophecy” and that
it concerned “a vision of the end of the world”. In response to Titus’s
scepticism, this marginally literate young woman assures him that
Bandele is “quite genuine” and “a holy man” who should not be taken
lightly. The much more highly educated engineer remains critical,
however, and asks Bimpe whether she was suggesting that “Bandele
is a greater Prophet than all those in the Bible, or a greater authority
on the subject of the Day of Judgement being at hand?” Titus then
plays his rhetorical trump card: “Did Jesus himself not preach the
nearness of it nearly two thousand years ago?” and wonders sarcasti-
cally whether such prophecies were the only reason for attending the
Alasotele services (pp. 75-76). All of this occurs in Chapter Eleven.
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Not until Chapter Twenty-four, some 100 pages later, does Bandele
reveal any further details of his visions, two more of which have
occurred in the interim. Titus learns, and discloses in a letter to his
fiancée in England, that the date of the world has been fixed for 12 Au-
gust 1950, less than a month hence. The people of Ibala are not tak-
ing the matter lightly, he informs her; Bandele has gained celebrity
status, and “large crowds go to Elder Matthew’s house at dawn and at
night where Matthew assisted by Bandele and a whole band of proph-
ets and prophetesses, are preparing the crowds against the coming of
the Lord!” (p. 172)
Aluko’s treatment of these visions remains otherwise sketchy, but he
provides a fairly detailed description of popular behaviour during the
hours immediately preceding the supposed Second Advent. So great
is local interest in the event that even the Moslems of Ibala take heed.
“The Alasoteles are Christians. We are Moslems. But Moslems and
Christians are brothers, Master” explains one employee of the Is-
lamic faith to Titus on 12 August who enquires whether the Imam
has told his flock that the world would end on that day (p. 178). Large
numbers of civil servants fail to report to work, to the great conster-
nation of both British colonial officials and Titus, whose scepticism
endures to the end. Bandele has apparently not specified an hour for
the Lord’s return, so the behaviour of expectant Christians in Ibala
varies a bit. In any case, they do not simply wait passively for the
apocalyptic event to occur: “Some of them had already started their
religious exercises in their individual homes reading psalms and sing-
ing from the hymn-book. Others had decided that the wisest thing to
do was to make straight for Elder Matthew’s”. That ostensibly holy
space becomes the focal point of the pre-eschatological behaviour
which Aluko describes at length:
The crowd at the usual house of prayer therefore grew fast, quite
early in the day. Enough prophets and prophetesses had assembled
long before noon to give leadership to the psalm-reading and the
hymn-singing and the clapping of hands. And, by noon, the usual
meeting-place in the backyard was already full and had overflown
through the central corridor of Elder Matthew’s house on to the front
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verandah and thence to the road outside - the main trunk road from
Ibadan through Ibala to Northern Nigeria (pp. 176-177).
The climax of the apocalyptic event, and indeed of the plot of Kins-
man and Foreman, occurs in Chapter Twenty-seven before the local
bride of Christ is stood up. Believing that they will not be acceptable
to the Lord if the Second Advent occurs while they still bear
unforgiven sins, several of those at Elder Matthew’s home take as
relevant to themselves the admonition of the unidentified preacher
who urges them to pray to God for forgiveness for “the millions whom
this day has caught unprepared to welcome the Bridegroom - dining
and drinking and committing sins and indulging in worldly desires”
(p. 188). They consequently confess past transgressions ranging from
beating a goat belonging to a co-wife of a polygamous husband to
seeking healing by a “native doctor” (pp. 190-191). Bimpe follows
suit, publicly confessing jealousy of a younger sister and “many other
things” which she, to the relief of the lawyer Chris, declines to specify
(p. 191). Simeon’s own confession, made “under great mental strain”,
includes his acceptance of bribes from people seeking employment
in the Public Works Department, claiming compensation for bogus
automotive expenses, and committing perjury while on trial for al-
leged private use on his farm of labourers who were being paid to
work on roads (pp. 192-193).
Perhaps the main thrust of these disclosures and accompanying pleas
for divine forgiveness is the fact that only the fear of imminent
eschatological judgement prompts the sinners in question to make them.
Neither participation in the conventional life of the Church nor attend-
ance at the Alasotele meetings has sufficed to bring believers to their
knees in an atmosphere of increasing corruption and other sins. In the
denouement which follows hard on the heels of his narrative of the
unfulfilled Second Coming, Aluko suggests in the final chapter that
Anglican life in Ibala is returning to its previous state. The only signifi-
cant difference is the more solid financial foundation on which All
Souls stands after it receives support from a Protestant Episcopal par-
ish in Chicago. Simeon has been transferred to Cameroon, but other-
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wise there is virtually no change in the status quo ante. And there are
no more self-revelatory confessions. One senses Aluko’s disillusion-
ment with corruption generally, the bane of post-independence Nige-
rian public life, in his silence about this matter.
In the end, the apocalypticism of the Alasoteles, in addition to serving
as a catalyst without which the previously mentioned financial assist-
ance would not have been forthcoming, prompts further distorted jour-
nalistic coverage of Nigeria overseas. Irresponsible American report-
ers have invaded Ibala and behaved like cultural vandals. Their ac-
counts are sensationalised exercises in creative writing. The focal point
is the visionary Bandele, whose age they variously report from thirty
to sixty years. It is explained that his age can only be estimated, “as no
vital statistics were kept in the jungles of black Africa”. In a similar
piece of ethnic calumny, the tribal chief of Ibala is reported to have no
fewer than “three hundred wives and more children than he himself
could count”. One American newspaper has carried a composite pho-
tograph of Bandele wearing a beard and a halo, neither of which he
actually possesses (p. 196). To the disillusioned observer Titus, the great-
est absurdity lies in the journalistic assertion that “the black man was
deeply religious and that it must be the Bandeles and the Morakinyos
of black Africa that must carry Christian revival back to sinful America
and decadent Europe” (p. 199).
Conclusion
Aluko’s portrayal of the millenarianism of the Alasoteles is woefully
incomplete with regard to its origins, theology, and history after the
non-fulfilment of Bandele’s ill-conceived prophecy. The strengths of
his depiction are those pertaining to the movement’s relationship to
the colonial Church of England, its African style of worship, and
individual spirituality within a context of community. Considered in
relationship to the novel’s theme of corruption, however, what stands
out in bold relief is the practical irrelevance of this religious current.
As Aluko’s mouthpiece, Titus Oti is a pragmatist with moral convic-
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tions and professional pride; he is consequently dedicated to the im-
provement of Nigeria’s infrastructure. He is deeply and increasingly
distressed at the corruption and inefficiency which he experiences as
his country proceeds towards modernisation and political independ-
ence. Neither his pastor nor anyone else at All Souls evinces more
than the slightest concern about the misdeeds which are so apparent
to him. Social ethics, in other words, does not seem to have any place
in the colonial Anglican establishment. But neither does the Alasotele
movement, however appealing some aspects of its Africanness are to
the culturally hybridised protagonist. Rather than making the slight-
est attempt to come to grips with the myriad social and moral prob-
lems which are so apparent to Titus, the religious separatists fix their
gaze on the eschatological termination of the world and seek their
individual salvation in that event. Appropriately enough, neither this
religious current nor Aluko offers an answer to the crisis in which the
local society, and by extension Nigeria generally, find themselves.
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Religionspluraliteten: en drøfting av
teoriene til John Hick og S. Mark Heim1
Bård Mæland
Pluralisme og religionsteologisk posisjonering
Innenfor disiplinen religionsteologi har det lenge pågått en diskusjon
om hvilke grunnleggende tilnærminger til det religiøse mangfoldet
som er mest sakssvarende utfra en teologisk referanseramme. Det er
særlig de såkalte inklusivistiske og pluralistiske posisjonene som har
blitt satt på gjensidige prøver.2  Særlig den pluralistiske tilnærmingen
har vært svært omdiskutert. Det kan nok delvis forklares ved at den i
én forstand er både mindre tradisjonell og konvensjonell enn den
første.3  Tilsvarende har majoriteten av de som deltar i denne diskursen
innen religionsteologien, forsøkt å skape et rom innenfor en inklusi-
1 Artikkelen er en bearbeidelse av et vitenskapsteoretisk essay levert til
doktorgradsopplæringen, Det teologiske Menighetsfakultet, våren 1999. Jeg ben-
ytter her muligheten til å takke Peder Gravem for klargjørende innspill underveis.
2 Til den historisk-analytiske typologien som utgjør bakgrunnen for disse typene,
samt ‘eksklusivisme’, se Alan Race, Christians and religious pluralism. Patterns
in the Christian theology of religions, Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1983, s.
7. Andre måter å innordne de religionsteologiske posisjonene på, finnes f.eks. hos
Reinhold Bernhardt, Der Absolutheitsanspruch des Christentums. Von der
Auferklärung bis zur Pluralistischen Religionstheologie, 2. durchges. und erg. Aufl.,
Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1990/1993 og Joachim Zehner,
Der notwendige Dialog. Die Welt religionen in katholischer und evangelischer
Sicht, Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn (Studien zum Verstehen
fremden Religionen), 1992.
3 Enkelte bruker i tillegg ‘post-modernistisk’ om de pluralistiske posisjonene. Dette
er en overforenkling da de som identifiserer seg med en pluralistisk merkelapp
fordeler seg på det man med bestemte kriterier kan kalle både moderne og post-
moderne poisjoner.
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vistisk ramme.4  I tilknytning til begge posisjonene har det imidlertid
vært ført en dyptpløyende meningsutveksling.5
I motsetning til den inklusivistiske og pluralistiske posisjonen, ser
det ut til at den eksklusivistiske posisjonen, er kommet (plassert?) i
skyggen. Dette kan skyldes at man dels ser den som utslag av ulike
typer protestantisk fundamentalisme, dels som et tilbakelagt stadium
i den teologiske debatt (for katolikkers vedkommende: post-Vatica-
num II!), dels som en posisjon med uønskede moralske implikasjoner,
og dels som en type språkspill som ikke tydelig nok innrømmer andre
retten til å etablere egne spilleregler.
En av grunnene til at den religionsteologiske argumentprøvingen har
foregått mellom pluralistiske og inklusivistiske posisjoner, gir seg utfra
debatten rundt den “kopernikanske revolusjon”. Dette konseptet ble
lansert av John Hick i 1973 som en betegnelse på overgangen fra et
kristosentrisk paradigme til et teosentrisk (jfr. Kuhns paradigmeteori).6
Den kopernikanske revolusjonen innen religionsteorien faller stort sett
sammen med alternativene inklusivisme–pluralisme. Den faller derimot
ikke sammen med alternativene eksplisitt Kristus-bekjennelse, som
grunnlag for frelse (eksklusivisme), og Kristus-konformitet7  i en impli-
sitt forstand (inklusivisme). En bestemt del av denne diskursen består i
4 Jfr. Robert Schreiter, ‘Christianity in multi-religious societies: research history
and methodological questions’, Swedish Missiological Themes / Svensk
MissionsTidskrift 86:4 (1998), s. 524.
5 På den inklusivistiske siden kan nevnes: Gavin D’Costa. For den pluralistiske
side: Reinhold Bernhardt. Begge disse kan sies å være betydelige bidragsytere i
kjølvannet av de ‘store’ evt. ‘klassiske’ religionsteologene som f.eks. H. Kraemer,
K. Rahner, W. C. Smith, J. Hick, og P. F. Knitter.
6 God and the universe of faiths, 2.ed., Houndmills, Basinstoke, Hampshire/Lon-
don: Macmillan, 1973/1988.
7 Denne kategorien rommer mange konkrete utforminger. Mest kjent er Rahners
‘anonyme kristne’. Andre lignende konsepter som faller i samme kategori, finnes
f.eks. hos Theodor Jørgensen (‘Kristus-signatur’, se ‘Christianity in multi-religious
societies: Missiological perspectives’, Swedish Missiological Themes/ Svensk Mis-
sionsTidskrift 86:4 (1998), s. 540) og Kenneth Cragg (‘Christic pattern’, se The
Christian and other religion. The measure of Christ, Oxford 1977).
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at pluralistiske posisjoner har blitt kritisert for at de egentlig ikke er
pluralistiske (nok), men inklusivistiske. Særlig en del nyere bidrag har
ført debatten om det pluralistiske paradigmet i denne retningen.8
Vi skal i det følgende se på ulike måter å danne teori i møte med det
religiøse mangfoldet.9  Når jeg velger å konsentrere meg om det
teoretiske, så innebærer ikke det at jeg ønsker å isolere det teoretiske
fra det teologiske. Det vil vise seg i arbeidet med ulike teoretiske
tilnærminger til religionspluraliteten at nettopp forholdet mellom det
teoretiske og teologiske utgjør en nøkkel til å forstå tilnærmingen til
det religiøse mangfoldet. Etter min mening vil det være rimelig å
stille som krav til en teori at den må kunne tilkjennegi en avhengighet
til en bestemt religiøs tradisjon, normalt formidlet ved teologisk
refleksjon. Jeg spør med dette som en forståelsesbakgrunn: På hvilke
premisser kan man etablere en teori om det religiøse mangfoldet?
I det følgende reserverer jeg begrepet ‘pluralitet’ og ‘plural’ (adj.) til
beskrivelsen av den situasjonen at mange forskjellige religiøse ut-
trykk og tradisjoner lever side om side i de aller fleste samfunn i
verden. Dette begrepet forsøker da å fange inn det som har å gjøre
med forskjellighet og differanse til forskjell fra likhet, mangfold til
forskjell fra enhet, osv. Begrepet ‘pluralisme’ vil jeg bruke om én
type teori(er) om religionsmangfoldet – de pluralistiske. John Hick
kaller disse “a familiy of theories about the relationship between re-
ligions”.10  Innenfor disse pluralistiske teoriene vil jeg forvente at
8 Se f.eks Kenneth Surin, ‘A “politics of speech”: Religious pluralism in the age of
McDonald’s hamburger’, i Gavin D’Costa 1990/1995, s. 192-212. Jfr. også S. Mark
Heim, Salvations. Truth and difference in religion. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis
Books (Faith Meeets Faith Series), 1995, som vil bli behandlet under pkt. 3.c, og
Schreiter 1998, s. 523f.
9 Jeg avgrenser meg her fra det Schreiter kaller de kulturelle, strategiske og prakti-
ske sidene ved det religiøse mangfoldet. Disse er bl.a. knyttet til hvordan kristendom-
men skal aksentuere sin tro innen det religiøse mangfoldet, og hvordan man som
kan hjelpe samfunnet i møte med de problemene som et multikulturelt samfunn
genererer, Schreiter 1998, s. 515f og 525.
10 Jfr. J. Hick, The rainbow of faiths: Critical dialogues on the religious pluralism,
London: SCM Press, 1995, s. 148.
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situasjonen (pluraliteten) innordnes overgripende synspunkter av
kvalifiserende eller legitimerende art. Disse kan tillegge pluraliteten
mening qua pluralitet, se den som et gode, som adekvat, forstå den
som en genuin måte å være mennesker på, kvalifisere den som gudgitt,
motsvarende til Guds handling med verden, eller lignende.
Teoretiske tilnærminger til religionspluraliteten
Dersom man tar utgangspunkt i en slik forståelse av ‘pluralitet’ og
‘pluralisme’, kan man tenke seg forskjellige aspekter ved ulike
teoretiske tilnærminger til religionspluraliteten. Innenfor den store
bredden som faktisk finnes i den religionsteologiske diskursen, skal
jeg forsøke å skissere to slike muligheter knyttet til utvalgte arbeider
av John Hick og S. Mark Heim. Disse vil deretter bli drøftet i forhold
til det jeg anser som vesentlige vitenskapsteoretiske spørsmål som
aktualiseres i møte med disse teoriene.
Min forståelse av ‘teori’ tar for det følgende utgangspunkt i en
definisjon av Otto Krogseth: “teorier er begrepsmessige forutsetninger
eller kategorisystemer som tjener til identifisering og forklaring, men
som ikke er gitt ut fra kildene selv”.11  Det som skal identifiseres og
forklares, og som er “kildene selv”, er det religiøse mangfoldet. I den
sammenheng vil det hypotetiske, epistemologiske og paradigmatiske
ved teoriene komme i forgrunnen.12
Kantiansk pluralisme: John Hick
Den britiske religionsfilosofen John Hick (ved Institute for Advanced
Research in the Humanities, University of Birmingham) er kanskje den
av de pluralistiske religionsteologene som klarest har formulert filoso-
11 Otto Krogseth, ‘Compare necesse est – komparative metoder i sosial- og human-
vitenskapene’, Veiledningsseminar i teologi/kristendomskunnskap: Komparative
metoder i teologi og religionsvitenskap, Samarbeidsutvalg for forskerutdanning i
teologi/kristendomskunnskap, Granavolden 19.-22. april 1989, s. 7.
12 Krogseth, ibid.
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fiske premisser for sin teoretiske tilnærming til religionspluraliteten.
Jeg skal i det følgende forsøke å rekonstruere en sammenheng i hans
teoretiske synspunkter på forholdet mellom de ulike verdens-religionene.
La oss starte med religionsforståelsen. Religion bestemmes av Hick
for det første som “belief in the transcendent”.13  Religion utgjøres av
mennesker som på ulikt vis tror på noe som går ut over det man kan
sanse. Vi skal senere se at denne transcendens-betoningen til sist ut-
gjør en nøkkel til å forstå hans tilrettelegging av forskjellighet og
enhet i det religiøse mangfoldet. For det andre fokuserer Hick på de
store “post-axial age” verdensreligionene, dvs. religioner som er
etablert siden midten av første årtusen f.Kr. Disse karakteriseres ved
deres felles anliggende om “salvation/liberation as the realisation of
a limitlessly better possibility”, og ikke som “the pre-axial religions”:
“to keep life on an even keel”.14  Religionene er først og fremst et
sted for frelse og frigjøring.
Vi merker oss at dette karakteriseres ved hjelp av det vi kunne kalle
uendelighets-terminologi (limitlessly). Forøvrig er begrepene formale;
de knytter seg ikke eksklusivt til bestemte religiøse uttrykk, selv om
språkbruken til tider er preget av bestemte tradisjoner, særlig de(n)
kristne. Hensikten er å generalisere så mye at han makter å skape
begreper som kan fungere på tvers av ulike tros-tradisjoner. Man må,
i følge Hick, kunne gå bakenfor “den dominerende selv-forståelsen i
hver tradisjon”.15  Samtidig innrømmer Hick at hans teori må ta ut-
gangspunkt i hans egen partikulære religiøse tradisjon, som er
kristendommen, fordi det finnes “lite av et tradisjons-nøytralt reli-
giøst vokabular”.16  Men selv om vi bruker begreper fra én tradisjon,
13 An interpretation of religion: Human responses to the transcendent. Basingstoke,
Hampshire/ London: Macmillan, s. 5ff. Dette er det mest helhetlige og sammen-
fattende arbeidet av Hick. Her holder han sammen både sin tidlige og mer
tradisjonelle religionsfilosofiske produksjon, og hans senere interesse for religi-
onspluraliteten. Boken er et resultat av hans Gifford Lectures i 1986-87, Univer-
sity of Edinburgh.
14 Ibid., s. 12.
15 Ibid., s. 2.
16 Ibid., s. 9.
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må vi av kommunikasjonsmessige årsaker “strekke de semantisk”
for å dekke “idéer” i andre tradisjoner.
Ved denne konsentrasjonen omkring transcendens og frelse/frigjøring
ønsker ikke Hick å definere religion ved å ta utgangspunkt i en felles
kjerne for all religiøsitet.17  Poenget er heller å understreke en konti-
nuitet mellom ulike religiøse uttrykk, “a family resemblance”. Hick
snakker derfor om et “nettverk av likheter som overlapper hverandre
og går på kryss og tvers”. En annerledes måte å si dette på, er å
lokalisere forskjellene mellom de ulike tros-systemene til “snittflaten”
(the interface) mellom “det Virkelige” og “våre ulike religiøse menta-
liteter og kulturer”.18
Et tredje element i Hicks religionsforståelse gjelder hvilken type
gyldighet han innrømmer religiøs tro. Kort sagt hevder han et realistisk
synspunkt. De religiøse tradisjonene har et bestemt kognitivt innhold
der referansen (det Virkelige) forutsettes å eksistere. Dette betyr at
de må anerkjennes som religiøst gyldige. Hick mener det derfor gir
mening å slutte seg til tradisjonene, ved det han kaller “a cognitive
choice” eller “faith”.19  Hick mener at forskjellen mellom en religiøs
og naturalistisk religionsfortolkning ligger her.20  Hans mål er derfor
å gi en “religious but not confessional interpretation of religion in its
plurality of forms”.21
17 Ibid., s. 4.
18 Hick 1995, s. 25.
19 Hick 1989, s. 12. Slik begrepet ‘faith’ brukes i denne sammenheng, er det klart
påvirket av Wilfred Cantwell Smith. Se f.eks. Faith and belief, Princeton, NJ: Prin-
ceton University Press.
20 Hick 1995, s. 28, Hick 1989, s.3. Det betyr ikke at kritiske religionsteorier (Freud,
Durkheim, Feuerbach nevnes) underkjennes i sin helhet, Hick 1989, s. 1 og 6. Hick
understreker tvert i mot at de interne og eksterne (humanvitenskapelige)
tilnærmingene til religion må kombineres, s. 2. Det henger nok sammen med det
hypotetiske aspektet som tillegges alle utsagn om Virkeligheten, religiøse som ikke-
religiøse, se nedenfor.
21 Hick 1989, s. 1, min uth.
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Spørsmålet som raskt melder seg, er hvordan man da skal forstå de
forskjellene som faktisk eksisterer mellom de religiøse tradisjonene.
De store verdens-troene, kristendommen medregnet, er “different and
independently authentic spheres of revelation and salvation”.22  Der-
som disse tros-tradisjonene hver for seg skal anses som religiøst
gyldige, vil man raskt havne i åpenbare selvmotsigelser. Hva gjør
man da? Må man da utelukke noen som sanne? Hele Hicks tilnærming
går i mot en slik løsning.
Vi må gå en liten omvei for å få grep om Hicks løsning av dette
problemet. Et av premissene for Hicks tilnærming, er det han kaller
“epistemisk distanse”. Dette begrepet trekker han veksler på fra sine
tidligere religionsfilosofiske arbeider. Poenget er å etablere en avstand
mellom guddommen og menneskene. Dette transcendens-grepet
frigjør for det første Gud fra å bli bundet til bestemte beskrivelser.
Men det setter også mennesket fri til å skape og erfare i sin egen
kulturspesifikke sammenheng. Konsekvensen er at Guds natur på den
ene siden forblir skjult for mennesket, og at mennesket på sin side er
prisgitt sine egne fortolkninger av guddommen, kalt “experiencing-
as”. Det siste representerer en kantiansk variant av en perspektivis-
me.23  Resultatet er et uendelig antall mulige fortolkninger av
Virkeligheten, det han kaller “universets religiøse ambivalens”.24
Disse fortolkningene har alle hypotetisk karakter som må testes på
våre liv og vår adferd.
Hick opererer ikke i et vakuum når han opererer slik. De filosofiske
premissene ligger i dagen; han er eksplisitt kantiansk når han
tilrettelegger dette slik. La meg bare henvise til hvordan han forsøker
å integrere religiøs erkjennelse og en kantiansk kategorilære:25
22 Hick 1973/1988, s. vii, i nytt forord.
23 Hick 1995, s. 29: “This approach assumes the now very widespread view that
what is perceived is always partly construed by the perceiver”. Hva Hick her mener
med “partly”, skal jeg ikke gå inn på. Det er rimelig å tenke seg at det ligger en
forståelse bak dette som tillegger det Virkelige en selvstendig aktivitet i verden
forut for menneskets fortolkning av den. Se også Hick 1989, s. 6 og 14.
24 Hick 1989, s. 12.
25 Hick 1995, s. 29.
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“Kant suggested that we are aware of our natural environment in
terms of certain categories which the mind imposes in the formation
of our conscious experience – for example, the categories of sub-
stance, or thinghood, and of casuality. I am suggesting analogously
that we are aware of our supernatural environment in terms of cer-
tain categories which the mind imposes in the formation of religious
experience. The two basic religious categories are deity (the Real as
personal) and the absolute (the Real as non-personal).26  Each of these
categories is then made concrete, or in Kant’s terminology
‘schematized’ – not, however, (as in his system) in terms of abstract
time but in terms of the filled time of history and culture as the expe-
rienced Gods and Absolutes of the various religious traditions”.
Men viktigere enn at han tematiserer det kategoriale og “konkrete”, er
forståelsen av det nouminale, ‘the Real’.27  Hick skiller mellom ‘The
Real’ an sich, og “the Real as humanly perceived”. Dette skillet er
selve nøkkelen til å forstå Hicks teori om det religiøse mangfoldet for-
di det muliggjør en bestemmelse av ‘the Real’ an sich, som kilde for
alt annet, underforstått: som kilde for forskjellige oppfatninger av hva
‘the Real’ er. Samtidig blir det umulig for en enkelt religiøs tradisjon å
si noe uttømmende om ‘the Real’ (‘the Real’ som ‘ineffable’). Følge-
lig knytter ‘the Real’ seg til en bestemt transcendens-forståelse.
Forståelsen av Det virkelige strukturerer også hans pluralistiske
hypotese. Denne kan inneha følgende form: “…the infinite Real, in
itself beyond the scope of other than purely formal concepts, is dif-
ferently conceived, experienced and responded to from within the
26 Dette begrepsparet, som tilsvarer skillet personal-apersonal, er brukt for å fange
opp religiøs erfaring i alle religioner. Det ikke-personale skal dekke de hinduiske,
buddhistiske og taoistiske tradisjonene.
27 Hick foretrekker dette fellesnavnet (generic name, også i likelydende former
som ‘the Ultimately Real’, ‘ultimate Reality’, ‘the Ultimate’ eller ‘Reality’) fremfor
f.eks. ‘God’, ‘the Divine’, ‘the Eternal One’, ‘Ultimate Reality’ og ‘the Transcen-
dent’, Hick 1995, s. 18; Hick 1989, s. 10f. Argumentet er å finne et begrep som er
mest mulig felles for og samtidig gjenkjennbart i de ulike tradisjonene. Han røper
likevel sans for både P. Tillichs ultimate concern og Wilfred Cantwell Smiths trans-
cendens-begrep/transcendentology, idem 1989, hhv. s. 4 og 6 (og s. xiv).
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different cultural ways of being human”.28  Mens de ulike kulturelle
uttrykkene kan opptre som pluralistiske i betydningen ‘forskjellige’,
reduseres imidlertid forskjelligheten i lys av den holdningen til Det
virkelige som de forskjellige religiøse uttrykkene skaper. Det er nemlig
den adekvate holdningen til det Virkelige som er det avgjørende, ikke
de konkrete beskrivelsene av hva det Virkelige skulle være. hvordan
derimot “adekvat” skal forstås, er uklart hos Hick.29
Vi finner her en kombinasjon av at religionene representerer utsagn
som intenderer å si noe om den aboslutte Virkelighet, samtidig som
de tolkes i lys av den virkningen de medfører. Denne pragmatiske
eller mytologiske forståelsen av religiøse utsagn henger selvsagt
sammen med grunntrekkene i en kantiansk ontologi og epistemologi,
særlig dualismen mellom erfaringsutsagn og vesensutsagn. Som nevnt,
bygger Hick på dette skillet.
Dette pragmatiske aspektet utvikles hos Hick i sammenheng med
hvilke type kriterier man kan bruke for å teste ulike religioner “som
helheter” i forhold til hverandre. Hick mener i utgangspunktet at de
religiøse tradisjonene må testes på et soteriologisk kriterium. Dette
henger sammen med en forståelse av religionene som primært frelses-
og frigjøringsveier, der det filosofiske og teologiske nedtones.30
Soteriologi hos Hick er nøye knyttet til begrepet ‘transformasjon’.
Frelsen er nemlig transformasjon, nemlig i form av at den
menneskelige eksistensen dreies fra å være selv-sentrert til å bli
Virkelighets-sentrert.31  Poenget til Hick er at denne endringen best
kan observeres ved sine moralske frukter, forstått i lys av idealet om
kjærlighet/medlidenhet (agape/karuna).32  At religionene – som
28 Ibid., s. 14. Jfr. tilsvarende hypotese i idem 1995, s. 27: “an ultimate ineffable
Reality which is the source and ground of everything, and which is such that in so
far as the religious traditions are in soteriological alignment with it they are con-
texts of salvation/liberation”.
29 Hick 1995, s. 102.
30 Ibid., s. 18.
31 Hick 1973/88, vii; Hick 1989, s. 14; Hick 1995, s. 18.
32 Hick 1989, s. 14; 325ff.
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menneskelige konstruksjoner – også kan være sted for det motsatte
(hat, utbytting, krigshissing, tortur, etc.), ligger under som en meget
reell mulighet.
Denne forståelsen legger også premissene for hvordan Hick velger å
tilrettelegge spørsmålet om sant og usant i religionene. Dersom det
finnes motsigelser mellom ulike utsagn, mener Hick at disse kan løses
på to ulike nivåer. Noen motsigelser er tilsynelatende. De er forskjel-
lige i sin litterære eller verbale form, men har samme funksjon for den
troende i forhold til ‘the Real’ idet de skaper “love, compassion, self-
sacrificing concern for the good of others, generous kindness and for-
giveness”.33  Men det finnes også virkelige forskjeller som ikke kan
utlignes slik de fremstår i sin historiske form. Disse kan bare evalueres
i en eskjatologisk gyldighetstest. At denne vil medføre at noe blir funnet
å være usant, er Hick overbevist om. Hick legger her inn en tidshorisont
som avlaster hans øvrige teori for en del vanskelige problemer.
En slik tilretteleging må få sterke agnostiske drag. Dette kan tillates
så lenge saken – hvorvidt forskjeller er reelle eller mytologiske – kun
har sekundær funksjon i hans religionsteoretiske system. Det primære
er både det erkjennelsesmessige, utilgjengelige numinøse – ‘the Real’
– og den moralsk, spesifiserte adferden som representerer en saks-
svarende respons på ‘the Real’s virkelighet, innen ulike partikulære
tros-tradisjoner. Disse responsene er parallelle fordi den nouminale
Virkeligheten er den samme. Slik sett er forskjellene “kompatible”
med den overordnede “hypotesen” – Det virkelige.34
“Orientational pluralism”: S. Mark Heim
En av de mest markante kritikkene av pluralistene (i praksis: J. Hick,
W. C. Smith og P. F. Knitter), kommer fra professor S. Mark Heim
ved Andover Newton Theological Seminary. Kort sagt ønsker han å
gå bakenfor både eksklusivismen og pluralismen ved å pluralisere
33 Ibid., s. 325.
34 Ibid., s. 15.
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det som religionene sikter mot av mål, oppfyllelser, frelse, etc. Derav
tittelen på boken: Salvations.35  Heim hevder at de pluralistiske teoriene
hos Hick, Smith og Knitter er preget av et grunnleggende
enhetsperspektiv – “a comfortable and unitary reference point” –
hvilket gjør dem “not religiously pluralistic at all”, tvert i mot: De er
like eksklusive som den eksklusivismen de selv forkaster.36  Hos Hick
gir dette, som vi har sett, seg utslag i tanken om et numinøst ‘Real’,
hos Smith etableres ‘faith’ som en felles eksistensiell karakter ved
ulike religiøse erfaringer, mens Knitter finner fellespunktet i en
frigjørende praksis (‘soteriocentrism’). Heim mener dette singulære
perspektivet utgjør et dobbelt problem:37
For det første: Hvordan kan man etablere slike entallsperspektiver
som et metaperspektiv uavhengig av de mangfoldige perspektivene
som religionene representerer? Disse metateoriene utgjør selv et av
mange perspektiver på det religiøse mangfoldet. Pluralistene må også
selv bli pluralisert! Dersom man f.eks skal hevde en universell
gyldighet av noe, skjer det ut ifra et bestemt perspektiv. Dette betyr
igjen at man må tillate andre å gjøre det samme, selv om dette
innebærer å fremsette eksklusive påstander. Det finnes ingen mulighet
for å etablere et “God’s-eye view” som skal bestemme hva man skal
godta eller forkaste av de ulike sannhetskravene.38
For det andre: Ingen av de viktigste religiøse tradisjonene forstås som
normative ved en slik tilnærming. Religionene forholder seg alle til
samme type sannhet, men ingen blir egentlig tatt alvorlig i sine
sannhetspretensjoner. I tillegg kommer avstanden mellom de plura-
listiske teoriene og religionenes liv til å bli forsterket ved at de
fellesmålene som stilles opp, ikke fyller noen aktuell funksjon i
religionene, de er utvendige i forhold til det religionene oppfatter
som deres sannhet. Som Heim selv spør i tilknytning til Hick: Hvordan
35 Salvations: Truth and difference in religion, Maryknoll/NY: Orbis Books, 1995.
36 Ibid., s. 129f. 139f.
37 Ibid., s. 129f.
38 Ibid., s. 153.
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skal man spesifikt leve som menneske for å tilpasse seg de målene
som er satt (“the Real”/”better possibility for humanity”)?
Heim stiller selv frem “a more pluralistic hypothesis” ved hjelp av
den logiske og personale filosofien til Nicholas Rescher.39  Denne er
i utgangspunktet brukt omkring nyere filosofiske debatter omkring
som objektivitet og relativisme, men Heim mener den har sterk
relevans for religiøse relasjoner også.40  Rescher kaller sin tilnærming
for “orientational pluralism”. Rescher forsøker å komme til rette med
det pluralistiske problemet innen filosofien omkring kravet om
rasjonalitet på den ene siden, og det faktum at man stort sett ender
opp med dissens i viktige spørsmål. Rescher mener at man dels må
innfinne seg med disse mangetydige svarene, samtidig som man
fastholder tanken om en enhetlig virkelighet. Av dette følger en
grenseoppgang mot tre posisjoner:41
1. “Unique reality view”, det at det bare finnes én riktig oppfatning
av tilværelsen.
2. “No-reality view”, det finnes ingen absolutt virkelighet, i alle
fall ingen som kan erkjennes. Filosofiske problemer er derfor
“pseudo-problemer”.
3. “A multifaceted reality”. Alle konkurrerende sannhets-
pretendenter “yter sannhet”, men ingen forvalter hele sannheten.
Som et alternativ til disse lanserer Rescher en orientational plural-
ism. Denne legger på sin side følgende premisser til grunn:42
1. En posisjon kan bare etableres ut ifra et bestemt perspektiv.
2. Det finnes en stor variasjon av ulike perspektiver.
3. Når man etablerer en posisjon, vil den fremtre som den beste.
Man knytter seg altså til en “unique reality view”, jfr. (1)
ovenfor. Ingen handler etter ulike orienteringer.
39 The strife of systems, Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh Univiverity Press, 1985.
40 Heim 1995, s. 133ff.
41 Ibid., s. 133.
42 Ibid., s. 134. 138.
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Det er viktig å merke seg forskjellen mellom denne “perspectival view”
og det som ble omtalt som (3) en multifasettert virkelighetsforståelse.
Kort sagt kan ulike fasetter kombineres, mens ulike perspektiver i
følge Rescher utelukker hverandre. Derfor hører det med et “eksklu-
sjons-prinsipp” til orienteringspluralismen.
Reschers karakteriseres på mange måter ved at han går inn for å
benytte seg av verdiladet argumentasjon. En nøytral, rasjonal ana-
lyse kommer i prinsippet ikke utenom å gripe tilbake verdidommer
eller en lojalitet til bestemte verdier. Dette illustrerer han ved såkalte
aporetiske samlinger (aporetic clusters) av påstander. Disse fremstår
hver for seg som innlysende, men samlet sett fremstår de som
innbyrdes selvmotsigende. For å innfri kravet om konsistens, blir neste
skritt å utelate bestemte bestanddeler/ påstander fra dette aporetiske
knippet. Og dét kan bare gjøres ved å foretrekke visse epistemiske
verdier fremfor andre. Disse verdiene identifiseres av Rescher som
konstituerende for en “orientation”.43  Slik blir orienteringspluralis-
men verken nøytral eller udogmatisk.44  Viktigere enn dette, er
imidlertid at enhver pluralistisk teori anvender sitt perspektiv på seg
selv. Pluralismen må være konsistent med seg selv.45
S. Mark Heim overfører dette på forståelsen av det religiøse
mangfoldet. Han reflekterer riktignok noe over forskjellene mellom
Reschers filosof-perspektiv (og den plurale situasjonen mellom ulike
filosofiske posisjoner) og hans eget arbeid med ulike teologiske
forståelser av den religiøse pluraliteten, men mener at Reschers
konsepsjon har enda større relevans for en religiøs situasjon.46
Et springende punkt er knyttet til hvilken teoretisk status de ulike
pluralistiske teoriene skal inneha. Kort sagt, mener Heim at disse
kun er “an argument over what kind of argument we are having”.47
43 Ibid., s. 135.
44 Ibid., s. 136.
45 Ibid., s. 136.
46 Ibid., s. 139f.
47 Ibid., s. 142.
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Pluralismene er med andre ord ikke noe annet, eller mer, enn det de
førsøker å teoretisere. På denne måten kommer de på samme tid til å
bli både 2. og 1. ordens utsagn: “Accounts of religious diversity of
any stripe – exclusivist, inclusivist, pluralistic – are at the same time
second-level descriptions of religions and first-level religious asser-
tions”48  Men dermed er også skillet mellom deskripsjon og
preskripsjon brutt: “the minute one attempts to draw any kind of con-
clusion from these descriptions one has entered the doctrinal realm”49
Utfra slike synspunkter er det umulig å stille opp et monistisk prinsipp
som all forskjellighet skal utlignes i forhold til. Heim reflekterer rundt
dette ved å stille opp et knippe av religionsteologiske påstander:50
1. Religious truth is one;
2. Religious truth is called by many names, experienced in many
forms;
3. Cultural and personal categories are constitutive of our know-ledge
and experience of reality: all experience is “experiencing as”;
4. Religious aims and fulfillments are various.
Heim hevder at pluralistiske teologer vanligvis vil benekte (4), mens
han selv vil beholde det. Av ham selv vil dette kreve en tilsvarende
utfordring i å fortolke (1). Utgangspunktet består i en påstand om det
finnes svar på spørsmål som angår virkeligheten, de kan ikke bare re-
duseres til å bli “salvifically irrelevant” (Hick): “There are real metha-
physical differences, real ontological questions with real answers”. 51
Dersom man dropper (1), sitter man imidlertid igjen med en form for
polyteisme. Det er tydelig at Heim ønsker å sammenholde (1) og (4),
der (4) blir understreket i og med at denne som oftest utelates av
pluralister. Selve hovedsynspunktet i Salvations er nettopp å pluralisere
religionenes bestemmelser og oppfyllelser (utfra et inklusivistisk
ståsted!), og befri dem fra ulike varianter av “God’s-eye view”.
48 Ibid., s. 140.
49 Ibid., s. 141.
50 Ibid., s. 145.
51 Ibid., s. 154.
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I dette ligger det også en påstand om at Heims “pluralistiske inklusi-
visme”52  vil kunne gi de ulike religiøse tradisjonene bedre muligheter
til å vise hvordan de selv forstår den religiøse pluralismen, enn hva
de pluralistiske teoriene er i stand til. Dette følger av at man innrømmer
religionene mulighet til tale for seg selv, etablere sine egne, innbyrdes
forskjellige formål, uten innblanding eller overprøving ved hjelp av
eksterne teoretiske perspektiver.
På den annen side er det klart at Heim først og fremst ønsker å etablere
en begrensning av de teoretiske mulighetene for å konseptualisere
det religiøse mangfoldet. Et hint om hva dette innebærer, finnes i
hans svar på spørsmålet om den ene religionens målsettinger kan være
like gode som en annens: Prinsipielt er de ikke det, sier han, men
dersom man skal si noe om dette, vil man komme til å gjøre nøyaktig
det samme som religionene selv forsøker å si.53  Konsekvensen av
det er at man etablerer sin egen religiøse tradisjon.
Sett under ett, kan det se ut som Heim legger seg på en form for
dialektisk integrasjon mellom eget normativt perspektiv og andres
perspektiver. Det dialektiske i ligger i at det egne perspektivet både
vil påvirke, og bli påvirket av, andres perspektiver. Det integrative
ligger i at ulike perspektiver søker å berike seg i en gjensidig prosess,
forstått som dialog, selv om dette skjer i ydmykhet for andre
tradisjoner. I denne transformasjonsprosessen oppstår det “relativt
objektive normer” (Cobb) som både representerer en tilknytning til
tradisjoners fortid, men også en utvidelse i møte med konkurrerende
perspektiver. I denne sammenheng vil det kristne perspektivet vise
seg overlegen. Heim støtter seg her eksplisitt på den tilretteleggingen
John Cobb har gjort av den interreligiøse dialog. Han mener denne
ligger nær orienteringspluralismen.54  Et forsøk på å tydeliggjøre de
teologiske sidene ved denne religionsteorien blir gjort i tilknytning
52 Ibid., s. 152. Heim forstår dette som “en begrenset klasse” innen inklusivistiske
posisjoner.
53 Ibid., s. 152f.
54 Ibid., s. 143f.
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til en trinitarisk religionsteologi, ikke minst inspirert av Gavin D’Costa
og Raimundo Panikkar.55
Drøfting av de ulike teoriene
Jeg skal nå drøfte to trekk ved teoriene om pluraliteten hos Hick og
Heim som jeg mener har vitenskapsteoretisk relevans. Det gjelder:
a) forholdet mellom det jeg vil kalle perspektiv og overperspektiv
b) fortolkningen av forskjellene mellom ulike religiøse uttrykk og
tradisjoner
Når det gjelder (a) vil det være naturlig å spørre hva som er forholdet
mellom i) teorier man etablerer om religionspluraliteten med
utgangspunkt i bestemte religiøse tradisjoner, og ii) teorier man
etablerer med større uavhengighet til religiøse tradisjoner. Dette ligger
nær forståelsen av forholdet mellom partikularitet og universalitet,
eller mellom de mange utkikksperspektivene og “Det store
perspektivet”. Dette punktet forsøker på denne måten å fokusere teori-
enes epistemologiske status. Jeg bruker begrepet ‘perspektiv’ i
betydningen ‘teori om religionspluraliteten på bakgrunn av egen
religiøs tradisjon’ når det ikke kvalifiseres nærmere, og
‘overperspektiv’ i betydningen ‘teori om religionspluraliteten innen-
for en overgripende forståelsesramme’.
Det andre punktet (b) fokuserer forskjellene mellom ulike religiøse
tradisjoner. Dette er ment som en eksemplifiering av forholdet mellom
perspektiv og overperspektiv. Jeg ønsker å drøfte hvordan religions-
differansene fortolkes i de ulike teoriene med tanke på hvilken virke-
lighetstilknytning de har eller skal tillegges. Jeg fokuserer på dette
punktet hvordan teoriene behandler teorienes objekt; religions-
pluraliteten. Ved dette håper jeg å klargjøre hvilke ontologiske trekk
teoriene fremtrer med. Jeg bruker her bevisst “ontologiske trekk” til
forskjell fra “en velutviklet ontologi”. Denne tematikken ligger
55 Ibid., s. 166ff.
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naturlig nok tett opp til sannhetsspørsmålet, selv om dette ikke vil bli
behandlet utførlig.
Perspektiv og overperspektiv. Teorienes epistemologiske status
Både Hick og Heim tematiserer sine egne partikulære perspektiver
på religionsmangfoldet. Hick sier at dette er eneste måten å respondere
adekvat på den absolutte Virkeligheten. Tilnærmingen til den ytterste
Virkelighet skjer i religionene. Som vi har sett, henger dette sammen
med hans understrekning av det moralske liv som enten viser seg å
være i overensstemmelse med ‘the Real’, eller som motsier denne
Virkeligheten. Slikt liv leves ut i religionene. På den annen side kan
man både fra et religionsfilosofisk og ikke-religiøst ståsted fremsette
hypoteser om Virkeligheten. Dette muliggjøres ved en kantiansk
epistemologi der Virkeligheten unndras enhver vesensbestemmelse.
Ved dette etableres det et hypotetisk rom både i og utenfor religionenes
ulike verdener i historien. I dette rommet kan man danne seg teorier
om både religionene, forholdet mellom dem, og om Virkeligheten.
Heim tar et skarpt oppgjør med enhver form for overperspektiv, særlig
de han finner hos “pluralistene”. Hans poeng er at et slikt
overperspektiv ikke er noe annet enn et religiøst, partikulært
perspektiv. Som sådan er det legitimt på linje med enhver religiøs
ytring. Med et slikt perspektiv kan man gjerne ytre seg om andre
religioner, men da med en bevissthet om perspektivbegrensningen
dette innebærer. På denne måten søker han å detronisere ethvert
“God’s-eye view”. Religionene er de eneste som innvilges talerett i
saker som har med religion og religionsmangfold å gjøre. Eller mer
presist: Enhver teori om religioner og religionsmangfold er religiøs.
Spørsmålet om perspektiv og overperspektiv er meget sentralt for
den religionsteologiske teoridannelsen. Dette spørsmålet dreier seg
til sist om hvilken epistemologisk status man skal gi til en teori om
religionspluraliteten. På hvilke premisser er det mulig å si noe om
flere religioner samtidig? På bakgrunn av særlig Heims kritikk, må
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man spørre om det er mulig å gjøre dette uten å bli beskyldt for å
være partikulær? På den annen side kan man stille spørsmål ved om
det gir mening å snakke om teori i det hele tatt dersom man formuler-
er seg slik Heim gjør.
Hick forsøker med utgangspunkt i sin egen kristne tradisjon å etablere
samlebegreper og “navn” som kan “strekkes semantisk” til også å
omfatte andre religioners “idéer”. Hans sentralbegrep – ‘the Real’ –
er nettopp et forsøk på å formidle mellom ulike religiøse tradisjoner,
i dette tilfellet mellom et personalt gudsbegrep og et a-personalt
absolutthetsbegrep. Hick mener at hans begrep om Virkeligheten er
så generelt at det kan gjelde alle religioner ved at deres egne tradisjoner
er gjenkjennbare i dette og andre begreper.
Man kan spørre seg om begrepet er for generelt, og om det faktisk lar
seg gjøre å kjenne seg igjen i det ut ifra ulike tradisjoner? Et slikt
spørsmål må i det minste kunne besvares ut ifra ens egen tradisjon.
Kravet må være at overperspektivet lar seg forene med den religions-
forståelsen som gir seg på interne premisser. Dersom denne
“operasjonen” lykkes, kan man i neste omgang tillate at overperspektivet
ligger på et mer generelt eller abstrakt nivå enn det man oppfatter som
en beskrivelse av det sentrale i sin tro. På bakgrunn av dette kan man
eventuelt gå videre og forsøke det tilsvarende innen andre religiøse
tradisjoner. Denne prøvingen bør fortrinnsvis utføres av mennesker med
tiknytning til de aktuelle tradisjonene.
Hicks tilnærming må i utgangspunktet anses som en mulig teori om
religionsmangfoldet. Samtidig mener jeg at med den sterke
tilknytningen til partikulære tradisjoner som jeg her har gjort meg til
talsmann for, vil dette kreve at et slikt forsøk legitimerer seg religiøst
for å være en normativ teori om religionsmangfoldet. Det utelukker
ikke muligheten for å danne ikke-religiøse teorier om deler av
pluraliteten (jfr. Hick).
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Slik jeg leser Heim, kan jeg ikke se at han har vært velvillig nok i sin
lesning av Hick. Jeg mener at Heim ikke tar høyde for at et religiøst
perspektiv også kan romme muligheter for å danne teorier med et
alment sikte. Dersom denne muligheten finnes, vil disse teoriene med
nødvendighet måtte fungere i et annet rom enn det strengt partikulære.
Etter min mening finnes det et slikt potensiale i bestemte utforminger
av den kristne tro, nemlig på bakgrunn av forståelsen av forholdet
mellom en generell gudsåpenbaring og moralerkjennelse, og den
særlige eler definitive åpenbaringen i Jesus Kristus. Det kan se ut
som om Heim på dette punktet identifiserer perspektiv og partiku-
larisme (perspektivisme) på en uheldig måte.
Forholdet mellom perspektiv og overperspektiv kan ikke settes på en
enkel partikularisme-universalisme formel. Verken Hick eller Heim
er uenige i at ens eget religiøse perspektiv, i deres tilfelle: kristen-
dommen, er avgjørende for hvordan man forstår det religiøse mang-
foldet. Fra dette utgangspunktet velger de svært ulike veier. Hick
hevder at man med utgangspunkt i eget perspektiv kan danne almen
teori om andre religioner, mens Heim utelukker dette. Samtidig ser
det ut til at begge sprenger en streng partikularistisk ramme, i alle
fall på teoriplanet. Det tyder på at ens egen religiøse tradisjon rommer
muligheter for å overskride en ren partikularisme.
Hva uttrykker forskjellene? Ontologiske trekk
En tydeliggjøring av forholdet mellom perspektiv og overperspektiv
kan gjøres ved å iaktta hvordan de ulike pluralitetsteoriene på ulikt
vis fortolker forskjellene mellom ulike religiøse uttrykk og tradisjoner.
Som vi så, differensierer Hick mellom ulike typer forskjeller. Det
finnes mytologiske forskjeller som er uegentlige i den forstand at de
ikke utgjør påstander som sier noe vesensmessig om Virkeligheten,
men på den annen side skaper en sakssvarende holdning til ‘the Real’
– på tvers av forskjellene. På den annen side finnes det en religiøs
kjerne i alle religioner som sier noe vesensmessig (kognitivt) om den
ytterste Virkelighet. De forskjellene som finnes mellom ulike tros-
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tradisjoner på dette “reelle” nivået kan bare løses utenfor tiden, som
en eskjatologisk løsning.
Hick kombinerer et dobbelt skille mellom kjerne (kognitive utsagn)
og periferi (mytologi), og mellom tid og eskjaton. Spørsmålet er på
hvilke premisser dette skjer? Når Hick andre steder56  tar farvel med
en nikensk-konstantinopolitansk kristologi på grunnlag av at den er
“mytologisk”, er det da perspektivet eller overperspektivet som slår
igjennom? Skillet mellom tid og evighet viser hvordan
religionspluraliteten ikke løses hos Hick. Han skyver tvert i mot den
reelle konfrontasjonen mellom konkurrerende trospåstander ut av
historien og inn i den (tidstranscenderende) nouminale virkelighet.
Samtidig påstår han at alle religioner er frelsesformidlende.
Konsekvensen er at pluraliteten opprettholdes som et alment vilkår
ved menneskelig erkjennelse, og at den nouminale virkelighet blir en
eskjatologisk dommer mellom motstridende påstander om den
enhetlige Virkelighet. Om ikke annet, får dette et sterkt abstrakt og
hypotetisk preg over seg.
Hos Heim finnes det ikke noe konvergenspunkt for religionenes
forskjellighet. Noe slikt kan verken etableres ved hjelp av epistemologi
eller tidsforståelse, jfr. Hick. Forskjellene er reelle, både som påstander
og med tanke på referanse. I tråd med dette kan Heim si at alle
religioner rommer mulighet for frelse eller tilsvarende (!). Dersom
disse “religionsmålene” i sin tid realiseres, vil det derfor ikke skje i
form av noe som er felles eller lignende, men som noe forskjellig –
og på ulike premisser. På samme tid hevder Heim at virkeligheten er
én. Men, hvordan skal dét holdes sammen med det som er sagt
ovenfor? Stikkordet er her “konkurranse”. De ulike perspektivene
konkurrerer om den samme virkeligheten. Med hjalp av Cobb tenker
Heim seg dette som en dynamisk prosess. Tros-tradisjonen kan be-
vege andre, og de kan selv bli beveget. Samtidig mener Heim det
56 Se f.eks. Hick, ‘On Wilfred Cantwell Smith: His place in the study of religion’,
Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 4:1-2 (1992), s. 15.
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ville være meningsløst å hevde noe annet enn at ens egen kristne tro
er den som kommer best til rette med fortolkningen av virkeligheten.
Heim er den som sterkest tematiserer betydningen av det vi kan kalle
et eget, gitt utkikkstårn. Samtidig slår han seg ikke til ro med å bli
stående der. Han innrømmer riktignok andre retten til å stå i andre
tårn og kikke i andre retninger, med muligheten for at de i et spesielt
(hellig?) øyeblikk kan se ting som Heim aldri ville kunne se fra sitt
tårn. Samtidig hevder han at tårnene er plassert med utsikt til den
samme virkeligheten, og at han skuer den best fra sitt sted. Hvorfor
han kan gjøre det, får man aldri helt svar på, og det er ingen som kan
garantere at det er slik. Men dét er også poenget hans. Han tror det er
slik fordi han har en kristen tro, men dermed er ikke alt sagt i denne
verden. Og: andre ting kan sies på andre måter uten komme i strid
med andres sannhet. Reelt motstridende perspektiver kan være sanne
på samme tid.
Det beskjedne ved en slik forståelse, er at andre innrømmes muligheten
for å hevde sin overbevisning med full styrke. Ingen avskrives i
utgangspunktet fordi de fremtrer som “fremmede”. Dette skaper på
den annen side et rom for Heim til fritt å tale om sin egen tro, inklusive
en prinsipiell mulighet til å underkjenne andres trospåstander.
Eksklusiviteten sikres altså ved et pluralistisk grep. Dette er i tråd med
Heims kritikk av pluralistenes enhetsperspektiver. Det mest verdifulle
ved hans bidrag, er imidlertid hans tanker om konkurranse mellom
ulike perspektiver.57  Hva kriteriene for dette skal være, er lite utviklet
hos ham. Relevante spørsmål i denne sammenheng er: Hva vil det si å
styrke sin posisjon gjennom en kamp med et annet tros-perspektiv? Er
det mulig å svekkes i kampen om forståelsen av virkeligheten?
57 Til en kort innføring i hvordan Horst Bürkle og Wolfhart Pannenberg tematiserer
en slik konkurranse mellom kristendommen og de ikke-kristne religionene, se Erik
Kyndal, ‘Kristendommen og religionerne i systematisk-teologisk belysning’,
Veiledningsseminar i teologi/kristendomskunnskap: Komparative metoder i teo-
logi og religionsvitenskap, Samarbeidsutvalg for forskerutdanning i teologi/
kristendomskunnskap, Granavolden 19.-22. april 1989.
Religionspluraliteten: John Hick og S. Mark Heim
288
Dette er dristige spørsmål som krever ryddige resonnementer dersom
man ikke skal havne i imperialistisk eller militaristisk språkbruk. Ikke
minst på egne vegne bør dette kreve en åpenhet om hvordan den kristne
tro i ulike utforminger har strevd med å fortolke virkeligheten. Uten en
fortrolighet som åpner opp for slike refleksjoner, vil også vurderingen
av andres fortolkning av virkeligheten virke truende eller nedlatende.
Det ser ut som om både Hick og Heim legger en eller annen form for
enhetsperspektiv til grunn for sine teorier om religionsmangfoldet.
Dette knytter seg på ulike måter til “virkelighet” (hhv. “the Real” og
“virkeligheten”). Ut fra dette virker det vanskelig, muligens også
meningsløst, å tale om pluralistiske teorier som ikke på samme tid
også har et sterkt drag av enhet. Forskjelligheten fremstår til syvende
og siste ikke som absolutt forskjellig, men relativt forskjellig.
Hvordan man i neste omgang unngår en aksept av alle mulige forskjeller
eller religiøse uttrykk, er nettopp knyttet til forståelsen av forholdet
mellom enheten og mangfoldet i religionenes verden. Dette er selvsagt
et avgjørende punkt dersom man ikke skal komme til å omfavne det
Langdon Gilkey kaller “det demoniske” innen pluraliteten.58  Som vi
har sett, etablerer Hick dels moralske kriterier for å bedømme i hvilken
grad mennesket motsvarer Virkeligheten, dels etablerer han et
erkjennelsesmessig skille mellom den nouminale enhet og den feno-
menale pluralitet. Heim utlyser, på sin side, en konkurranse mellom
ulike perspektiver, som igjen – hver for seg – innebærer ulike mål og
meninger. Hos han gjenstår det imidlertid å utvikle denne tenkningen.
Konklusjon
Jeg startet denne artikkelen med å plassere spørsmålet om teori-
dannelse i møte med det religiøse mangfoldet innenfor en religions-
teologisk diskurs. Mitt anliggende var å analysere premissene for å
58 ‘Plurality and its theological implications’, The myth of Christian uniqueness:
Toward a pluralistic theology of religions, Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1987/1992, s. 44.
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danne teori om religionspluraliteten. Dette ble gjort i tilknytning til
bestemte teorier om det religiøse mangfoldet, representert ved utvalgte
arbeider av John Hick og S. Mark Heim.
I drøftingen og sammenligningen av disse har jeg understreket be-
tydningen av det egne religiøse utgangspunktet for teoridannelse i
møte med den religiøse pluraliteten. Samtidig hevder jeg at dette
“perspektivet” kan inneholde muligheter for å tematisere andre
religioners trosinnhold. Betingelsen for å gjøre dette, må være at man
selv og andre gjenkjenner sin egen tradisjon i et slikt “overperspekti-
v”, selv om en slik tematisering nødvendigvis må bli mer generell og
abstrakt enn om man hadde operert på interne premisser alene. Jeg
har i forlengelsen av dette synspunktet støttet en tilnærming som
understreker konkurranse-aspektet mellom ulike religiøse tradisjoner.
Til slutt har jeg drøftet hvordan forskjellene mellom ulike religiøse
tradisjoner skal forstås. Jeg ender opp med en konstatering av at
teoriene som er drøftet, forutsetter ulike former for enhet på tvers av
forskjellene. Forskjellene fortolkes til syvende og sist som relative
forskjeller, i forhold til en enhet av ontologisk art. Hvordan man i
neste omgang unngår ulike former for relativisme, er knyttet til
forståelsen av forholdet mellom forskjellene (representert ved religi-
onspluraliteten) og enheten.
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ENGLISH SUMMARY
Religious Plurality:
A Discussion of the Theories of
John Hick and S. Mark Heim
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Pluralism and theological approaches
Within the discipline of the theology of religions, the inclusivist and
pluralist positions have been sharply debated. The pluralist position,
being the less conventional, has been the more disputed one. It seems
that a majority of the participants in the discourse establish approaches
with inclusivist features. Still others find both of these positions un-
satisfactory and want to expand the debate beyond the traditional
classifications.
This article discusses various theories of religious diversity, and the
premises from which such theories proceed. However, this concen-
tration on theory does not imply an isolation from theology. As I see
it, the very relationship between theory and theology is a key to any
understanding of religious plurality. Moreover, any theory should be
capable of integrating religious perspectives. Concerning terminol-
ogy, I prefer to reserve ‘plurality’ and ‘plural’ to refer to the descrip-
tion of the situation or fact of religious diversity. The term ‘plural-
ism’ will refer to a certain kind of theories of this religious situation
(what John Hick calls “a family of theories”) – the pluralist theories
– where plurality is qualified or legitimised within a superior struc-
ture of meaning. I use ‘theory’ to refer to “conceptual presupposi-
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tions or systems of categories that serve for identification and expla-
nation, though not being deduced from the sources [(in this instance
religious plurality] themselves”1
Theoretical approaches to religious plurality
Taking this as a point of departure, a spectrum of theoretical ap-
proaches are at hand. I shall concentrate on only two positions, namely
those of John Hick and S. Mark Heim. After a presentation, I will
discuss their ideas in relation to what I perceive as major questions of
relevance from the theory of science.
Kantian pluralism: John Hick
John Hick has formulated in a very clear manner the philosophical
premises for his theoretical approach to religious plurality. Hick’s
theory concentrates on both 1) transcendence (‘religion’ as “belief in
transcendence”) and 2) salvation/liberation (the “post-axial age” re-
ligions as characterised by their ability of “salvation/liberation as the
realisation of a limitlessly better possibility”). In this manner, Hick
attempts to use concepts that can function in different traditions, al-
though he admits the terminology at times conveys features of spe-
cific traditions, especially his own. He asserts that this is unavoid-
able since any theory has to take its point of departure from one’s
own tradition as long as there is nothing like a tradition-neutral reli-
gious vocabulary at hand.
Hick does not attempt to find a common core underlying the various
traditions. He only speaks of a “family resemblance”, a continuity,
which may be located at the interface between “the Real” and “our
1 My translation into English of a citation from Otto Krogseth, ‘Compare necesse
est – komparative metoder i sosial- og humanvitenskapene’, Veiledningsseminar i
teologi/kristendomskunnskap: Komparative metoder i teologi og religionsvitenskap,
Samarbeidsutvalg for forskerutdanning i teologi/kristendomskunnskap,
Granavolden 19.-22. april 1989, p. 7.
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religious mentalities and cultures”. As one can recognise, Hick holds
to a cognitive understanding of religions, what he calls a “religious
but not confessional interpretation of religion in its plurality of forms”.
What about the differences between religious traditions, then? Are they
real or only apparent? On the one hand, Hick maintains that the tradi-
tions are “different and independently authentic spheres of revelation
and salvation”. On the other hand, however, he tries to avoid contra-
dictions between them. The solution seems to be the notion of “epistemic
distance”. Hick discerns, in a Kantian way, between “the Real” an sich
and “the Real as humanly perceived”. This makes it possible to keep
the Real as the source of every perception while making it possible to
maintain different views of what the Real is. The transcendent frame-
work of this conception also prevents any religious tradition from say-
ing the last word about the (ineffable) Real.
As the characterisations of the Real may vary legitimately, the “ad-
equate attitude” towards it may unite. As one might see, this funda-
mental dualism between expressions of experience and of essence is
Kantian. This division is a key to understanding Hick’s theory. Fur-
thermore, the pragmatic aspect, the “adequate attitude” towards the
Real, is developed by Hick as a soteriological criterion. Whereas phi-
losophy and theology in the end receive lower priority than salvation
and liberation do, ‘transformation’ from self-centredness to Reality-
centredness becomes a major feature, best observed by its moral fruits
(in the light of agape/karuna).
As a consequence of this emphasis, contradictions between religions
have to be perceived as apparent. As long as “love, compassion, self-
sacrificing concern for the good of others”, etc. follow from one or
another tradition, they serve the same function and purpose. How-
ever, Hick maintains on another level that some differences might be
real. If such is the case, they have to be assessed in an eschatological
test of validity. Doing this, Hick draws on a horizon of time to relieve
his theory of certain problems. This results in agnostic features on
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the secondary level of his theory. This is acceptable to him as long as
his focal point is preserved: the epistemological, ineffable ‘Real’, as
well as the morally specified agency adequate to the reality of the
Real, within a diversity of traditions. Thus, the differences become
parallel and ‘compatible’ to the superior hypothesis, the Real.
Orientational pluralism: S. Mark Heim
One of the most pronounced criticisms of the pluralists (i.e. Hick, W.
C. Smith and P. F. Knitter) has been delivered by S. Mark Heim of
Andover Newton Theological Seminary. His aim is to go beyond both
exclusivism and pluralism by pluralising the aims of the religions
(cf. the title of his book: Salvations).
What Heim rejects most emphatically in the pluralists is their “com-
fortable and unitary reference point” which places them together
with the exclusivists. The problem with these unitary premises is
twofold. Firstly, is it possible to establish a unitary perspective as a
metaperspective apart from the diverse perspectives of the religions?
As Heim sees it, every metaperspective is itself a particular per-
spective among others. There is nothing like a “God’s eye” at hand
for the assessment of the validity of different religions. Secondly,
in a pluralist approach no single perspective is understood to be
normative. Since they merely relate to another kind of truth, none
of the perspectives is taken seriously according to its own truth-
claims. In addition, the common aims which the pluralists set up
independent of the various traditions do not really have an actual
function within any of them. Thus, these aims are external to what
the believers conceive as truth.
Heim offers “a more pluralistic hypothesis” which relies heavily on
the logical and personal philosophy of Nicholas Rescher. Heims finds
this philosophy applicable also to religious issues. Rescher labels his
approach “orientational pluralism” and takes the following premises
as axioms:
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1. Argument and inquiry can only operate from a particular per-
spective.
2. There is a great irreducible plurality of perspectives (“exclu-
sion principle”).
3. One’s own perspective will appear as the best one. One cannot
act on two different orientations. In the end we are all
inclusivists.
According to this understanding, there is nothing like a neutral orien-
tation or perspective. Quite the contrary, what constitutes an orienta-
tion is a deliberate choice of which values should get preference over
others as a means of solving the problem of inconsistency by com-
peting claims/values.
As Mark Heim brings Rescher’s theory into the field of the theology
of religions, a crucial issue is what kind of theoretical status different
pluralistic theories should be given. According to Heim, these theo-
ries are nothing but “an argument over what kind of argument we are
having”. In other words, the pluralists turn out to be exactly what
they aim to explain. Thus, the pluralist theories become both first
and second order language. Developing a theory about religious tra-
ditions entails making a tradition yourself.
Heim seeks to combine the premise that “religious truth is one” and
that “religious aims and fulfilments are various”. By adopting this
“pluralistic inclusivism”, as Heim calls his position, he attempts to
avoid both polytheism and a “God’s-eye view”. At the same time, he
tries to limit the possibility of developing theories about religions. It
seems that Heim combines the above premises by means of a dialec-
tic integration. Whereas the dialectical refers to the mutual process
of different perspectives having an impact on each other, the integra-
tive refers to the process of transformation and expansion of one’s
own perspective at the expense of another. In this respect, Heim as-
serts that the Christian perspective, understood as a Trinitarian theol-
ogy of religions (cf. G. D’Costa and R. Panikkar), will come out as
superior to that of other traditions (cf. J. Cobb).
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Discussion
In a comparison of the theories of Hick and Heim, I find it relevant to
focus on two matters:
a) the relationship between what I call perspective and
metaperspective, and
b) the interpretation of the differences between diverse religious
expressions and traditions. In this manner I aim to discuss the
epistemological status of the theories of religious plurality and
to clarify the ontological features of the theories.
Perspective and metaperspective: the epistemological status of the
theories
Both Hick and Heim give room for their own particular perspectives
on religious plurality. This is the case when Hick says that participa-
tion within a specific religious tradition is a prerequisite for acting
adequately towards the Ultimate reality. As previously shown, this
room for plurality is established on the basis of a Kantian epistemol-
ogy (everybody may recognise something of the Real, because no-
body knows everything). Heim argues sharply against any
metaperspective. One may very well comment on other religions, he
says, but that remains entirely a religious statement. In other words
every theory of religion(s) is religious.
The crucial question is to what extent it is possible to develop theo-
ries about more religions simultaneously. As I see it, Heim misinter-
prets Hick to a certain degree. What Heim rules out is the possibility
within religious traditions of making theories with general aims. If
this is indeed possible, then these theories will certainly break out of
any strict particular room. It seems that Heim identifies perspective
and particularism in an unfortunate way. Evidence for this critique of
Heim is the fact that he himself develops a theory of other religions
than his own.
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What do the differences signify? Ontological features.
Hick discerns between different kinds of differences. There are ap-
parent and real differences according to his double division between
core (cognitive expressions) and periphery (mythology, e.g. the
Nicene-Chalcedonian Christology), and between time and the
eschaton. Consequently, plurality is maintained as a general condi-
tion of human recognition, at the same time as the noumenal reality
becomes an eschatological judge of contradicting statements about
the unitary Reality. Persuasive or not, this is in the least an abstract
and hypothetical strategy.
Heim perceives the differences as real, and any point of convergence
is excluded. On the other hand, any religious tradition contains the
possibility of salvation, or anything similar to it. If the fulfilments in
time come true, they will do so on different premises. At the same
time reality is one, according to Heim. His leitmotif is ‘competition’.
Why so? According to Heim, there is no external guarantee for his
view. It is only an expression of his Christian faith, and there might
be other true perspectives conceiving the same reality at the same
time. Thus, exclusiveness is consolidated by a humble attitude to other
perspectives, despite their being competitive ones. Heim’s idea of
competition is worth following up. The criteria are scarcely devel-
oped by him, and such bold questions as what it means to strengthen/
weaken a perspective in competition with another perspective are
left unanswered.
Lastly, the theories of both Hick and Heim have unitary features.
This is a fundamental part of Hick’s conceptional system, whereas it
is only implicit, and not at all acknowledged, by Heim. It seems,
therefore, difficult to establish pluralistic theories about religious plu-
rality apart from a unitary frame of interpretation. How one subse-
quently escapes relativism is related to the connection between unity
and diversity. This is conceived as morally and epistemologically
dualistic by Hick and in terms of competition by Heim.
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Contemplation and Dialogue:
Zen Buddhism and Catholic Monasticism
Aasulv Lande
Katrin Åmell. Contemplation et dialogue: Quelques examples de dia-
logue entre spiritualités aprés le concile Vatican II. Studia Missionalia
Upsaliensia, LXX. Uppsala: Swedish Institute of Missionary Research,
1998. 248 pp.
The climax of religious life - sharing spiritual otherness
This book is a doctoral dissertation publicly defended at the Faculty
of Theology at Uppsala University on 15 May 1998. The following
is an edited English version of my commentary, originally delivered
in Norwegian, given in my capacity as external examiner on the oc-
casion. As indicated in her subtitle, Katrin Åmell intended to analyse
interreligious contemplative dialogue after the Second Vatican Coun-
cil. The book thus spans about thirty years of Roman Catholic expe-
rience. The writer, a Swedish Dominican sister, is deeply involved in
interreligious contemplative dialogue. A basic conviction permeates
her objective and expressly anthropological research: the climax of
religious life is sharing in spiritual otherness.
The book is divided in four main sections. After a general introduc-
tory Part I of thirty pages, the author outlines in Part II - seventy-five
pages - Roman Catholic monastic dialogue. A Japanese contribution
to this dialogue, Part III, is of equal length. In the concluding Part IV,
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comprising thirty-five pages, the writer summarises her interpreta-
tion of interreligious monastic dialogue. The Christian encounter with
Japanese Zen Buddhism is given special emphasis.
Study of contemplative dialogue - method and sources
The author explores interreligious contemplative dialogue. She de-
fines her subject in contrast to three other standard forms of
interreligious dialogue: “dialogue of life”; “dialogue on social con-
cern” and “theological dialogue”. Her “contemplative dialogue” is
furthermore studied on two levels, namely the Benedictine organisa-
tion for interreligious monastic dialogue, the Dialogue Interreligieux
Monastique (DIM) and a special concern of the DIM: Échange
spirituels est-ouest. The latter term designates the spiritual encounter
between Eastern and Western religions. Japanese Zen Buddhists are
the Eastern partners in this dialogue. A special study, in Part III, of
three Japanese practitioners of contemplative dialogue falls, how-
ever, outside the Benedictine DIM, as none of them is a Benedictine.
These three monks (a Carmelite, a Dominican and a Jesuit) have none-
theless contributed significantly to the DIM in the Échange spirituels
est-ouest.
The research is anthropologically oriented, and elements of asceti-
cism, cultural encounter and spirituality are included (p. 21). Phi-
losophy and theology of religion subsequently occupy a secondary
position in the study. Distinguishing her method from a wider ‘herme-
neutical’ perspective, the author emphasises (p. 22) the concrete,
monastic dialogue, “dialogue de moines”.
Official Roman Catholic texts constitute the main sources, although
the author at times draws on other material. For instance in Part II, on
the DIM-dialogue, external comments and analyses are consulted.
Certain sections are based on secondary sources. Research by Father
Jean Leclercq (1911-1993), pioneering contemporary Benedictine
monasterial missions is extensively used. His study of Benedictine
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monastic mission history (organised by the Secrétariat de l’Aide à
l’Implantation Monastique - hereafter called the AIM) is Katrin
Åmell’s main source for Part II. Written sources, including those on
the Japanese dialogue, are exclusively in Western languages (Ger-
man, French and English). Interviews and personal experiences in
Japan, including Zen meditation, enhance the authenticity of the au-
thor’s research.
A special selection of sources, comprising (1) primary literature and
(2) documents from events in the established contemplative dialogue,
needs special mention. It includes Interreligious Dialogue: The Offi-
cial Teaching of the Catholic Church (1963-95), published in 1997,
together with representative texts from Vatican II. An important docu-
ment published by the Secretariat for Non-Christians is Attitude de
l’Eglise catholique devant les croyants des autres religions, published
in 1984. Documents from the Federation of Asian Bishops’ Confer-
ences are also included in her selection. Important material is found
in the volume For All the Peoples of Asia. Federation of Asian Bish-
ops Conferences: Documents from 1970 to 1991. John Paul II’s en-
cyclicals Redemptoris missio and Dialogue et Annonce, both pub-
lished 1991 by the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue
(CPDI) and The Congregation for Evangelisation of the Peoples
(Congrégation pour l’évangélisation des peuples), provide important
source materials.
The multi-religious gathering of October 1986 in Assisi is assigned sig-
nificance as a “religious testimony and prophetic symbol” (p. 37). Like-
wise are recurring arrangements such as “The religious summit on Mount
Hiei” near Kyoto and “Westminster Interfaith” in London taken into
account. Initiatives by Popes John XXIII, Paul VI and John Paul II fur-
ther influence her interpretation of current interreligious dialogue.
The section is indeed well worked out and clear. From an enormous
amount of material Katrin Åmell has selected ecclesiastically repre-
sentative parts. Evidently she is interested in the dialogue at the ‘top’,
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as manifested in congresses, meetings and in papal documents. This
offers a representative and official picture of what is happening. I miss,
however, materials from varied personal perspectives, outsiders or in-
dividual theologians. Another consequence of this selectivity is a lack
of sources dealing with women’s perspectives and experiences.
Thirty years of Benedictine monastic dialogue (AIM)
The beginning of the AIM might be traced to initiatives at the Ben-
edictine Abbots’ Congress in Rome 1959 to establish a mission agency
within their order. At first it was conceived of as an agency of infor-
mation than administration (p. 51). Desires for new monasteries had
been brought up - from Africa, Asia, Latin America and Oceania.
Katrin Åmell points at the importance of the Bangkok congress 8-15
December 1968 to the AIM history in Asia. Honoured by the pres-
ence of distinguished Thai Buddhists led by the Patriarch Phra
Ariavong Sankarat, this congress comprised a wide, international rep-
resentation of religious personalities. Three major concerns charac-
terised the 1968-congress: the de-Hellenisation of Christianity,
interreligious monastic dialogue and the problem of poverty. Tho-
mas Merton offered before and during this congress valuable contri-
butions regarding the intercultural dialogue East - West. His presen-
tation of “Marxism in monastic perspective” received serious atten-
tion. Due to the tragic accident which terminated his life during the
congress, his contributions made a special impact on the participants.
Five years later, 14-22 October 1973, a second congress was held in
Bangalore, India. This meeting also gathered representative interna-
tional and distinguished Buddhist participation. The famous agency
for Buddhist mission to the West, the Maha Bodhi Society, for exam-
ple, was represented. The congress followed up a central concern ex-
pressed in Bangkok: the experience of God and monastic social re-
sponsibility. The connection between monastic life and social concern
was stressed accordingly (p. 71). Father Aloysius Pieris from Sri Lanka
emerged at this congress as an active and influential personality. The
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problem of poverty remained a major subject and was selected as the
main theme at the third pan-Asian AIM congress 1980 in Kandy, Sri
Lanka. At this third meeting the AIM further reflected on the condi-
tions of contemplatively in an Asian socio-economic context.
Having presented the monastic dialogue at these congresses, Katrin
Åmell introduces the agency named the Dialogue Interreligieux
Monastique, or the DIM, one of two commissions for dialogue or-
ganised within the AIM in 1978. Corresponding to the North Ameri-
can Board for East-West Dialogue (the NABEWD), the DIM was
established to facilitate dialogue between Christian and non-Chris-
tian monasticism in other parts of the world. The DIM will promote
awareness of non-Christian male and female monastic traditions and
works to open a space within the Church for dialogue with such tra-
ditions. The DIM also aims at establishing healthy and relevant rela-
tionships between Christian and non-Christian monastic centres.
As a part of the DIM Katrin Åmell introduces ESEO (Les Échanges
spirituels est-ouest). This particular dialogue is seen in a broad per-
spective, including purpose, programme and wider dynamics. It is
moreover described in terms of characteristics and details from its ini-
tiation in 1979 and by exchanges, generally occurring every four years.
The contemplative dialogue of the DIM is, however, controversial.
Lately, sceptical voices have surfaced. A critical letter from Joseph
Cardinal Ratzinger in 1989 on the DIM dialogue provoked debate.
This letter especially annoyed and irritated Asian Catholics, due to
its author’s alleged lack of comprehension of the dialogue of Asian
Churches (p. 104). In 1991, Francis Cardinal Arinze, president of the
Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue, called for a broad evalu-
ation of the DIM programme. In 1993 responses by a variety of groups
appeared. The role of dialogue for discovering one’s true identity (p.
112) and the importance of universality, incarnation and spirituality
(intériorité) were reasons put forth in support of the DIM programme.
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The above section brings to our attention the dialogue organised within
the Benedictine order. Largely based on a study by Catholic historian
Jean Leclerck, it emphasises organisation and hierarchy. Katrin Åmell
has not focused on the elements of conflict. Particularly I think of the
discussion initiated by Cardinal Ratzinger and the subsequent evalu-
ation of the DIM programme. Although the letter by Cardinal Arinze
is quoted in extenso the even more decisive and controversial letter
by Cardinal Ratzinger is only referred to. Why not allow for more
space on the statements of Cardinal Ratzinger and the critical argu-
ment? Such a presentation would in my opinion enhance the schol-
arly quality of the dissertation at this point.
Contemplative dialogue promotes Christian
inculturation in Japan
Katrin Åmell here proceeds from her study of contemplative dia-
logue in the Benedictine organisation to an analysis of Catholic reli-
gious dialogue in Japan at large. From a historical outline of Catholic
history in Tokugawa Japan she leads up to Zen meditation in current
practice. In this wide context the contemplative dialogue includes
the Protestant-Catholic Zen Christian Colloquium from 1967, praxis
at various centres for Catholic Zen, and the Benedictine project ESEO
from 1979. The “religious summit” under Tendai hospitality at Mount
Hiei contains tenets from the meeting in Assisi 1986 and is also seen
as “contemplative dialogue”.
More important, however, is her presentation of three Japanese monks
presently in their seventies: the Dominican Oshida Shigeto (b. 1922),
the Carmelite Okumura Ichiro (b. 1923) and the Jesuit Kadowaki
Kakichi (b. 1926). Oshida Shigeto reflects deeply on his Japanese
identity. Åmell focuses on his concept of zenna which transcends
zazen and might be rendered “contemplative life”. In her considera-
tion of Oshida Katrin, Åmell stresses inculturation, where the com-
mon life in the community Takamori Soan is central. Takamori ap-
pears as a Japanese illustration of Christian authenticity (p. 184).
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Okumura Ichiro provides a characteristic Christocentric theology.
Christ is a reality, he says, and refers to the Christian fact, “le Fait
Christique” (p. 155). Okumura holds that Christ deepens the East-
West encounter. In the mystery of Christ the East of “night, moon,
the obscure, silence” (p. 157) joins hand with the Western “light, day,
sun and the word”. To Okumura the universal ‘Logos’ takes on dif-
ferent appearances in East and West. The “Word” of Western culture
becomes in the East the “Word without word”, “la Parole sans pa-
role” (p. 160). In the East it includes silence. Okumura is also deeply
concerned with inculturation.
Kadowaki Kakichi was awarded a doctorate in Rome for a disserta-
tion on Thomas Aquinas. He emphasises zazen and is concerned with
Christian inculturation in Japan. His work with Noh drama and other
aspects of traditional Japanese arts has generated renewal of Chris-
tian liturgy in Japan. To Katrin Åmell Kadowaki is a person who
deepens his faith by zazen through a particular method of meditation
(p. 166 f.) and by the use of koan (p. 171 f.). She moreover discovers
in Kadowaki a forward-looking person who combines Occidental and
Oriental perspectives. To him Christianity offers a capacity for Zen
meditation and also for justice and internationality (p. 174).
Katrin Åmell underscores in a summary how these three theologians,
by different approaches and accents, carry a common concern for
Christian inculturation in Japan. They integrate Japanese Zen in Chris-
tianity according to the ways of three different monastic orders. She
finds their contribution to contemplative dialogue comparable to con-
tributions in the Benedictine dialogue project.
A particular methodological problem appears in this section. Åmell
has explicitly claimed that she wanted to study the dialogue between
spiritualities on two levels (dialogue entre spiritualités, p. 20). One
of these is the DIM - a structured dialogue of the Benedictine order.
The other is the dialogue as East-West Exchange (ESEO), a part of
the DIM activity. Part of the problem is the non-Benedictine identity
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of the Japanese theologians. Thus they do not formally fall inside the
framework of Katrin Åmell’s research. To this must be added an-
other observation: the main perspective of these theologians appears
to be ‘inculturation’. Could then their experience be seen as an
interreligious dialogue on contemplation? Is it not rather an experi-
ence of mission to Japan? Thus, not only are the Benedictine frames
blurred but so is the author’s focus on contemplative dialogue. How
relevant is the Japanese contemplative experience if it is basically a
tool to root the Gospel in Japan?
Contemplation - inculturation and interreligious
monastic experience
Katrin Åmell understands ‘contemplation’ on three levels: philosophi-
cal, phenomenological and theological - borrowing terminology from
William Johnston. She relates the core of her study to the second of
these levels and makes interesting observations about contemplative
experience. Buddhists, she concludes, interpret their experiences in
an non-personal, cosmic frame of reference. Christians, on the other
hand, relate their experience to God and the incarnate Jesus Christ.
She finds that Benedictines in zazen have gained important insights
into their own faith, especially regarding incarnation.
She works with the concept of “true inculturation” and concludes that
“respect for the other” is an important element of it. With Pedro Arrupe
she sees inculturation as an ongoing incarnation of Christian life and
message in a concrete cultural area. By the process transformation takes
place also in the receiving culture. The role of Zen is especially ob-
served and so is Japanese theologians’ concern with Japanese identity.
Interreligious dialogue is seen by Katrin Åmell as a “common search
for the absolute” (p. 217). Thus it is a pilgrimage together with repre-
sentatives of Buddhism. It is a tool which, however, contains a spe-
cific and independent value. This dialogue is characterised by silence
and listening. It has an authentic, spiritual character and transcends
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verbal conversation. Åmell argues that the monastic experience is a
key concept in the meeting with the spiritual traditions of Asia (p.
221 f.) and also in the encounter with poverty. Monasticism opens up
the encounter of Occident and Orient - where “Love meets wisdom”,
to quote the title of a book by Aloysius Pieris. Implying a missionary
perspective, she admits that dialogue contains weak and strong ele-
ments where the non-verbal and immeasurable dimensions prove
advantageous or disadvantageous. The contemplative dialogue is in
any case part of a wider dialogue where conceptual and theoretical
dimensions are included.
Katrin Åmell underscores the central importance of monastic
interreligious encounter for all interreligious dialogue. She refers to
P. F. Bethune, who holds that the dialogue in the room of the heart is
the key to all doors of dialogue (p. 228). The dialogue also leads to
new theological insights: lex orandi, lex credendi. Actually, the con-
templative dialogue provides a deep fellowship in the worldwide
search for truth “une communion en profondeur et repose sur la quête
universelle de l’Absolu”.
An objectivistic method prevents Katrin Åmell from stating clearly
that she considers contemplative dialogue to be the most important
of the four types of interreligious dialogue described above. An as-
pect of her conviction is the alleged universality of contemplative
dialogue (see p. 226). As shown above the writer also regards the
search for truth to be a universal element in the contemplative dia-
logue. To this can be added the statement lex orandi lex credendi
which implies that theological creativity is born of contemplative-
ness. My question is: Does after all the contemplative dialogue oc-
cupy so universal a role?
Alternatively, the “dialogue of life” spontaneously recommends it-
self as universal to a larger degree than the “contemplative dialogue”.
The former implies people from various classes and functions in so-
ciety. It includes poor as well as rich people and spans cultures and
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regions worldwide. Contrary to this, the contemplative dialogue is
largely pursued by a monastic elite. Does not the specialisation of
monasticism limit its universal perspective? Should not what Carl F.
Hallencreutz with a book title termed Dialogue in Community after
all be awarded a higher rank in the hierarchy of dialogues?
Another question is whether Åmell exaggerates the independent role
of dialogue in Roman Catholic missiology. In other words, does dia-
logue to Roman Catholic theologians provide a value on its own or is
it rather a part of proclamation? My question is already nurtured by
the author’s conception of dialogue as a tool to search for “l’Absolu”
(pp. 225 ff.). Does the concept of l’Absolu allow for an independent
dialogue? Is it not rather a term defined and determined by a Chris-
tian concept of God? How ‘open’ then is the Roman Catholic Church?
I admire the existence of a spirit of genuine openness within Roman
Catholicism, convincingly illustrated by the aggiornamento during
and immediately after Vatican II. During this period dialogue experi-
enced an unparalleled role within classical Christianity, and Catholic
doctrines were brought into fresh reconsideration from interreligious
and ecumenical angles. Giant Christianity opened her windows and
removed her barriers. The Roman Church apparently had initiated a
process of serious listening. Later developments have revealed that it
mainly was so, thereby admitting a certain suspicion. Official Catho-
lic positions remained Church-centred, and traditional monopolist
Roman thought was largely consolidated. Interreligious concerns
shared a similar fate. According to prevailing thinking in Roman
Catholicism, dialogue with non-Christian religions should be subor-
dinated to the proclamation of Christianity.
The following is an example from the Extraordinary Synod of Bish-
ops, Rome December 8th 1985. The Second Vatican Council affirmed
that the Catholic Church denies nothing of what is holy in non-Chris-
tian religions. Indeed, it exhorted Catholics to recognise, preserve and
promote all the good spiritual, moral, and socio-cultural values they
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find in their midst. All of this was to be done with prudence and char-
ity, through dialogue and collaboration with the faithful of other reli-
gions, giving testimony to the Christian faith and life (Nostra Aetate,
2). The Council also affirmed that God does not deny the possibility of
salvation to anyone of goodwill (Lumen Gentium 16) The concrete
possibilities of dialogue in the various regions depend on many con-
crete circumstances. All of this is also true for dialogue with non-be-
lievers. Dialogue must not be opposed to mission. Authentic dialogue
tends to bring the human person to open up and communicate his
interiority to the one with whom he is speaking. Moreover, all Chris-
tians have received from Christ the mission to make all people disci-
ples of Christ (Mt 28:18) In this sense God can use the dialogue be-
tween Christians and non-Christians and between Christians and un-
believers as a pathway for communicating the fullness of grace.
To the Ends of the Earth, a document published by American Roman
Catholic bishops in 1986, lends support to a similar interpretation. In
paragraph 40 of this document the bishops state that dialogue shall
be a part of all mission. Dialogue is the norm as well as the necessary
manner of every form of Christian mission. A mission not permeated
by the spirit of dialogue would go against the demands of true hu-
manity and against the teachings of the Gospel. Although dialogue is
a vital characteristic of mission, it is not the goal of missionary proc-
lamation. The document To the Ends of the Earth, continues and sup-
ports the interpretation by the Secretariat for Non-Christians: “Ac-
cording to the Second Vatican Council missionary proclamation has
conversion as its goal: ‘that non-Christians be freely converted to the
Lord under the action of the Holy Spirit who opens their hearts so
that they may adhere to Him’ (Ad Gentes 13).”
Similarly the pontifical encyclical Redemptoris Missio from 7 De-
cember 1990 concludes in paragraph 55 that “Dialogue should be
conducted and implemented with the conviction that the Church is
the ordinary means of salvation and that she alone possesses the full-
ness of the means of salvation.”
Zen Buddhism and Catholic Monasticism
310
In 1991 the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue together with
the Congregation for the Evangelisation of Peoples published the docu-
ment Dialogue and Proclamation. This work also treats dialogue, proc-
lamation and their interrelation. In this document the dialogue is fre-
quently emphasised as a function with its own and independent value.
Referring to the four types of dialogue, the conduct of dialogue itself is
given a sordid and sensitive treatment (paragraph 47):
Dialogue requires on the part of the Christian as well as of the fol-
lowers of other traditions, a balanced attitude. They should be nei-
ther ingenuous nor overly critical, but open and receptive. Unself-
ishness and impartiality, acceptance of differences and of possible
contradictions, have already been mentioned. The will to engage to-
gether in commitment to the truth and the readiness to allow oneself
to be transformed by the encounter are other dispositions required.
Although dialogue is treated in the first part of the document, the
proclamation of Jesus Christ has primary emphasis. Proclamation is
biblically and dogmatically based, particularly in relation to the power
and presence of the Holy Spirit. The document underlines the ur-
gency of the Christ proclamation, which should take place in humil-
ity, respectfully and conscious of inculturation and dialogue. In para-
graph 77 the document states:
Interreligious dialogue and proclamation, though not on the same
level are both authentic elements of the Church’s evangelising mis-
sion. Both are legitimate and necessary. They are intimately related
but not interchangeable: true interreligious dialogue on the part of
the Christian supposes the desire to make Jesus Christ better known,
recognised and loved, proclaiming Jesus Christ is to be carried out
in the Gospel spirit of dialogue. The two activities remain distinct
but, as experience shows, one and the same local Church, one and
the same person can be diversely engaged in both.
In the last part of the document the priority of the testimony to Jesus
Christ has priority. All Christians are called to partake in the mission
of the Church in these two ways. But the awareness that dialogue is
not be the total mission is important, as the documents states. Dia-
logue is oriented towards proclamation
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in so far as the dynamic process of the Church’s evangelising mis-
sion reaches in its climaxes and its fullness. As they engage in dia-
logue in interreligious dialogue they will discover the ‘seeds of the
Word’ sown in people’s hearts and in the religious traditions to which
they belong.... All both Christians and the followers of other reli-
gious traditions, are invited by God himself to enter into the mystery
of his patience, as human beings seek his light and truth. Only God
knows the times and stages of the fulfilment of this long human quest.
(Paragraph 82.)
Although the document clearly shows the priority of proclamation, it
also lends support to an independent role of dialogue within the total-
ity of Christian mission to the world.
Against this background I see some limited possibilities for a Roman
Catholic emphasis on open dialogue as promoted by Katrin Åmell. I
would wish, however, that she had clearly defined her own position
to the proclamation-centred view of dialogue which presently domi-
nates Roman Catholic theology. This might be done by giving space
to a broader consideration of attitudes towards dialogue in contem-
porary Roman Catholic thought.
Moreover, I have a question about the Åmell’s view of historical re-
search, and, implicitly her view of history. Her research is neither
based on a hypothesis nor is it structured around a clearly defined
theme. It might rather be described as a multilevel treatment of inter-
related phenomena which also are intertwined in history. However,
Katrin Åmell supports an idea of contemplation as the very basis of
interreligious dialogue. Could not this position have been explicitly
formulated and made the basis of a hypothesis illustrated and dem-
onstrated by history? Could such a method lift up and thus serve the
main concern of the writer? Might an even more exciting thesis and
exciting history writing then emerge?
I further question the view of history implicit in the selection of sources
and the scope of the present work. The dissertation conveys the im-
pression that history reflects a spiritual universe, structured around a
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universal truth of spiritual character. In this universe religiosity and
religious persons occupy central functions. I admit the value of this
presupposition - supported by the author’s orientation towards
l’Absolu, her research on contemplation and contemplative experi-
ence. But, I cannot suppress a question: are congresses and ecclesias-
tical structures vital for the interpretation of history, especially the
history of spiritualities? In this regard, what is the significance and
importance of Assisi, Bangkok, Bangalore and Kandy for spiritual
history? Is the history of contemplative spirituality borne by ecclesi-
astical structures, popes and prelates? Ought not the interreligious
dialogue of spiritualities – the dialogue based upon religious experi-
ence – rather be sought elsewhere?
Could one conceive a history of spirituality which transcends organi-
sational processes? Firstly, one might include processes of religious
history outside the Roman Catholic realm. That might include Prot-
estant dimensions as well as general religious history, in particular
that of Buddhism. The author also touches on secular dimensions of
history when contemplatives such as Thomas Merton and Aloysius
Pieris voice a concern for poverty. Even secular history is thus im-
portant when interpreting spirituality. Why not then apply a wider
framework of history?
In a wider historical context I believe that the interreligious dialogue
as a whole might be better grasped. Secularisation processes and
Christian attempts at responding by ‘dialogue’ might illustrate ad-
vantages of a multidimensional concept of history. It is evident that
religious dialogue with secularisation will benefit from a study of
religiosity and secularisation. The 1960s provide scenes with plenty
of illustrations of such developments. But one might step even fur-
ther into the past and consider the effects of the twentieth century
wars on religion. For East-West dialogue the experiences and trau-
mas of the Second World War in the Pacific and Asia should not be
underestimated. With regard to Japanese theology - a major concern
of the dissertation - the decisive importance of the war is beyond
Aasulv Lande
313
doubt. The experience of armed conflict between East and West might
particularly enlighten the recurring question of inculturalisation - es-
pecially since the three theologians treated all had deep war time
experiences. Two of them were in their twenties when the war against
Japan was brought to a sudden end by nuclear bombs dropped on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I wonder whether for instance Okumura’s
Theology of Silence might have an intrinsic relationship to traumatic
war experiences.
The critical questions which I have formulated do not in my view
detract from the overall solid impression which the thesis makes. A
broad and relevant body of material is interpreted by objective rea-
soning and sober methodology, and it is given a balanced presenta-
tion. It is indeed an enlightening work - courageously written and
well-formulated in readable French. Among the merits of the disser-
tation is its authenticity - an honest and thorough study of existential
material, approached with scholarly devotion and personal humility.
Most laudable in my view is the content as such. Contemporary Ro-
man Catholic contemplative dialogue is not to my knowledge pre-
sented to any comparative degree of comprehensiveness. In this re-
spect the work is unique - relating unknown stories and covering
voids on the interreligious map. The questions I have asked will hope-
fully be seen as pointers for extended research in the field. The work
is rare in its kind, a Nordic lighthouse radiating missiological schol-
arship of international quality and relevance. My hearty congratula-
tions to the author also extend to the milieux out of which the re-
search was born.
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Discussing the future of African nation states, Kenyan scholar Ali
Mazrui has suggested that instead of ‘secular’ we use the term ‘ecu-
menical’ when talking about multireligious societies governed by
pluralist ideologies, anchored in local value systems, and where the
constitutions are non-confessional. ‘Ecumenism’, a word with rich
connotations from the history of Christian Churches, implies friendly
co-operation across denominational borders on the basis of a plat-
form of common beliefs and/or values.1
1 From the Greek oikoumene, “the [whole] inhabited world”. The so-called ecu-
menical movement of the past century is an organised effort to bring different
Christian Churches and world communions closer together after centuries of sepa-
ration and division.
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For all intents and purposes, modern India can be defined as such an
ecumenical state, one in which secular ideologies Western-style can
hardly survive in the political arena unless they heed indigenous reli-
gious traditions. Yet the very concept of a pluralist, non-discrimina-
tory state is fraught with political difficulties, especially if articulate
minorities are perceived by majority persons to be privileged at their
expense. Thus, in 1986 L. K. Advani, assuming the presidency of the
Bharatiya Janata Party (commonly referred to as the BJP), declared:
“For many politicians and political parties secularism has become
only a euphemism for political appeasement of minority sections
which tend to vote en bloc”.2
The three books under review here deal with different aspects of this
“one nation/many cultures” model and its consequences for various
segments of contemporary Indian society. As we shall see, the au-
thors unwittingly converge in their proclaimed concern for the vic-
tims of oppressive practices, which originate in patriarchal – often
religiously legitimised – power structures. However, of the three only
Sheel deals in some depth with the complex issues of caste;
symptomatically she is also alone in using works by the recently de-
ceased M. N. Srinivas, who was the first Indian sociologist to realise
that caste loyalties could be used in electoral politics.3
The right to multiple identities
Within the span of less than two hundred pages, Gurpreet Mahajan
succeeds in bringing out (albeit in rather a theoretical manner) virtu-
ally all major polarisations which characterise India – or any other
multireligious democracy for that matter. One example is the tension
between a uniform legal code and a diversity of (religious) value
systems: is it possible to maintain both cultural pluralism and equal
rights for all individuals? And what about the political realities: how
2 P. S. Ghosh, BJP and the Evolution of Hindu Nationalism (New Delhi, 1999), p. 89.
3 See T. M. Madan, ‘M. N. Srinivas: the man and his work’ (The Hindu, 8 Decem-
ber 1999), 12.
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far must – and will! – the majority/host population go in terms of
compromise to make room for minorities/migrant communities? These
and related questions are precisely those which haunt any UN ses-
sion on human rights and deserve much more scholarly attention than
hitherto paid, and Mahajan’s contribution is commendable.
The title of the book is somewhat misleading, since the author de-
votes as much space to ideas and experiences from Western Europe
as to developments in India. Furthermore, adopting a historical ap-
proach, Mahajan has by and large restricted her study to the first half
of the twentieth century. Her focus is on public ideological discourse,
within which India’s constitution was written. She also offers analy-
ses of some early court cases regarding the interpretation and imple-
mentation of those articles in the constitution (and related state legis-
lation), which refer to the rights and legal status of minorities and
religious communities.
The author reminds us that Ambedkar and his colleagues used
“ascriptive social identities” to define minorities in India – religion,
language and caste – but when one takes a closer look at the relevant
articles of the constitution, the main concern appears to be the pro-
tection of cultural rights for religious communities. However, an over-
emphasis on inter-group equality may endanger the rights of vulner-
able individuals within those groups, says Mahajan: “The historical
context in which community rights were granted in India posed spe-
cific problems. Above all it disadvantaged women as a group and
neglected the issue of intra-group equality”.
This fundamental dilemma remains an underlying theme throughout
book, although gender issues do not shine through more than occa-
sionally. With unusual insight, Mahajan has observed how nations in
Western Europe try to handle this thorny issue: “When the [religious]
community is no longer an oppressive structure embodying inequali-
ties, the demand for preserving cultures and their practices has gained
considerable attention and legitimacy in these societies”. Mahajan’s
position seems to be that India is not yet there; in religious/cultural
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communities “conservative patriarchy and discrimination” still per-
sist, and “gender inequalities have remained unattended” under the
pressure of inter-communal conflicts.
Mahajan discusses the limited effects of state intervention – e.g. quo-
tas for ‘backward’ castes in education and jobs – and concludes that
it is doomed to failure as long as the target is individual persons rather
than social structures. The same is true, she contends, for the emanci-
pation of women. Thus Mahajan is no advocate for an exclusively
rights-based approach to problems of social discrimination: “Unre-
stricted exercise of individual rights could destroy indigenous cul-
tures and communities.” Instead, she argues for the right to multiple
identities and promotes Kymlicka’s idea of dual membership, mean-
ing that “people are owed respect as citizens as well as members of a
cultural community”.4 However, Mahajan notes the formidable diffi-
culties surrounding the very definition of ‘minorities’ in post-inde-
pendence India, where the language-based state borders have created
new majority/minority constellations, cutting across the old, religion-
based map, which, after all, once provided the rationale for Partition
Although Mahajan frequently discusses communalism – and, occa-
sionally, the plight of ‘untouchables’ – she does so in rather abstract
terms and evades a critical examination of hindutva movements. The
Arya and Brahmo Samajs are mentioned briefly, as are the Jains and
the Satsangis, as “sects and denominations” identified by the Supreme
Court as entitled to minority status separate from the (vaguely de-
fined) majority community of Hindus. There is no mention of the
RSS or related communitarian organisations when the author talks
about post-independence “mobilisation of citizens on the basis of
religion” for political purposes. Yet she observes that “the need to
separate religion from politics is the central motif of the secularist
perspective in India”, and notes, with K. N. Panikkar, that secular
democrats object to religious rituals being used as part of public func-
tions held under the auspices of the State.
4 See W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford 1991) and idem,
Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford 1995).
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The theology of separateness
Surprisingly, Gurpreet Mahajan all but neglects Indian Muslim per-
spectives on these issues. Indeed, the scant references to Islam in her
book indicate that she is not well acquainted with the subject, except-
ing a few legal controversies over the management regulations for a
waqf. Yet, as Arun Shourie has shown, the fatwas (authoritative opin-
ions) pronounced by contemporary Indian ‘ulama contain vital in-
formation about the tension between negation and integration, as per-
ceived by India’s largest religious minority and formulated, accord-
ing to Shourie, as an “ideology of separateness”.
Together with expert co-writers Shourie has gone through five major
Indian collections of fatwas given by Islamic scholars like Ahmad
Riza Khan, Mufti Kifayatullah, Mufti Abdur Rahim Qadri, by the
‘ulama of Dar al-Ulum and of influential movements such as Ahl-i-
Hadis and Ahl-i-Quran. What is the purpose of this ambitious enter-
prise in research journalism bordering on the academic? According
to the Introduction it is something both “useful and lofty”, namely to
help “free the Muslims from the thrall of the Ulema”, just as Chris-
tians were once “liberated from the thrall of the Church”. To achieve
this goal, the all too inhibited Muslim liberals of today must be en-
couraged to speak up and name their grievances.
However, Shourie’s book sends double messages which emerge from
his different agendas: religious politics and research journalism, re-
spectively, the latter clearly subservient to the former. The introduc-
tory section is outright polemic (like the concluding section) and pro-
vides an hermeneutic key for the detailed studies that make up the
bulk of this book (pp. 73-626). From the outset the writer tries to
show that because of their religion Muslims are – and must perforce
be – disloyal citizens of India.
First, in a historical sketch of Mahatma Gandhi’s relations with his
Muslim contemporaries, Shourie insinuates that Muslim leaders (es-
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pecially Muhammad and Shawkat Ali) were deceitful and opportunist
in their dealings with Gandhiji. Disregarding the fact that it was an
RSS member who killed the Mahatma, Shourie leaves his reader with
the impression that Gandhi was really a victim of betrayals by Mus-
lims he had trusted. Second, Shourie provides examples of internal
conflicts in the Muslim communities in India: a Sunni fatwa
anathemising the Shias, conservative ‘ulama rulings censoring liberal
Muslim intellectuals (for example, Nazir Nyazi and Zakir Hussein).
Third, adducing positive evidence from Ambedkar and nationalist
Muslims and negative evidence from the fatwas, he makes his case:
if Muslims obey their religious authorities, i.e. the ‘ulama, they can-
not live peacefully together with other communities within one na-
tion, nor can they even co-exist as a nation among other nations.
Who is the reader implied throughout Shourie’s text? At first sight it
seems to be the adversaries, namely all those intellectuals with whom
the writer strongly disagrees: “the liberal who happens to be a Hindu
... who has internalised sham-secularism and ... double standards”, or
the blinkered liberals like those of “the English-speaking press” or
the misguided “Marxist-secularist intellectuals”. Against the back-
ground of Shourie’s earlier attack on Christians, Missionaries in In-
dia5, one might have expected them to be included in the batch of
unenlightened groups he addresses. But this time – in a clever imple-
mentation of the divide-and-conquer strategy – Shourie avoids criti-
cising Christians, as he is well aware of the conflict-ridden history
and deep mistrust between Islam and the Church through the ages.
Probing a little deeper, however, we discern another implied reader,
less obvious but at least as important as the enemies in Shourie’s
discourse: the allies, those contemporary, post-modern Hindu intel-
lectuals of hindutva persuasion, who may profit greatly from the ar-
senal of anti-Islamic arguments that Shourie amasses.
5 For a Christian response, see V. Mangalwadi, Missionary conspiracy: Letters to a
Post-Modern Hindu (1996), reviewed by Y. Sikand in HMI Bulletin Vol. 17, 1
(1998), 107 f.
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For the benefit of all these audiences, Shourie intentionally “punctures
the image of Islam” as a religion of tolerance. For, unlike many con-
temporary Western Islamicists, Shourie believes that removing preju-
dices about Islam and showing its true face (as if there were only one!)
will inevitably provoke a critique of the Muslim establishment – rather
than offer pleasant surprises and motivation for interfaith dialogue.
Purporting to defend the encroached freedom of Muslim liberals,
Shourie has cloaked his two main accusations in the garment of an
intellectualist critique of the most reactionary segment of the Mus-
lim leadership in India. He finds them guilty of:
a) Separatism: the fundamental ideology of Islam, as presented
by the ‘ulama, is “totalitarian”, engenders “parastatal terror-
ism”, and “makes it well-nigh impossible for Muslims to live
peaceably in societies in which Muslims are just one of several
communities”.
b) Obscurantism: the ‘ulama are hopelessly out of touch with the
modern world, its sciences, its technologies, its world views.
By perpetuating outdated teachings in e.g. cosmology and hu-
man sciences, through authoritarian rote learning in their
madaris and colleges, conservative Islamic scholars cement the
backwardness of Indian Muslims.6
Echoing the regrettably few contemporary voices of Muslim self-
critique, Shourie quotes Muhammad Iqbal’s argument that the ‘ulama
in fact hold their community captive to memories of real or imagined
glories in such a way that any progress, any active participation in
modern society, becomes impossible for the believers. Instead, as
Shourie shows rather convincingly, Muslims are encouraged to de-
vote their mental energy and innate curiosity to ridiculous non-issues
such as “When I go to the toilet, must I sit facing Makka (i.e. the
qiblah)?” Far from showing any empathy, or making any attempt to
6 For a discussion on backwardness among Indian Muslims, see e.g. ‘Blame it on
illiteracy’ (The Hindu, 8 December 1999).
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understand the sincere devotion and simple piety that cause the ordi-
nary Muslim to worry about the minutiae of daily life, Shourie bran-
dishes his numerous extracts from fatwa collections as objects of
satire and contempt.
Public criticism by Muslims of the Islamic establishment – e.g. in
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan or Malaysia – is rare and amounts
to an act of great moral courage. Islamic institutions in Muslim ma-
jority countries often exercise power in oppressive ways, including
censorship, anathema (takfir) and forced exile, and the victims are
minority persons – e.g. Christians and Baha’is – as often as dissent-
ers within the Muslim majority community itself. In such societies,
protecting “God’s rights” (hisbah) is equated with defending the rights
of the majority. Those Muslim writers who venture to express dissent
do so at their own peril, as evidenced by the killing of Egyptian secu-
larist Farag Fouda and the forced exile of Sudanese Shari’a expert
Abdullahi an-Naim.
However, The World of Fatwas is a different story. Shourie repre-
sents a powerful Hindu majority which today dominates many of
India’s political decision-making bodies and legislative assemblies.
He was the BJP media guru during the 1999 election campaign and
was duly rewarded with a government post as state minister. The
religious community that comes under attack by Shourie are those
Muslims who opted for pluralist mother India rather than monolithic
Pakistan and who by consequence live as minorities must: at the mercy
of the majority population.
Shourie’s religio-political position is transparent:
For a brief moment it seemed that Ayodhya would spell a change.
On the one hand, the Muslim community was brought face to face
with the costs of the politics of Shahabuddin, Imam Bukhari and the
rest... On the other, the Muslim liberal was reminded that ... if the
community continued to follow obscurantist leaders, there would be
a reaction.
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In other words, the Muslims in Ayodhya and elsewhere had, by their
own actions or attitudes, incurred the justified wrath of militant Hindu
nationalists! Thus, Muslims on Indian soil had better beware, lest
they provoke another pogrom against themselves. This type of argu-
ment incorporates the strategy which Edward Said has labelled “blam-
ing the victim”, and has been used repeatedly to justify ethnic cleans-
ing. One wonders about the post-mortem feelings of the two Mus-
lims who anonymously helped Shourie wade through thousands of
pages of Shari’a technicalities. Is this venomous book really what
they envisaged?
Paying the price of hypergamy and gender
It is rather curious that Mahajan in her above-mentioned study of
collective and personal identities in twentieth century India does not
discuss the ongoing re-emergence of the caste system. Indeed, it may
be justified to talk about a renaissance of caste consciousness in ur-
ban societies of contemporary India. Among the professional classes
who have recently migrated to large cities, caste seems to have be-
come a substitute for roots. From its age-old function as a collective
identifier (or stigma), caste appears today to have evolved into a per-
sonal identity, more specific and more historically meaningful than
the repeatedly redefined geographical entities of ‘states’. By refer-
ring to caste origins you are compensating, as it were, for your
uprootedness, for breaking with your traditional social milieu and,
above all, for the absence of your extended family.
Ranjana Sheel touches upon these modern phenomena in her inci-
sive study (originally a doctoral dissertation) of the political economy
of dowry. She adduces a wealth of evidence to prove that precisely
the desire to climb the social ladder is a major factor behind the per-
version of the dowry system. In pre-colonial times hypergamy actu-
ally made change of caste possible, but British rule froze the old caste
hierarchy. Upward social mobility continued but was reinterpreted in
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educational and economical terms, whereas caste appeared to recede
into the background.
As Sheel shows, however, the present scourge of exorbitant dowry
demands is partly the result of ‘brahminisation’ among ambitious
lower caste people. The laws of Manu prescribed four forms of mar-
riage for upper caste people and four other forms for the lower castes.
In the course of social advancement, families from the lower castes
abandoned their traditional bride-price types of marriage and opted
for the dowry-based Brahma form. (In view of Mahajan’s and
Shourie’s studies on cultural and religious identities, one should ob-
serve that we are talking here of a cross-cultural and cross-denomi-
national phenomenon: dowry as a life-long extortion is a contempo-
rary experience, shared by Hindu, Christian and Muslim parents alike.)
Historically, Sheel contends, dowry can be understood as “arising
from both compensation to a girl in lieu of the full right of inherit-
ance and from hypergamy”, to achieve a desired social status (p. 27).
She explicates the connotations of the many Sanskrit terms involved:
dakshina, kanyadana, daheej, stridhana, the last of which seems to
dominate today, although experts are divided over its historical mean-
ing and proper interpretation: was stridhana originally a voluntary
gift in response to the bride-price (kanyashulka) paid by the groom’s
family? Or is it better described as “the earliest recognised form of
women’s property”?
As the title of Sheel’s book indicates, she looks primarily at the eco-
nomic aspects of marital customs in India but makes it very clear that
religious and other cultural dynamics come into play. Even today,
she remarks, marriage is considered “a socio-religious sacrament” to
be performed at any cost to preserve family honour. As marriage has
become a social venture, dowry has deteriorated into a
destructive and monstrous practice [which] has caused many young
girls to commit suicide in order to alleviate their parents’ misery.
This custom has so reduced women’s status that many innocent girls
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are put to death at birth and ... many are married to old men ... having
numerous wives.
In addition, there is the barbarity of burning young brides to death
within the “safe haven” of her husband’s home.
Sheel surmises that this development reflects a deterioration of wom-
en’s status in modern India: “The history of the growth of dowry is
also the history of exclusion of women from the process of produc-
tion”. Another factor is the flagrant lack of commitment to women’s
emancipation that flawed the movement for national independence.
Although there was widespread awareness of these dire consequences
of the dowry system among women’s groups on the regional level
already in the 1920s, the struggle for India’s independence domi-
nated the national arena, and gender issues were largely neglected.
As Sheel reminds us, many of the male social reformers were openly
criticised for not only disregarding women’s problems but actually
contributing to their perpetuation.
Even though women’s organisations began to wage war against dowry
on the national level during the 1970s, they have as yet hardly left
any footprints in legal texts. Sheel even talks about a “collusion be-
tween the state and the familial patriarchy” and claims that present
legislation (e.g. the Hindu code) has reinstituted rather than abol-
ished the linkage between women’s property rights and their mar-
riage. The effect is that women remain extremely vulnerable in case
of divorce or widowhood and continue to be financially dependent
on male family members. Sheel concludes: “The continued recogni-
tion of stridhana as an essential part of marriage and a woman’s well-
being and support … perpetuates the patriarchal ideology”.
To sum up: we encounter in these three books three different analyses
of the causes of social and communal tensions in India today. The weaker
party or the victimised group is identified by Mahajan as the vulner-
able individuals (especially women) within minority groups, by Shourie
as the liberal Muslim intellectuals and by Sheel as those women who
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are excluded from the means of production. In all three cases the domi-
nant, oppressive group is depicted as dominated by men with a patriar-
chal mentality, and it is significant that the two female writers recog-
nise and articulate this, whereas Shourie does not.
Jan Henningsson
